19th Annual Environmental Law Institute by Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Continuing Legal Education Materials Kentucky Legal History
11-2003
19th Annual Environmental Law Institute
Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/uky_cle
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Kentucky Legal History at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Continuing
Legal Education Materials by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Repository Citation
Office of Continuing Legal Education at the University of Kentucky College of Law, "19th Annual Environmental Law Institute"
(2003). Continuing Legal Education Materials. 58.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/uky_cle/58
19th Annual
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
INSTITUTE
November 2003

19th Annual
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
INSTITUTE
November 2003
Presented by
OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW
FROM THE LIBRARY OF:
Written materials and oral presentations offered through the University of Kentucky College of Law Office of
Continuing Legal Education (UKICLE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintaining their professional compe-
tence. The Office ofContinuing Legal Education and its volunteer speakers and writers are not rendering legal
or other professional services by their participation in continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others
using information obtained from UK/CLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current
sources of authority to properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents
contained in our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the profes-
sional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether a particular form
or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is believed to be accurate, but is not
warranted to be so. These written materials and the comments ofspeakers in presentation ofthese materials may
contain expressions of opinion which do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal
Education, the University of Kentucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other governmental authorities.
UK/CLE strives to make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-spe-
cific references may remain where it would otherwise be awkward or unclear. It should be understood that in
such references the female includes the male, and vice-versa.
Copyright 2003 by the University of Kentucky College of Law,
Office of Continuing Legal Education.
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States ofAmerica
ABOUT ...
__UK _
CLE
The University ofKentucky College ofLaw, Office ofContinuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) was organized in 1973
as the first permanently staffed, full time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth ofKentucky. It endures with
the threefold purpose: 1) to assist lawyers in keeping abreast ofchanges in the law; 2) to develop and sustain practical lawyering
skills; and 3) to maintain a high degre~ of professionalism in the practice of law. Revenues from seminar registrations and
publication sales allow the Office to operate as a separately budgeted, self-supporting program ofthe College. No tax dollars
or public funds are used in the operation of UK/CLE.
Seminars
UK/CLE provides a variety of convenient, practical seminars to satisfy the continuing legal education needs of
lawyers. Seminars range from half-day programs in selected areas to in-depth programs extending over several days. While
most seminars are conducted at the College of Law in Lexington, UK/CLE has a long-standing statewide commitment. Since
its first year ofoperation, beginning with a criminal law seminar in Madisonville, Kentucky, the Office has continued to bring
high-quality continuing legal education to attorneys in every region of Kentucky.
Publications
Each seminar is accompanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound course materials are
offered for sale following seminars and are consistently regarded as valuable, affordable references for lawyers.
Since 1987, UK/CLE has produced a series ofPractice Handbooks and Monographs. Each Practice Handbook is an
extensively referenced, fully indexed practice guide consisting ofseparately authored chapters, allowing for the comprehensive
coverage ofa distinct body oflaw. Their format permits updating through supplements and revised indexes. Each Monograph
is a concisely written practice guide, often prepared by a single author, designed to cover a topic of narrower scope than the
Handbooks. They are convenient references on topics often not treated elsewhere.
Professional Management
UK/CLE serves the needs of the bar from its offices on the University of Kentucky campus in Lexington. Its staff
manages course registrations, publication planning and editing, publication sales, seminar and publication marketing,
publication composition and printing, and seminar content planning, as well as budgeting, accounting and financial reporting.
As an "income based" program, UK/CLE's seminar tuitions and publication sales are budgeted to generate sufficient revenues
for self support.
Commitmentto Quality and Creativity
UK/CLE is a member of the Association for Continuing Legal Education (ACLE). As such, UK/ CLE subscribes to
the ACLE Standards in Continuing Legal Education; and the Standards ofFair Conduct and Voluntary Cooperation administered
under the auspices ofthe American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education.
Throughout its existence UK/CLE has been actively involved in the activities and services provided by ACLE. UK/CLE's
association with national and international CLE professionals has afforded it the opportunity to continually reassess instructional
methods, quality in publications, and effective means of delivering CLE services at consistently high levels of creativity and
quality.
An Integral Part of the Legal Profession's Tradition of Service
An enormous debt is owed to the judges, law professors, and practitioners who generously donate their time and talent
to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience are the fundamental ingredients for our seminars and
publications. Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication to a distinguished profession, high quality
continuing legal education would not exist.
As a non-profit organization, UK/CLE relies upon the traditional spirit ofservice to the profession that attorneys have
so long demonstrated. We are constantly striving to increase attorney involvement in the continuing education process. Ifyou
would like to participate as a volunteer speaker or writer, please contact us and indicate your areas of interest and .experience.
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
COLLEGE OF LAW
OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
Suite 260 Law Building
Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0048
Phone
(859) 257-2921 or
(859) 257-CLEI
Facsimile
(859) 323-9790
Website
www.uky.edu/LAW/CLE
PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY:
DEAN, COLLEGE OF LAW:
DIRECTOR OF UK/CLE:
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF UK/CLE:
ADMINISTRATIVEIBUSINESS MANAGER:
EDITORIAL/MARKETING MANAGER:
REGISTRARS/STUDENT ASSOCIATES:
Lee T. Todd, Jr.
Allan W. Vestal
Kevin P. Bucknam
Timothy S. Chase
Melinda Rawlings
William G. Nims
Dennis Flynn
Brian Powers
Joseph A. MacLaren
Heather H. Wyrick
UKICLE: A SELF-SUPPORTING ENTITY
The University of Kentucky Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK!
CLE) is an income-based office of the University of Kentucky College of
Law. As such, it is separately budgeted and financially self-supporting. UK!
CLE operations are similar to not-for-profit organizations, paying all direct
expenses, salaries and overhead solely from revenues. No public funds or
tax dollars are allocated to its budget. Revenues are obtained from registrant
enrollment fees and the sale of publications. Our sole function is to provide
professional development services. In the event surplus funds become avail-
able, they are utilized to offset deficits or retained in our budget to improve
the quality and variety of services we provide.
19th Annual
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE
PLANNING COMMITTEE
Lloyd R. Cress, Jr. -Co-Chair
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC
Frankfort, Kentucky
Richard W. Bertelson III
Kentucky Cabinet for
Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection
Frankfort, Kentucky
Eric A. Braun
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Kevin P. Bucknam
Director, UK/CLE
Lexington, Kentucky
Dennis J. Conniff
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Louisville, Kentucky
w. Blaine Early, III - Co-Chair
Stites & Harbison PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Barbara A. Foster
Kentucky Cabinet for
Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection
Frankfort, Kentucky
Laura D. Keller
Stites & Harbison PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Dan Risch
Legislative Research Commission
Frankfort, Kentucky
David A. Smart
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs LLP
Lexington, Kentucky
19TH ANNUAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE & CASE LAW UPDATE: 2002-2003 SECTION A
Robin J. Morecroft
ETHICAL CONCERNS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYER:
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTING .. SECTION B
Amy D. Cubbage
DIVISION OF WATER TRIENNIAL REVIEW OF
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS SECTION C
Lloyd R. Cress
BANKRUPTCY ISSUES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYERS SECTION D
Claude R. Bowles, Jr.
W Blaine Early, III
THE CLEAR SKIES INITIATIVE:
A MULTI-PERSPECTIVE ANALYSIS SECTION E
Nat Mund
Quin Shea
Sam Napolitano
REAL ESTATE ISSUES FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYER SECTION F
Clinton J. Elliott
Susan C. Bush
TIPS AND POINTERS FOR CONDUCTING AN EFFECTIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING SECTION G
James L. Dickinson

ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE & CASE LAW UPDATE
2002-2003
Robin J. Morecroft, P.E.
Stites & Harbison PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Copyright 2003. Robin J. Morecroft. All Rights Reserved.
SECTION A

ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE & CASE LAW UPDATE
2002-2003
PART ONE: LEGISLATIVE UPDATE - THE KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY
2002 REGULAR SESSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-3
HB 174 Solid Waste Management - Chapter 342 A-3
HB 244 Hazardous Waste Program - Chapter 54 A-4
HB 367 Agricultural Water Quality - chapter 191 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-4
HB 422 Waste Tire Program - Chapter 46 A-4
HB 618 Vehicle Emissions Testing - Chapter 229 A-4
SB 193 Petroleum Storage Tanks - Chapter 361 A-4
SB 257 Kentucky State Board on Electric Generation and
Transmission Siting - Chapter 365 A-5
SCR 17 Kentucky Watershed Task Force - Chapter 112 A-6
2003 REGULAR SESSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-7
HB 18 Air Pollution - Chapter 10 A-7
HB 524 Oil and Gas Wells - chapter 150 A-7
SB 81 Pesticides - Chapter 72 A-8
SB 162 Chemical Weapons Treatment Materials Disposal- Chapter 149 A-8
SB 165 Underground and Surface Mines - Chapter 87 A-8
PART TWO: CASE LAW UPDATE 2003
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh,
317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hayden II) A-II
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman,
336 F.3d 1236, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12830 (11 th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-13
U.S. v. Deaton,
332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-15
u.s. v. Rapanos,
339 F.3d 447, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15600 (6th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-17
Regional Airport Authority of Louisville and Jefferson County v. LFG, LLC,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11904 (W.D. Ky. 2003) A-19
SECTION A
Kentec Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth,
2003 WL 21714582 (Ky. App. 2003) A-21
Upchurch v. Cumberland County Fiscal Court,
2003 WL 253171 (Ky. App. 2003) A-23
Rockwell International Corp. v. Wilhite,
2003 WL 21826306 (Ky. App. 2003) A-25
SECTION A
LEGISLATIVE UPDATE:
THE KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY
2002 REGULAR SESSION
2003 REGULAR SESSION
Robin J. Morecroft, P.E.
Stites & Harbison
Lexington, Kentucky
A-I
A- 2
2002 Regular Session
HB174
Solid Waste Management - Chapter 342 1
KRS 224.43, a new section created setting an environmental remediation fee of$1.75 per ton of
waste generated or collected at transfer stations that is to be disposed ofat municipal solid waste
disposal facilities. Effective January 1, 2003.
KRS 224.43, a new section created establishing the Kentucky Pride Fund trust fund to receive
the remediation fees, state appropriations, gifts, grants and federal funds and interest on funds.
The trust to be administered by the Cabinet and $5,000,000 of the funds deposited into the trust
will be retained by the Cabinet subject to these conditions
• Up to $2,500,000 can be used to fund direct costs of to identify, characterize, assess
and develop implementation plans to close solid waste disposal sites that ceased
accepting waste after July 1, 1992.
• $2,500,000 shall be used to pay debt service on bonds sold by the Kentucky
Infrastructure Authority in the amount of at least $25,000,000 with the proceeds
deposited to the fund and utilized for undertaking closure and corrective action at
previously permitted solid waste disposal facilities or abandoned solid waste sites.
• Up to $1,000,000 in interest on all monies deposited in the fund shall be distributed to
the Kentucky Environmental Education Council for implementation of the
environmental education center component of the Environmental Education Master
Plan.
• The remaining balance of the funds from the environmental remediation fee shall be
used by the Cabinet for the elimination of illegal open dumps.
$2,500,000 is to be transferred annually from the Road Fund, KRS 48.010(13)(g), and
$2,500,000 transferred annually from the Highway Construction Contingency Fund to the
Kentucky Pride Fund to be reserved and distributed for anti-litter control programs.
The Solid Waste Reduction and Management Plan Advisory Committee was stricken.
Timing for counties to establish universal collection was extended to October 1, 2003. All
persons providing collection service must register with the counties in which they provide
service.
1 Chapter references are to 2002 ADVANCE LEGISLATIVE SERVICE (Michie 2002).
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HB244
Hazardous Waste Program - Chapter 54
KRS 224.46-580(7) amended to extend until June 30, 2004, the collection of the annual
hazardous waste assessment from hazardous wast~ generators.
KRS 224.46-580(8)(d) created stating that emissions control dust and sludge from primary
production of steel that is recycled by high temperature metals recovery or managed by
stabilization ofmetals is exempt from the fee.
HB367
Agricultural Water Quality - Chapter 191
KRS 224.71-100 to KRS 224.71-140, a new section created requiring that any documents
relating to agricultural operations' agricultural water quality plans, conservation plans, or forest
stewardship management plans submitted to local conservation district office or a state agency
shall be confidential and their disclosure to anyone other than state or federal officials is
prohibited. However, if any person engaged in an agricultural operation is deemed a "bad actor"
under KRS 224.71-130(2), the privilege of confidentiality given under this section to documents
relating to the bad actor's agricultural operation shall be lost.
HB422
Waste Tire Program - Chapter 46
KRS 224.50-868(1) amended such that the collection ofa fee on new tires of$I.00 is extended
through July 31,2006. The scope of fund uses was expanded to include costs associated with
waste tire amnesty programs.
HB618
Vehicle Emissions Testing - Chapter 229
KRS 77, a new section created that requires the pollution control district board in a county
approving a consolidated local government, which is in attainment at the time of approval of the
consolidation, for ozone, carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide to eliminate· any vehicle
emissions testing program.
SB 193
Petroleum Storage Tanks - Chapter 361
KRS 224.60-140(1) amended splitting the Petroleum Storage Tank Environmental Assurance
Fund into two sub accounts: the Financial Responsibility Account and the Petroleum Storage
Tank Account, with the Financial Responsibility Account receiving $0.004 of the $0.014 paid on
each gallon of gasoline or special fuels received in the state pursuant to KRS 224.60-145 and the
Petroleum Storage Tank Account receiving $0.01 of the $0.014.
KRS 224.60-130(2) amended such that Operators seeking coverage under the Petroleum Storage
Tank Account must file for eligibility and financial assistance before January 15, 2004. In order
to be eligible for reimbursement, corrective action projects must be carried out before July 15,
2009.
A- 4
KRS 224.60-137 amended such that when funds are available the University of Kentucky will
update the 1995 study and recommend amendments to standards for levels ofpetroleum
contamination, including lead and other additives, requiring corrective action to adequately
protect human health, safety and the environment. And to require the Cabinet to develop an
inventory of facilities eligible for reimbursement from the Financial Responsibility Account and
the Petroleum Storage Tank Account and the current status of each facility within the corrective
action process.
SB257
Kentucky State Board on Electric Generation and Transmission Siting - Chapter 365
KRS 278, a new section created that establishes the Kentucky State Board on Electric Generation
and Transmission Siting consisting of seven members, three members of the PSC, the Secretary
ofNatural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, two ad hoc public members from
the county where the proposed facility is to be located, (the chairman of the planning
commission with jurisdiction of the area where the facility is to be located or the county judge
executive or mayor of the city if there is not a planning commission with jurisdiction, one ad hoc
member who is a resident of the county in which the facility is to be located). The Board is
attached to the Public Service Commission for Administrative purposes. The Chairman of the
Public Service Commission is chairman of the Board.
A new section ofKRS 278 is created that requires a person seeking to construct a merchant
electric generating facility to apply for and receive a construction certificate from the Board.
The application must include, among other things:
• Full description of the site including a map showing distance of the site from residential
neighborhoods, residential structures, schools and public and private parks that are
located within a 2 mile radius.
• A statement that the proposed site is at least 1000 feet from the property boundary and
2000 feet from any residential neighborhood, school hospital or nursing home facility,
unless a facility capable of generating 10 MW or more is currently on the site.
• An analysis of the proposed facility's projected effect on the electric transmission system
in Kentucky.
• An analysis of the proposed facility's economic impact on the affected region and the
state.
• A site assessment report that includes: a site description including location ofbuildings
transmission lines and other structures; location and use of access ways; internal roads
and railways; existing or proposed utilities to serve the facility; evaluation of the noise
levels expected to be produced by the facility; an evaluation of the compatibility of the
facility with scenic surroundings; the potential changes in property for property owners
adjacent to the facility resulting from the construction and operation of the facility; the
impact of the facility's operation on road and rail traffic to and within the facility
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including anticipated levels of fugitive dust created and any anticipated degradation of
roads and lands within the vicinity of the facility.
A new section ofKRS 278 created that requires any person seeking to construct a non-regulated
transmission line to apply for and receive a construction certificate issued by the Board. The
application must included, among other things:
• A full description of the proposed route of the transmission line and its appurtenances
including initial design voltages, length of line, termination points and capacities, and
substation connections.
• A map showing the location of the proposed line and all proposed structures that will
support it, existing property lines and names ofpersons who own property over which the
line will cross, the distance of the proposed line from residential neighborhoods, schools
and public and private parks within one mile of the proposed facility.
A new section ofKRS 278 created to require a person seeking to construct a merchant electric
generating facility to submit a cumulative environmental assessment which shall contain a
description with appropriate analytical support of:
• Air pollutants -- Types and quantities of air pollutants that will be emitted and a
description of the methods used to control those emissions.
• Water Pollutants -- Types and quantities ofwater pollutants that will be discharged from
the facility into the waters of the Commonwealth and a description of the methods used
to control those discharges.
• Wastes -- Types and quantities ofwaste that will be generated by the facility and the
methods to be used to manage and dispose of such wastes.
• Water withdrawal -- Identification of the source and anticipated water volume needed to
support the facility construction and operation and a description of the methods used for
managing water usage and withdrawal.
SCR17
Kentucky Watershed Task Force - Chapter 112
Created the Kentucky Watershed Task Force to study the need for managing the state's water on
a watershed basis; the necessity of seeking agreements with border states on the management of
water in shared watersheds and the possibility of seeking agreements with the owners of
impounded waters, except for owners ofprivate water impounds, to manage the impounded
water to further state and local water management goals.
A- 6
2003 Regular Session
BB18
Air Pollution - Chapter 102
KRS 224.20.720 amended such that State vehicles and official vehicles routinely operating in a
county with a vehicle emissions control program are to be inspected on the same frequency as
private vehicles.
BB524
Oil and Gas Wells - Chapter 150
KRS 353.500 amended such that Government responsibility for oil and gas exploration,
production, development, gathering and transmission rests with the State. The Department
(Department ofMines and Minerals) shall promulgate regulations relating to all aspects of oil
and gas exploration, production, development, gathering and transportation to the exclusion of
all other non-state governmental entities.
KRS 353.520(2) amended such that the prohibition on the waste ofoil and gas includes
unnecessary loss by spillage or venting and not just surface loss.
KRS 353.560 amended to delete the "Water Pollution Control Commission" and added U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet.
KRS 353.580 amended to revise the notice requirements for applying for drilling permit
extension and noting that permit extension does not open issues ofwell location or mediation.
KRS 353.590 amended to establish bonding requirement for a single well for domestic use.
KRS 353.610 amended the wording ofboundary for setback purposes from "boundary" to
"mineral boundary."
KRS 353.620 amended to eliminate reference to "any premises" to "adjacent premises directly
affected" by setback distances for wells drilled closer to a boundary or another well than
prescribed in KRS 353.610.
KRS 353.630 amended deeming consent ofunknown or unlocatable owners in pooling acreage if
publications requirements ofKRS 353.640(1) have been met.
KRS 353.660 amended to require the submission of electronic copies of electrical surveys and
logs if requested by the Department.
2 Chapter references are to 2003 ADVANCE LEGISLATIVE SERVICE (Michie 2003).
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SB 81
Pesticides - Chapter 72
KRS 217B.170 00 amended to eliminate backpack sprayers and ground driven hand propelled
applicators from the fee structure for equipment used in the business of applying pesticides.
SB 162
Chemical Weapons Treatment Materials Disposal- Chapter 149
KRS 224.50.130(6) added requiring that no site for treatment or disposal of chemical weapons
shall be permitted except on a pilot scale.
KRS 224.50.130(7) added requiring that no permit or authorization to construct or operate a
hazardous waste site to treat or dispose of chemical weapons will be issued unless the applicant
certifies that:
• The infrastructure identified in the final emergency response plan has been or will be
completed prior to operation of the facility.
• The applicant has provided the host county sufficient funding for reasonable direct and
indirect costs of the creation and maintenance of the position ofhost community liaison.
SB 165
Underground and Surface Mines - Chapter 87
KRS 352.480 amended to allow the commissioner to make available, for copying, final or
abandoned mine maps in response to a written request by any person. The Department may also
make public or divulge any portion of a mine map submitted to the Department by a licensee or
operator.
A- 8
2003
CASE LAW UPDATE
Robin J. Morecroft, P.E.
Stites & Harbison
Lexington, Kentucky
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A-IO
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh,
317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003)(Hayden II)
ISSUE:
Whether §404 of the Clean Water Act ("Act") authorizes the Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to
issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into navigable waters for the creation
ofvalley fills in connection with coal mining activities when the valley fills serve no purpose
other than to dispose of excess overburden from mining activities.
HOLDING:
The Fourth Circuit held that the Corps' authorization under §404 of the Act to Martin County
Coal was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise contrary to the Clean
Water Act. The court vacated the permanent injunction issued by the District Court forbidding
the issuance of §404 permits for mining valley fills.
FACTS:
The Corps issued authorization under §404 Nationwide Permit #21 to Martin County Coal
Company ("Martin County") as part of the permitting process for a mountain top mining
operation located in West Virginia. The Corps' authorization allowed Martin County to
construct 27 valley fills and bury 6.3 miles of stream.
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth ("Kentuckians") commenced an action in the District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. Kentuckians claimed that the Corps' issuance
of the permit was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion and otherwise contrary to the
law. Kentuckians sought to have Martin County's authorization under the §404 Nationwide
Permit #21 revoked. They argued that the excess overburden to be placed in the valleys creating
the valley fills was not "fill material" as used in §404 of the Act, but was "waste" that was
excluded from the Corps' regulation. Kentuckians argued that "waste" could only be regulated
under §402 of the Act that was administered by. the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").
Prior to issuance of the authorization to Martin County, the Corps and the EPA had issued
notice of intent to revise their rules to better clarify the use of the word "fill material" in the
regulations ("New Rule"). Among the clarifications was that discharge ofmining overburden
would be regulated by the Corps under §404 and that effluent discharges from sedimentation
ponds into the waters of the United States would continue to be regulated by the EPA.
The District Court found that "fill material" as used in §404 of the Act referred to material
that was placed for some beneficial primary purpose: construction work; infrastructure;
improvement and development in waters of the United States; and not waste material discharged
solely to dispose ofwaste. The District Court issued a permanent injunction enjoining the Corps'
Huntington District Office from issuing any further §404 permits that had no primary purpose
but the disposal ofwaste.
The District Court also found that the New Rule proposed by the Corps and the EPA was
ultra vires.
A-II
DISCUSSION:
The Fourth Circuit first held that the District Court's pennanent injunction was over broad.
Kentuckian's alleged injury related only to the Martin County authorization and they sought to
have that authorization revoked or suspended pending EPA review. The Corps argued that since
Kentuckians had only challenged a specific pennit issuance, the injunction issued, reaching
future pennits issued in a five-state area was over broad. Kentuckians argued that since the
scope of the violation involved ongoing ultra vires actions by the Corps throughout the
Huntington District, the scope of the injunctive relief should be detennined by the scope of the
Corps'violation. The Court vacated the injunction concluding that the injunction was far
broader in scope than that required to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs and did not
carefully address the circumstances of the case. The Court also found that the District Court
gratuitously addressed the New Rule reaching beyond the issues before it to find the New Rule
was inconsistent with the Act.
Addressing the heart of the action the Court conducted a Chevron analysis and detennined
that applying traditional tools of statutory construction the District Court could not have
concluded that Congress intended "fill material" to mean only material placed for some
beneficial purpose. The Court conducted a de novo review as to whether Congress had spoken
clearly as to the meaning of "fill material" concluding that Congress had not defined "fill
material" as material deposited for some beneficial primary purpose. Guided by the standard
that a reviewing court can set aside an agency's interpretation of its own regulation only if that
interpretation is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, the Court concluded that
the Corps' interpretation of the meaning of "fill material" in §404 "as all material that displaces
water or changes the bottom elevation ofa water body except for 'waste' - meaning garbage,
sewage, and effluent" was a pennissible construction of §404.
A-12
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman,
336 F.3d 1236, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12830 (11 th eire 2003)
ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the Environmental Appeals Board finding that Tennessee Valley
Authority ("TVA") had violated the Clean Air Act ("Act") and failed to respond to EPA
Administrative Compliance Orders ("ACO") was unlawful and a product ofarbitrary and
capricious decision making.
HOLDING:
The court held that the Clean Air Act is unconstitutional to the extent that mere
noncompliance with the terms of an ACO can be the sole basis for imposing severe civil and
criminal penalties and that since the ACO lacks finality the Court ofAppeals lacks jurisdiction to
review the validity ofACOs.
FACTS:
TVA had undertaken rehabilitation projects at nine of its coal fired power plants without
permits. The EPA issued ACOs requiring TVA to complete several major compliance
initiatives. TVA refused to comply with the ACOs. Believing that TVA could not be sued in
federal court, the EPA established an ad hoc procedure within the Environmental Appeals Board
("EAB") to provide the appearances of an adjudication. The EAB affirmed the EPA's ACO
concluding that TVA had violated the Act when it began its rehabilitation projects without
permits.
TVA appealed the decision of the EPA and the EAB to the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act's ("APA") judicial review provisions, arguing that the EPA order
was unlawful and the product of arbitrary' and capricious decision making.
DISCUSSION:
The court outlined the four options available to the EPA when it finds a regulated party has
engaged in unlawful activity. The EPA can: -
1) request the Attorney General commence a criminal prosecution;
2) file suit in district court seeking injunctive relief and the imposition ofcivil fines;
3) conduct a fonnal adjudication of liability consistent with the APA and assess civil
penalties; or
4) issue an ACO directing compliance.
The court noted that options 1-3 provide the defendant an opportunity to make legal and
factual arguments in an independent forum. Under the Act an ACO can be issued if any of the
following requirements are met:
a) the ACO must be based upon "any information available to the Administrator;"
A-I3
b) the ACO must be issued thirty days after the issuance of a Notice of Violation; and
c) the regulated party must be given an "opportunity to confer" with the Administrator.
The court expressed concern that the ACO has an injunction-like status and is issued without
an adjudication or meaningful judicial review. Further, the court found that an ACO can be
issued on the basis of "any information available to the Administrator," concluding that this
information could include a staff report, newspaper clipping, anonymous phone tip or anything
else that could be considered "information." Lastly, the court was troubled that a violation of an
ACO is a freestanding violation and that such a violation can itself serve as the basis for
imposition of significant civil penalties or imprisonment.
The court looked at the conflict between §7603 and §7413 of the Clean Air Act. Section
7603 allows the EPA to issue emergency orders in limited situations where a pollution source
presents an "imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the
environment." In these instances the Act provides that the EPA may bring suit for appropriate
relief; however, if it is not practical to assure prompt protection ofpersons or the environment,
the EPA may issue an order with injunction-like powers. This order is only effective for a short
period of time and can only be extended by a federal court. On the other hand, §7413 of the Act
governing ACOs allows the EPA to issue ACOs of unlimited duration without going to court or
identifying a public emergency. In addition, §7413 states that any person who knowingly
violates any order issued under §7413 shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine or
imprisonment.
The court proceeded to look at the cases addressing ACOs concluding that there are two
categories ofcases. First, cases where the courts have recognized that ACOs have the status of
law but fail to deal with the Constitutional issues that arise as a result of that status. In the
second group ofcases the courts have under-appreciated the legal significance ofACOs and
ignored or readout the penalty provisions of the statute.
Dealing with the Constitutional issue head on, the court concluded that the statutory scheme
established by Congress - in which the head of an executive agency has the power to issue an
order that has the status of law after finding, on the basis of any information available, that a
Clean Air Act violation has been committed - is repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Before the government can impose severe civil and criminal penalties, the
defendant is entitled to a full and fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. Finding that the
improvised hearing process implemented in the case of TVA was insufficient to save the process,
the court held the Clean Air Act unconstitutional to the extent that mere noncompliance with the
terms of an ACO can be the sole basis for the imposition of severe civil and criminal penalties.
In addition, the court found that ACOs fails to meet the two part test for finality outlined in
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), requiring the action be the "consummation" of the
agency's decision making process and the action be one by which rights and obligations are
determined or from which legal consequences flow. Since the ACO is not a final agency
decision, the court concluded that Courts ofAppeals lack jurisdiction to review the validity of
ACOs and the EPA must prove the existence of Clean Air Act violations in district court.
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u.s. v. Deaton,
332 F.3d 698 (4th eire 2003)
ISSUE:
Whether the Corps of Engineers' ("Corps") jurisdiction over navigable waterways under the
Clean Water Act ("Act") extends to wetlands adjacent to a roadside ditch that eventually
discharges into a navigable-in-fact waterway.
HOLDING:
The court upheld the decision of the district court requiring remediation, finding that the
Corps ofEngineers' jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act was sufficient to reach the roadside
ditch and adjacent wetlands.
FACTS:
Deaton purchased twelve acres of land on which to develop a residential subdivision. The
property was poorly drained and there was a large low wet area in the middle of the property
where water stood in the winter months and after heavy rainfall. The property sloped gently
downhill toward a county road, Morris Leonard Road. A drainage ditch runs alongside the road
between the pavement and Deaton's property. Deaton calls the ditch the "Morris Leonard Road
ditch" while the Corps calls it the "John Adkins Prong of Perdue Creek." The Fourth Circuit
chose to call it the "roadside ditch." There was disagreement on how much water flows through
the ditch and how consistent is the flow. There was agreement that water entering the ditch
meanders thirty-two miles to Chesapeake Bay.
The Wicomico County Health Department denied Deaton's application for a sewage disposal
permit due to the drainage problems on the property. Deaton decided to dig a drainage ditch
across the property to alleviate the problem. The U.S. Soil Conservation Service advised Deaton
that a large part of the property contained non-tidal wetlands and Deaton would need a permit
from the Corps before digging the ditch. Ignoring this advice Deaton hired a contractor to dig
the drainage ditch. The contractor dumped the dirt excavated onto the side of the ditch in a
practice known as sidecasting. The Corps discovered the ditching and issued a stop-work order
and warned Deaton about dumping fill material in the wetlands. The government eventually
filed a civil complaint against Deaton alleging that Deaton had violated the Clean Water Act by
discharging fill material into wetlands without a,permit. The district court concluded that
sidecasting did not constitute discharge of a pollutant and granted Deaton summary judgment.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case. Not long after remand, the
Supreme Court decided Solid Waste Agency ofNorthem Cook County v. United States Army
Corps ofEngineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). Deaton sought reconsideration by the district court in
light of Solid Waste arguing that the Clean Water Act could not be read to extend to the roadside
ditch and adjacent wetlands. The district court denied reconsideration. Deaton appealed.
DISCUSSION:
The court first addressed Deaton's claim that interpreting the Clean Water Act to reach the
roadside ditch exceeds the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause. The court
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concluded that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress had the authority to prevent the use of
navigable waters for injurious purposes; further, that the Corps' regulatory interpretation of the
term "waters of the United States" to encompass nonnavigable tributaries ofnavigable waters
does not invoke the outer limits of Congress' power. The court determined that it should defer to
the Corps' interpretation of its own regulations that the Corps reading the regulations to include
the roadside ditch within its jurisdiction is a reasonable interpretation of the Clean Water Act.
Deaton argued that even if the Act permits the Corps to regulate nonnavigable tributaries of
navigable waters, the roadside ditch is not such a tributary. The court looked at the use of the
word "tributaries" in the Corps' regulations, concluding that while the Corps has not always
chosen to regulate all tributaries, it has always used the word "tributaries" to mean the entire
tributary system, that is, all of the streams whose water eventually flows into navigable waters.
The roadside ditch was thus a tributary subject to Corps' jurisdiction, and the adjacent wetlands
were also subject to Corps' jurisdiction. The court found that there was sufficient nexus between
a navigable waterway and its nonnavigable tributaries and that discharges into nonnavigable
tributaries and adjacent wetlands have a substantial effect on water quality in navigable waters.
The result of this nexus is that the Act reaches the roadside ditch and its adjacent wetlands.
Deaton also attacked the indicator used by the Corps in designating part of the property as
wetlands based on the Corps' 1987 Wetlands Delineation Manual. The court found that since
Deaton did not challenge the Manual as plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations,
the court was bound to defer to the Manual's interpretation of the regulations.
Lastly, Deaton challenged the district court's remediation order that required Deaton to fill in
the ditch. He argued that they should be required to move the discharged material to a non-
wetlands part of the property rather than filling in the ditch. The court upheld the district court's
remediation order concurring with the district court's finding that hauling the dirt away would
likely cause ecological damage would allow Deaton to benefit from the violation of the Act.
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u.s. v. Rapanos,
339 F.3d 447, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15600 (6th eire 2003)
ISSUE:
Whether the district court correctly determined, in light of Solid Waste Agency ofNorthem
Cook County v. United States Army Corps ofEngineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), that the Corps of
Engineers' ("Corps") jurisdiction over wetlands did not extend to wetlands that were not
adjacent to navigable waters.
HOLDING:
The court reversed the decision of the district court and reinstated Rapanos' criminal
conviction for unlawfully filling wetlands.
FACTS:
Rapanos intended to sell one hundred and seventy-five acres for development. The plot
contained (based on Rapanos' own consultant) between 49 and 59 acres ofwetlands. Rapanos
began destroying the wetlands on the property filling them with dirt. When a search warrant was
executed agents found only 29 acres ofwetlands remaining on the property.
The property was located in Williams Township, Bay County, Michigan. The wetlands are
eleven to twenty miles from the nearest navigable-in-fact waters. The wetlands connect to the
Labozinski Drain (a 100 year-old man-made drain) which flows into Hoppler Creek which in
turn flows into Kawkawlin River which is navigable. The government argued that there was a
direct and significant link between the wetlands on Rapanos' property and the navigable
waterway, thus the wetlands in question are covered by the Clean Water Act ("Act").
Rapanos was convicted ofunlawfully filling wetlands. Following various appeals, on
remand, the district court set aside the conviction and dismissed the case finding that Solid
Waste, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) had changed the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Act, and that
the wetlands on Rapanos' property were not directly adjacent to navigable waters, thus outside
the government's scope of regulation.
DISCUSSION:
The court looked at the range of Corps' jurisdiction as addressed by the Supreme Court, first
turning to United States v. Riverside Bayyiew Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) where the
Supreme Court found that Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction extended to protect wetlands adjacent
to waters that are protected by the Act, including wetlands adjacent to other bodies ofwater over
which the Corps has jurisdiction. Exactly what waters were within the Corps' jurisdiction
remained to be answered. The outside limit ofjurisdiction was established in Solid Waste where
the Supreme Court determined that the Corps' Migratory Bird Rule extending their jurisdiction
to wetlands with no hydrological connection to waterways was an unreasonable application of
the Act.
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Disagreeing with the broad reading of Solid Waste by the district court, the Sixth Circuit
looked to the Fourth Circuit decision in U.S. v. Deaton, 332, F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) finding
that for Corps' jurisdiction to extend to the Rapanos' property there must be a significant nexus
between the wetlands and navigable waters. Applying this test to the facts the court found that
because there existed a hydrological connection between the wetlands on Rapanos' property, the
Drain and the Kawkawlin river, there was ample nexus to establish jurisdiction.
The court reversed the decision of the district court and reinstated the conviction ofRapanos.
A-18
Regional Airport Authority of Louisville and Jefferson County v. LFG.. LLC,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11904 (W.D. Ky. 2003)
ISSUE:
Whether contamination ofan industrial site by a previous owner constituted a private
nuisance, a public nuisance or negligence per se as to a subsequent owner required to expend
funds to clean up the contamination.
HOLDING:
Contamination of an industrial site by a previous owner does not constitute a private nuisance
as to a subsequent owner. The Plaintiff did not establish the unusual or special damages
necessary to recover under a public nuisance. The Plaintiff did not establish that he was the type
ofparty the statute violated by the defendant was intended to protect, and the injury suffered by
the Plaintiffwas not the type of injury the statue intended to prevent. Thus there was no
recovery on the basis ofnegligence per see
FACTS:
The Regional Airport Authority of Louisville and Jefferson County ("RAA") acquired a
property owned by LFG, LLC ("LFG"). LFG had acquired the site from Navistar, formerly
International Harvester Company, who had operated a foundry, forge and assembly plant on the
site. Prior to acquisition of the site RAA conducted an environmental investigation of the site.
Subsequent to the acquisition, RAA conducted another site evaluation and identified site
contamination including asbestos. RAA spent significant amounts ofmoney cleaning up the
environmental contamination. RAA filed suit against Navistar and LFG to recover the clean up
costs.
DISCUSSION:
The court first looked at the private nuisance claim. The court resolved that RAA was urging
the court to extend private nuisance beyond its traditional purpose of resolving conflicts between
competing and simultaneous uses ofneighboring property, to recognize a cause ofaction by a
current owner of a parcel of land against the former owner of the same parcel for environmental
contamination. Noting that in more traditional nuisance actions the Kentucky courts have not
allowed land owners to recover for a private nuisance where the land was purchased with the
knowledge of the existence of the nuisance, the court determined that a Kentucky court would
not recognize a cause of action for private nuisance between subsequent owners of the same land
and dismissed this count.
In regard to the public nuisance claim, the court found that a public nuisance is a condition
that is prejudicial to the health, comfort, safety, property, sense ofdecency, or morals of the
citizens at large, resulting from an act not warranted by law or from neglect of a duty imposed by
law. The court concluded that the contamination of the site did not constitute a public nuisance
because the contamination was not public since it occurred in a place ofbusiness into which
there is no general right on the part of the public to go. The court went on to assume, arguendo,
that the contamination constituted a public nuisance and concluded that for RAA to recover for a
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public nuisance it must demonstrate unusual or special damages, different from those sustained
by the community at large. RAA's expenditures to clean up the environmental contamination of
the site, if considered damages, relate to RAA's private rights over the site and not its public
rights. Thus the court dismissed RAA's public nuisance claim.
Lastly, in evaluating negligence per se, the court allowed that violation of a statute,
administrative regulation or ordinance could give rise to an action for negligence per see
However, such a determination ofnegligence per se requires that the plaintiffbe a member of the
class ofpersons intended to be protected by the regulation,. and the injury suffered must be of the
type that the regulation was designed to prevent. The court concluded that KRS Chapter 77,
APCD regulations and EPA regulations were intended to protect the public air contamination
and that violations of the statutes and regulations causing RAA to suffer asbestos clean up costs
were not the type of injury the statutes and regulations were intended to prevent. Thus RAA was
not entitled to reliefunder a claim ofnegligence per see
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Kentec Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth,
2003 WL 21714582 (Ky. App. 2003)
(THIS OPINION IS NOT FINAL AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY IN ANY COURTS OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKy)
ISSUE:
Whether the statutory requirement or the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet's ("the Cabinet") regulatory requirement that a proposed penalty be prepaid
prior to a hearing on the magnitude of the penalty is constitutional.
HOLDING:
The court concluded that KRS 350.0301 and KAR 7:092 were unconstitutional violations of
due process, equal protection, and the ban against arbitrary state action contained at Section Two
of the Kentucky Constitution. The court held that the Cabinet's assessment of a penalty without
a hearing, due to the unique circumstances of the third-party disturbance at issue, was
unreasonable and arbitrary and in violation of Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution.
FACTS:
Kentec Coal Company was assessed a penalty by the Cabinet for a postmining land use
violation. A house was constructed on a mine site leased and permitted by Kentec. The
increment in question was permitted for a postmining land use of forestry land or
hayland/pasture and the house constituted a violation of the permit. After being advised by the
Cabinet that a post mining land use revision was required, Kentec failed to apply for such a
revision. Kentec was issued a non-compliance order and subsequently a cessation order which
remained unabated for thirty days. The Cabinet then noticed Kentec of a proposed penalty
assessment of $29,700. Kentec failed to appear at an assessment conference. Kentec then
requested a formal hearing regarding the penalty but failed to prepay the penalty as required by
KRS 350.0301 and 405 KAR 7:092. Kentec's petition was dismissed and the penalty assessment
was upheld by the Secretary and subsequently by the Franklin Circuit Court.
DISCUSSION:
Kentec argued that KRS 350.0301 and 405 KAR 7:092 are unconstitutional as they denied
Kentec due process and equal protection by requiring the prepayment of the penalty assessment
as a prerequisite to a formal hearing regarding that very penalty assessment. The court first
turned to Franklin v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 799 S.W.2d 1
(Ky. 1990). In Franklin the court found that the predecessor regulation to KRS 350.0301
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitutions of the United States
and Kentucky because it denied the due process hearing based solely on a party's financial
inability to pay the penalties he sought to appeal. KRS 350.0301, enacted in response to
Franklin, provided for bifurcated hearings with individual hearings dealing with the actual
violation and penalty assessment, but the statute required the prepayment of the proposed
assessment before the penalty portion of the hearing. The court concluded that the statutory and
regulatory changes enacted in response to Franklin presented an impermissible monetary bar to
access to the fundamental due process right to a hearing and were thus unconstitutional
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violations of the due process, equal protection and the ban on arbitrary state action in Section
Two of the Kentucky Constitution.
Kentec argued that the issuance of the noncompliance and cessation order by the Cabinet
were erroneous and arbitrary in light of the Cabinet's third-party disturbance policy. The court
concluded that given the circumstances of the case, it would be impossible for Kentec to comply
with the noncompliance and cessation order within the time allowed by the Cabinet and, even if
it could, any meaningful action by the Cabinet would be rendered moot. The court found that the
Cabinet's assessment of a penalty without a hearing was unreasonable and arbitrary and also in
violation of Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution.
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Upchurch v. Cumberland County Fiscal Court,
2003 WL 253171 (Ky. App. 2003)
(THIS OPINION IS NOT FINAL AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY IN ANY COURTS OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKy)
ISSUE:
Whether a county Ordinance restricting the construction and operation ofpoultry facilities
was appropriately enacted under the County's police powers and "Home Rule" statue or must the
restrictions have been enacted under a Planning and Zoning scheme.
HOLDING:
The Court held that an ordinance establishing the conditions for the construction and
operation of a poultry facility was properly enacted under the County's powers as enumerated in
KRS 67.083.
FACTS:
The Upchurches planned to develop a confined poultry production facility on a parcel of land
located in Cumberland County. Following their purchase of the property the Cumberland
County Fiscal Court enacted Ordinance No. 1998-03 ("Ordinance") setting restrictions on the
construction and operation of such poultry facilities. Under the Ordinance the Upchurches were
required to obtain a construction and operation permit for the facility. The Ordinance restricted
the location of the poultry facility and litter storage areas in relation to dwellings, schools, public
parks, churches and incorporated city limits. The Ordinance also established minimum setback
distances from lakes, rivers, blue line streams, springs, sinkholes and roadways. Finally, the
Ordinance established that the facility must be located in an agricultural zone on a tract of land
of at least 15 acres. Cumberland County does not have a comprehensive planning and zoning
scheme.
DISCUSSION:
Upchurch challenged the Ordinance arguing that KRS Chapter 100 establishes the
requirements for enacting land use regulations. It was admitted that Cumberland County did not
have a comprehensive planning and zoning sch~me and in enacting the ordinance had not met
any of the requirements ofKRS Chapter 100 for establishing such land use regulations. The
County argued that the Ordinance was not enacted under KRS Chapter 100 but was enacted
under KRS 67.083(3), a "Home Rule" statute, that vested in a county government the power to
enact legislation to protect the health and welfare of its citizens.
The court held that the Ordinance was a valid ordinance properly enacted pursuant to KRS
67.083(3). In reaching this conclusion the court found that control of animals and protection of
the public, including control ofpublic sanitation and vectors, were powers granted under the
"Home Rule" statute. In supporting its conclusion, the court found that the Ordinance did not
designate any particular place for the location of a poultry facility, as would a zoning ordinance.
Rather, the Ordinance required the owner of a poultry facility within the county to comply with
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the specific conditions of the Ordinance, requirements that were reasonably related to the
specific powers in KRS 67.083(3).
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Rockwell International Corp. v. Wilhite,
2003 WL 21826306 (Ky. App. 2003)
(THIS OPINION IS NOT FINAL AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY IN ANY COURTS OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKy)
ISSUE:
What is the applicable statute of limitations for contamination of landowners' properties by
PCBs discharged by an industrial polluter and to what time period do damages apply? Do the
landowners have a claim for negligent trespass? Do the landowners have a valid claim based on
the creation of a permanent nuisance? Was the award ofpunitive damages the result ofpassion
and prejudice?
HOLDING:
The court reversed judgment for the plaintiff landowners against Rockwell. In so reversing
the court found that the landowners filed their claim within the five year statute of limitations
following their notice of the contamination. The court extended the "discovery rule" from
personal injury cases to property damage cases. However, the court found there was no
negligent trespass and there was no permanent nuisance as a result of the contamination. Lastly,
the court found that the statements of the plaintiffs counsel at closing were improper.
FACTS:
This case involved contamination injury to a number ofproperties in Logan County,
Kentucky. At trial there were 50 separate awards to landowners of compensatory damages
totaling $7,566,118 and punitive damages totaling $210,000,000. Polychlorinated Biphenyls
("PCBs"), in an amount insufficient to present a health hazard, were found on the properties.
Rockwell International Corporation allowed the PCBs to flow from their plant into Town Branch
from which it carried onto the properties during periods of flooding. The case was on remand
from the Supreme Court where the Appeals Court was directed to consider a number of issues
not decided on the initial appeal.
DISCUSSION:
The first issue the court was directed to address was determining the applicable statute of
limitations and whether the landowner claims were barred by the statute. The plaintiffs argued
that they discovered the damage to their properties in September 1988 and that the damage to
their property became permanent at that time. Rockwell argued that as the damage was
permanent and had occurred prior to the discovery by the plaintiffs they were barred from
seeking damages beyond the statutory period. The court chose to extend the "discovery rule" to
property injury cases, tolling the statute of limitations until the injury is discovered. The court
determined that the landowners discovered the injury to their property in September 1988 and
that their suit was filed within the five-year statutory period following the discovery.
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Rockwell argued that since the plaintiffs alleged the damage to their property was permanent
and had occurred prior to the immediately proceeding period of the statute of limitations, there
was no recovery. The court found it "illogical" that the statute of limitations would be tolled but
that the plaintiffs ability to recover damages was limited to the immediately proceeding statute
of limitations period, and concluded that since the Plaintiffs had a viable cause of action they
were entitled to recover damages for injuries that occurred outside of the five-year limitation
period preceding the filing of their complaint.
The court was to determine whether the landowners had a valid claim for negligent trespass.
The court concluded that while the landowners established that Rockwell had negligently
trespassed on their properties they had failed to establish that the property had suffered any
injury resulting from the trespass, as no persons who have come upon the land have been
harmed, no farm animals or pets have been sickened, nor have any crops been lost. The land and
the buildings thereon continue to be used as they were before the presence ofPCBs was
discovered.
Turning to the issue of a permanent nuisance, the court quickly dispatched the argument
stating that in Kentucky nuisance is primarily concerned with some use ofproperty by a
defendant which causes sufficient annoyance to an adjacent property possessor that interferes
with the use of the adjacent land to such a degree that its value is materially reduced. The court
concluded that there was no rational basis for a finding that the discharge ofminute quantities of
PCBs onto the landowner's property resulted in any interference with their use and enjoyment of
the properties. Furthermore, the law does not allow relief on the basis of an unsubstantiated
phobia.
Lastly, turning to statements of the plaintiffs attorney during summation where the attorney
repeatedly and gratuitously referred to Rockwell's location in "Seal Beach, California," and
referred to Rockwell's position regarding PCB contamination stating "we're not worried out in
Seal Beach where everybody has got a tan and a $60.00 haircut and life is good," the court found
that the statements ofcounsel were outside the record, and otherwise improper, and were
calculated to inflame the passions and excite the prejudices of the jurors inducing them to
disregard the evidence, and go to an extreme and unjustifiable length in arriving at a verdict.
Based on the inflammatory nature of the counsel's comments the court held that Rockwell was
entitled to have the punitive damages award set aside.
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Congress adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (the "Act") in an effort to restore investor confidence in light of public scandals such as
Enron and Worldcom. Though only applicable to publicly-traded companies, the Act sets forth a
new standard of conduct concerning disclosure of liabilities that may ripple down to privately-
held companies.
The Act has various implications for the environmental lawyer. First, the Act sets forth
new standards for reporting liabilities, including environmental liabilities. Second, the Act sets
imposes obligations on attorneys to report potential violations of law by representatives of the
client "up the ladder," a significant intrusion on the attorney-client privileg.e. Last, potential
liabilities implicit in the Act create a need to ensure that all publicly-available information is
completely accurate in order to stave off any claims that a company is concealing potential
liabilities. Though treated in the popular press as a new securities law, the Act has far-reaching
effects that all environmental lawyers need to consider.
I. Overview of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
A. Applicability
The Act is applicable to companies currently registered under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 or who apply to register securities under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
B. Basic Requirements of the Act
The Act includes provisions on three broad topics-(l) auditors; (2) internal corporate
governance; and (3) corporate attorneys. Though this outline will focus on the third
topic, it includes the basic provisions of the Act concerning auditors and corporate
governance.
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1. Auditors
The Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB").
The PCAOB was created to regulate accounting industry standards applicable to
outside audits ofpublic companies' books. See Section 101 of the Act.
All accounting finns preparing or issuing audit reports for public companies must
be registered with the PCAOB. See Section 102 of the Act.
Registered finns perfonning audits for a client may not provide some non-
auditing services to those clients, including bookkeeping, appraisal and valuation
services, and actuarial services. See Section 201 of the Act. These provisions are
intended to preserve auditor independence in reviewing the books of a public
company.
Registered finns must comply with rules enacted by the PCAOB in order to
maintain their certification, including rules concerning document retention and
destruction. See Section 103 of the Act.
The PCAOB has the power to periodically audit registered finns to ensure
compliance. Finns auditing more than 100 public companies are subject to an
annual compliance audit; finns auditing less than 100 public companies are
subject to a compliance audit every three years. See Sections 104-105 of the Act.
The PCAOB has the power to levy civil penalties of up to $750,000 against an
individual and $15,000,000 against corporate-type entities, in conjunction with
the SEC.
2. Corporate Governance
The Act sets forth several requirements to ensure that public companies, in
making disclosures in publicly-available securities filings, do not mislead
investors about the financial condition of the company. These requirements
include (1) enhanced certification requirements; (2) requirements applicable to
public companies' audit committees; and (3) restrictions on executive
compensation. The Act also includes civil and criminal penalties for violation of
the corporate governance provisions.
a. Certification Requirements
The Act required the SEC to adopt rules (now codified as Exchange Act
Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) requiring the CEO and CFO of all public
companies to certify the accuracy of all annual and quarterly reports filed
with the SEC. The certification must include the following: (1) They have
read the report; (2) The report, to their knowledge, does not contain any
material misstatements; and (3) The report fairly presents the financial
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situation of the company. See Section 302 of the Act; Exchange Act Rules
13a-14 and 15d-14.
Every periodic report containing financial statements must be
accompanied by a written statement from the CEO and CFO certifying
that statements comply with sec~rities laws and fairly present the financial
condition of the company. This requirement overlaps with the
requirements in Section 302, but it imposes criminal penalties of up to
$5,000,000 in fines and 20 years in prison. See Section 906 of the Act.
Public companies must maintain controls on procedures for making
disclosures, and do an evaluation of their internal disclosure controls
within 90 days before filing quarterly reports. See Exchange Act Rules
13a-15 and 15d-15.
b. Requirements Applicable to Audit Committees
The Act includes a requirement that all members of the audit committee be
"independent," i.e., that the committees members must not be internal to
the public company such as a member of management or receive
compensation from the public company other than director or committee
fees. See Section 301 of the Act.
The Act allows the SEC to adopt rules requiring the stock exchanges and
the NASDAQ to deny the listing of securities of any issuer not in
compliance with the audit committee provisions. See Section 301 of the
Act; Securities Act Release 33-8220.
The Act requires the audit committee to contract for outside auditing
services on behalf of the public company instead of management. See
Section 301 of the Act.
The audit committee must establish a system to allow employees of the
public company to make confidential reports concerning questionable
practices. See Section 301 of the Act.
The Act requires audit committees to disclose whether any of its members
is a "financial expert," and if so, whether that expert is "independent" of
management. See Section 407 of the Act; Securities Act Release 33-8177.
c. Requirements Applicable to Executive Compensation
If a public company is required to restate its public financial reports as a
result of "misconduct," the Act requires the CEO and CFO to disgorge any
bonuses or profits from sale of company stock gained in the 12 months
after filing the inaccurate financial report. See Section 304 of the Act.
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Corporate executives cannot trade company stock during blackout periods
imposed on the company's employee stock plan. Any profits obtained on
such trades must be returned to the company. See Section 306 of the Act.
Directors and officers must disclose any transactions they make in their
company's stock ("insider" transactions) within two business days after
completion of the transaction. See Section 403 of the Act.
Public companies may no longer make personal loans to directors and
officers. See Section 402 of the Act.
d. Penalties
The Act lengthens the statute of limitations for civil secuntles fraud
actions from one year to two years from discovery of the violations, with
an overall bar against civil actions after five years from the occurrence of
the violation. See Section 804 of the Act.
The Act amends the Bankruptcy Code to prevent discharge of
indebtedness due to judgements or settlements of securities violations.
See Section 803 of the Act.
The Act lowers the standard required for the SEC to bar an officer or
director of a public company from serving in either of those positions in
another public company from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness." The
SEC may also now bar an officer or director in an administrative cease
and desist proceeding. See Sections 305 and 1105 of the Act.
The Act also creates a number of new crimes, including a new securities
fraud crime substantially the same as existing criminal liability under Rule
10b-5. Maximum jail time is increased from five to 20 years, and
maximum fines are increased from $1,000,000 to $5,000,000 for
individuals, and from $2,500,000 to $25,000,000 for corporate-type
entities. See Sections 802, 807, 903, 1102, 1106, and 1107 of the Act.
3. Attorneys
The Act requires the SEC to enact rules to govern the conduct of attorneys
"practicing before the Commission," including rules requiring attorneys to report
potential violations of securities or other laws "up the ladder" to senior
management in order to ensure that those managers are fully aware of all potential
liabilities to report in securities filings. See Section 307 of the Act. The SEC
enacted those rules in Janllary 2003. See Securities Act Release 33-8185.
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The SEC, as part of the rules it plans to enact to carry out Section 307 of the Act,
has proposed a rule to require attorneys who have knowledge that,
notwithstanding any up the ladder reporting, the company filed any materially
false or misleading information with the SEC, to effect a "noisy withdrawal" from
that representation. The SEC has put implementation of the proposed "noisy
withdrawal" rule on hold pending further comment.
II. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Environmental Reporting
The provisions of the Act (and accompanying regulations) affecting certification of a company's
financial condition do not specify any mechanism for determining whether an environmental
liability is "material." Material effects of compliance with environmental laws and material
pending or threatened litigation proceedings are required to be reported pursuant to Items 101,
103 and 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229, and are subject to generally-accepted standards
developed in light of that regulation. Those rules have not changed in the wake of the Act.
However, some groups are concerned that the increased emphasis on corporate disclosures will
increase the scrutiny on environmental liabilities and whether they are indeed material.
A. Standard for Materiality
There is no hard and fast rule for determining whether a potential liability is material.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "material" as anything that would influence
a reasonable investor's decision to invest in a company.
Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires public companies to disclosure the material effects
of compliance with environmental laws.
Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires a description of all pending material legal
proceedings. Item 103 normally requires any non-routine liability to be disclosed, as well
as any damage claims that exceed 10 percent of the net worth of a company OR probable
liability that is equal to or greater than $100,000, though the SEC claims that $100,000 is
not a bright-line test. Item 103 is the most violated requirement.
Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires a public company to disclose any known trends or
uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material impact on operations.
B. Alternative Proposals for Determining Materiality
1. ASTM
Some groups have petitioned the SEC to formally enact as regulations under the
Act the American Society of Testing and Materials ("ASTM") Standard Guide for
Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities (ASTM E2137-01) established in March
2002 for estimating and disclosing environmental liabilities. According to the
rulemaking petition, adoption of the ASTM standards would provide a uniform
and comprehensive approach to estimating environmental liabilities and
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expanding the scope of conditions requiring disclosure. Should the SEC decide to
enact regulations enshrining the ASTM standards, companies may be faced with
expanded disclosure obligations if they do not currently adhere to the ASTM
standards.
ASTM E2137-01 gives a public company mechanism by which to estimate the
amount ofpotential liabilities, particularly when there are uncertainties inherent in
the potential liabilities. ASTM E2137-01 sets forth four methods for calculating
liabilities-(l) expected costs; (2) most likely value; (3) range of value; and (4)
known minimum value. The method to be used depends on the amount of
information available and the degree ofuncertainty.
2. ISO 14000
ISO 14000 standards are a set of internationally-recognized standards for
environmental process management developed by the International Organization
for Standardization. The Act provides that public companies must maintain
controls on procedures for making disclosures, and do an evaluation of their
internal disclosure controls within 90 days before filing quarterly reports. See
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15. ISO 14000 processes and ISO
certification under ISO 14001 give public companies a mechanism to monitor
their environmental management systems to ensure that they can give proper
assurances under Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15. Unlike ASTM E2137-
01, there has not been a push to codify ISO 14000 standards into regulations as a
method to achieve prima facie compliance.
3. Other Standards
Other standards which attempt to give meaning to the materiality requirement
include: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Statement of Position
96-1, Environmental Remediation Liabilities; Financial Accounting Standards
Board Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.5, Accounting for
Contingencies; and Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 14,
Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of a Loss.
III. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Attorney-Client Privilege
Section 307 of the Act authorizes the SEC to enact rules "setting forth minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys practicing before the Commission." The SEC has taken steps
to exercise its authority under Section 307 of the Act by enacting a rule requiring attorneys for
public corporations to report potential violations of law "up the ladder" to senior management
and by proposing a rule requiring a "noisy withdrawal" by an attorney for a public company if
senior management does not appropriately react to the up the ladder reporting of potential
violations. Both the current up the ladder reporting rule and the proposed noisy 'withdrawal rule
have implications for the attorney-client privilege.
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A. Threshold Issue-"Practicing Before the Commission"
Section 307 of the Act limits the SEC's authority to those attorneys "practicing before the
Commission." The SEC has claimed jurisdiction over all lawyers preparing and issuing
securities, representing a public company in any way before the SEC, making or
preparing disclosures to the SEC, or otherwise providing advice on documents to be filed
with the SEC. See 17 CFR § 205.2(a). The last two provisions pull in attorneys
preparing disclosures of any type to the SEC, including disclosures of environmental
liabilities. Thus, even though most environmental attorneys do not consider themselves
to be securities lawyers, if those lawyers aid in preparing environmental disclosures they
are "practicing before the Commission" for the purposes of Section 307 of the Act and all
rules enacted under that Section. There are no cases at this time challenging the SEC's
interpretation of the extent of its power under Section 307 of the Act.
B. Up the Ladder Reporting Rules
The Up the Ladder Reporting Rule requires attorneys aware of evidence of a material
violation of law to report that evidence to the CEO or chief legal officer of the public
company. This rule is of particular importance to environmental attorneys, who normally
deal with environmental managers and not persons at the senior management level. This
rule does not directly affect the attorney-client privilege (though it does interfere in the
attorney-client relationship) because it does not directly require a breach of the privilege.
However, other parts of the Rule are of concern.
The Rule permits, but does not require, attorneys to reveal client confidences to the SEC
without the client's consent if the attorney believes that a material violation of law will
occur. See 17 CFR § 203.5(d)(2). Any attorney who chooses to breach the confidence
and reveal client confidences in such a manner would in most states be guilty of a
violation of ethics rules on confidentiality of client information (as distinct from the
evidentiary privilege). The SEC takes the position that its rules preempt all other
conflicting law, and that this preemption gives any attorney cover from ·an ethics
complaint. See 17 CFR § 205.1; 17 CFR § 205.6(c). However, it is not clear that state
ethics rules would recognize any federal preemption since this rule is not mandatory.
See, e.g., SCR 3.130(1.6), Commentary 20-22 (setting forth the principle that disclosure
of client confidences based on other law is only appropriate in Kentucky when compelled
and that there is a presumption against interpreting other law to compel disclosure). In
other words, in most states an attorney risks an ethics violation if he or she attempts to
rely on the SEC for authority to breach client confidences.
Also, the SEC has given itself the power to sanction attorneys who do not comply with
the Up the Ladder Reporting Rule. While this provision could only be invoked if the
SEC determines that a public company committed a material violation of law, the SEC
could use this provision to force attorneys to defend their own actions, and, in turn, reveal
client confidences to the SEC in their own d.efense.
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c. Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rules
The proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule would require attorneys who reasonably believe
that a material violation of law is ongoing or about to occur and that the material
violation of law is likely to result in substantial injury to the public company or its
investors must (1) withdraw from the representation; (2) provide written notice to the
SEC that the attorney had withdrawn from the representation for "professional
considerations"; and (3) disaffirm to the SEC any filing which contains any material
misrepresentations. The last provision applies to in-house attorneys, but in-house
attorneys are not required to quit their jobs.
This proposed Rule is designed to give notice to the SEC of potential violations of law,
which implicitly reveals a client confidence. The SEC has contended that the proposed
Rule is consistent with ABA Model Rules 1.16(a)(1) and 4.1, Comment 3, which allow
an attorney to withdraw from a representation if the attorney's services are or will be used
in commission of a fraud or crime. See also SCR 3.130(1.16) and 3.130(4.1) (equivalent
Kentucky ethics rules). However, some commentators have opined that the
circumstances permitting withdrawal in Model Rules 1.16(a)(1) and 4.21 are sufficiently
broad to protect client confidences, whereas a withdrawal under the SEC proposed Rule
will give the SEC much more information concerning the conduct of the client.
Given the outcry over the proposed Noisy Withdrawal rule, the SEC has tabled the Rule
for now and is offering for comment an alternate proposal which would allow the
attorney to withdraw upon notice to the public company. The public company would
then have the burden to notify the SEC of the withdrawal. This proposal has also been
criticized on the same grounds as the original proposal, i.e., that the SEC notice
provisions reveal client confidences no matter who is compelled to make the disclosure.
IV. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Public Information
In addition to the direct implications of the Act, U.S. EPA's roll-out of the ECHO Database,
along with other publicly-available data from U.S. EPA and equivalent state agencies, may have
implications for the reporting of environmental liabilities in securities filings.
A. Publicly-Available Information
The ECHO Database (Enforcement and Compliance History Online) provides the public
easy access to facility enforcement and compliance information for approximately
800,000 facilities for the past two years. Facilities regulated under the Clean Air Act
Stationary Source Program, Clean Water Act, National Pollutant Elimination Discharge
System, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are included in the ECHO
Database. Information on the ECHO Database is available on the U.S. EPA website at
http://www.epa.gov/echo/.
The ECHO Database is updated once a month, but some commentators have noticed a
longer lag time between posting of a proposed penalty assessment and correction to a
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final, negotiated penalty assessment, which could be much lower. An EPA spokesperson
has admitted that "there may be a small percentage of cases where EPA shows the
proposed penalty where the company has settled for a lesser amount." See "Sarbanes-
Oxley Act Forces Corporations to Focus on Environmental Disclosure Rules," 34
ENVIRONMENT REpORTER 36 at 2048-2049 (September 12, 2003).
Other regulatory agencies commonly post enforcement records on their websites, and any
member of the public can easily obtain enforcement information about public companies
from regulatory agencies through the Freedom of Information Act and its state
equivalents.
B. Interaction of Publicly-Available Information and the Materiality
Requirement
Item 103 of Regulation S-K of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires a public
company to disclose any non-routine liability, as well as any damage claims that exceed
10 percent of the net worth of a company OR probable liability that is equal to or greater
than $100,000. See Section II.A, supra. The ECHO Database will include information
on proposed penalty assessments, and that information will be available to the public and
the SEC. If a proposed penalty is listed in excess of $100,000, the SEC and stockholders
will be able to find that information to use as a double-check against disclosures. If that
proposed penalty is not disclosed pursuant to Item 103, the SEC or stockholders may be
under the impression that the public company failed to properly disclose liabilities, even
if the ultimate liability ended up being less than $100,000. This danger heightens the
need for public companies to periodically review the accuracy of information in the
ECHO Database and similar databases to make sure accurate penalty information is
posted.
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DIVISION OF WATER TRIENNIAL REVIEW OF WATER oUALITY STANDARDS
Overview
Water quality standards establish the regulatory goals for instream water quality to be
attained through limitations on individual discharges through effluent limitations and permit
conditions. The Clean Water Act vests states with primary responsibility for establishing water
quality standards subject to federal review and approval. IfUSEPA disapproves state water quality
standards the federal agency is obligated to promulgate replacement federal standards. States must
conduct a public review of their water quality standards at least every three years. Kentucky's
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet Division ofWater is currently engaged in
its triennial review of water quality standards.
NREPC Proposed Revision of Water ouality Standards
See summary at Tab 1.
Antide2radation Issue
The Clean Water Act does not specificallyaddress antidegradation. USEPA has promulgated
40 CFR 131.12 requiring states to adopt and implement antidegradation policies and implementation
procedures that provide three levels of protection of water quality - Tier 3 outstanding national
resource waters where virtually no activity lowering water quality is permitted; Tier 2 high quality
waters where activity lowering quality is permitted only if it is necessary to accommodate important
social and economic development; and Tier 1 use protected waters where lowering water quality is
permitted as long as water quality standards are met. USEPA has not adopted federal regulations
establishing procedures for implementation of the antidegradation program.
NREPC Division of Water adopted antidegradation implementation regulation 401 KAR
5:030 in 1995 which was partially approved and partially disapproved by USEPA in 1997. The
Division of Water revised 401 KAR 5:030 in 1999 and USEPA partially approved and partially
disapproved the regulation in 2000. USEPA's partial disapproval was based upon its position that
the criteria for identification ofhigh quality waters were inadequate and resulted in an insufficient
number of streams being identified as high quality. In 2001 environmental advocacy groups filed
with USEPA a notice of their intent to initiate a citizen suit challenging USEPA's failure to
promulgate a replacement antidegradation implementation regulation for Kentucky. In November
2002 USEPA proposed a replacement federal antidegradation implementation regulation for
Kentucky which was very general and lacked detailed procedures.
NREPC proposed significant revisions to 401 KAR 5:030 in the October, 2003
Administrative Register (See Tab 2). The proposed revisions included the folloW-ing:
(i) creation of a new high quality water category and a new impaired water category;
(ii) elimination of the use-protected category;
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(iii) exemption of coal mining discharges to exceptional and high quality waters from
review under the antidegradation program;
(iv) assignment ofall waters identified on the CWA Section 305 (b) Report to Congress
as impaired for any pollutant to the impaired water category for all pollutants thereby
obviating the requirement for antidegradation review;
(v) clarification that the exemption from antidegradation review for existing discharges
that are expanded by 20% or less is based upon previously permitted rather than
previous actual discharge levels;
(vi) requirement that new or expanded discharges to high quality waters that do not
accept special effluent limitations (Yl the otherwise allowable water quality-based
limitation) demonstrate that no technologically or economically feasible alternatives
exist (with alternatives considered to be economically feasible .if the cost does not
exceed 120% oforiginal proposal) and that allowing lower water quality is necessary
to accommodate important economic or social development (without utilization of
the USEPA guidance document);
(vii) default to high quality water category for all waters not specifically categorized;
(viii) conclusive presumption that approval of a POTW's regional facility plan
demonstrates compliance with the alternatives analysis and socioeconomic
demonstration requirements for new and expanded discharges by POTW to high
quality waters..
The Division of Water's proposed revisions to 401 KAR 5:030 have encountered opposition from
both environmental advocates (See Tab 3) and business interests (See Tab 4).
LEX:634359.1
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SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
401 KAR 5:002, 5:026, 5:029, 5:030, AND 5:031
5:002 Summary This amendment revises 401 KAR 5:002 to include two (2) new definitions and deletes
one (I) definition that is no longer necessary.. The two (2) new definitions are for the tenn, nE. coli" or
"Escherichia coli" and the category, "high quality water". The previously included category, "Use protected
water", has been deleted in this amendment·because the category name, "Impaired water", is now being used.
The tenn, "impainnent", already exists in the definitions regulation; therefore, there was no need to include a
defInition for "Impaired" in this amendment. This administrative regulation is being amended to accompany
the amended water quality standards, 401 KAR 5:026, 5:029, 5:030, and 5:031, filed on the same date.
5:026 Summary This amendment revises designated use infonnation for three (3) previously listed
surface waters, replaces one (1) previously listed surface water, and adds twelve (12) previously unlisted
surface waters. Two (2) of the three (3) revisions were to correct errors in the previous triennial review in
which cold water aquatic habitat use was mistakenly changed to wann water aquatic habitat use in the Nolin
and Rough rivers below their respective reservoirs. This amendment is necessary to update surface water
infonnation and assign use designations for previously unlisted surface waters. This administrative regulation
is being amended as part of the triennial review.
5:029 Summary This amendment restricts location of a mixing zone which would jeopardize endangered
or threatened aquatic species listed in the Federal Endangered Species Act. This amendment also prohibits
mixing zones for new discharges of l3ioaccumulative Chemicals of Concern (Bees) and phases out mixing
zones for existing discharges of these substances. This amendment is necessary to establish revised 'measures
to protect human health and aquatic life.
5:030 Summary This amendment revises surface water categories to include the new category of high
quality water as a default category and the newly named impaired water.. It also sets forth antidegradation
review requirements for several types of discharges. The amendment reorganizes much of the Section 1 text
and includes 166 surface waters newly classified as exceptional water that are reorganized into a new table.
The new table includes waterway segments for each listed water. Two (2) new docwnents are incorporated by
reference and two (2) documents previously incorporated by reference have been removed from this
administrative regulation. This amendment is necessary to address outstanding U.S. EPA disapproval. The
U.S.. EPA has disapproved this regulation after promulgation twice on August 7, 1997 and August 20, 2000.
At Volume 67 Federal Register No 220 p 68971 on November 14, U..S. EPA proposed a substitute rule that is
substantially the same as 401 KAR 5:029(1). The proposal, if enacte<L will leave Kentucky without
implementation procedures for its antidegradation program.
5:031- Summary This amendment updates water quality criteria to reflect scientific developments. Three
(3) tables previously divided in this administrative regulation have been consolidated into one (1) table and
placed in Section 6 of this administrative regulation.. Dilution flows for non-carcinogenic substances in fish
tissue and radionuclides were modified from 7Qlo to hannonic mean flow in order to more accurately reflect
the duration of exposure under· which these human health criteria were developed. This amendment is
necessary to revise criteria to protect human health and, to meet, federal recommendations..
Tab One
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jng increases are not anticipated to be necessary to the imple-
mentation of this amendment
(8) State whether or not this administrative regulation estab-
lishes any fees or directly or indirectly increases any fees: This
administrative regulation does not establish any fees nor directly or
indirectly increase any .fees~
(9) TIERING: Is tiering applied? Yes, tiering is applied in this
administrative regulation. Dischargers with mixing zones and
zones of initial dilution must comply with 401 KAR 5:029, Section
4. Dischargers with mixing zones must comply with the Endan-
gered Spedes Act and must limit discharges of bioaccumulative
chemicals of concern in. mixing zones. Dischargers with zones of
initial dilution must meet spealic aiteria s~cified in Section 4· of
this administrative regulation. This. administrative regulation. pro-
vides for a variance for coal remining operations.
FEDERAL MANDATE ANALYSIS COMPARISON
1. Federal statute· or ·regulation constituting the federal man-
date. There is no federal statute or regulation mandating that Ken-
tucky implement a' water pollution control program. For Kentucky to
maintain its delegation over the NPOES pennit program, the Clean
Water Act requires that Kentucky review its water quality standards
every three yearS and comply with the programmatic requirements
of 40 C.F.R. Part 131, induding the antidegrada~.policy.
2. State compliance standards. 401KAR 5:002, 5:026,5:029,
5:030, and'5:031 f the wat~r qualitystandards regulations.
. 3. Minimum or uniform standards contained in the federal
mandate. TheOean Water'Act requires designated uses, criteria,
standards and antidegradation policies in water quality standards.
·4. Will this administrative regulation impose stricter require-
ments, or additional or different responsibilities or requirements
than·those required by the federal mandate? No. .
5. Justification for the impos.ition of the ·stricter standard, or
additional or different responsibilities or requirements. There is no
stricter·.. standard or additional or different -responsibilities or re-
quirements.
FISCAL NOTE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
1. Does this administrative regulation relate to any aspect of a
10C21 government. induding any service provided by that local gov-
ernment? Yes
2. State what unit, part, or division of local government this
administrative regulation will affect This admin'istrative regulation
may affect the wastewater treatment operations of local govern-
ment if tl)ey will have new or expanded discharges into surface
waters of the Commonwealth.
3. SL,te, in.detail•. the aspect or service of local government to
which .thi~ administrative regulation relates, induding identification
of the applicable state or federal statute or regulation that man-
dates the aspect or service or authorizes the action taken .by the
administrative regulation. This amended administrative regulatiqn .
relates to local govemme~ts' wastewater treatment service. KRS
224.10-100.224.70-100. and 224.70-110 mandate action taken by
this administrative regulation.
4. Estimate the effect of this administrative regulation on the
expenditures and revenues of a local government for the first full
year the administrative regulation is to be in effect. If specific dollar
estimates cannot be detennined. provide a brief narrative to ex-
plain the fiscal impact of the administrative regulation.
Revenues (+1-): Cannot be detennined.
Expenditures (+1-): Cannot be detennined.
Other Explanation: Wastewater treatment costs may· increase
for those local governments that will have new or expanded dis-
charges into streams. rivers, and publidy.owned lakes and reser-
voirs. On the other hand, local governments withdrawing drinking _
water from these waters may have lower treatment costs because
these waters should have lower pollutant loads.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECnON·"CABINET
Department for Environmental Protection
Division of water
(Am~ndment)·
401 KAR5:030. Antidegradation policy implementation
methodology.
RELATES TO: KRS 146.200 to 146..360.. 146.410 to 146..535,
146.550 to' 146.570, 146.600 to 146.61:9,14~..990~224.Q1~10
(2~4 01 100), 224.01-400, 224.16-050,224.16.()!O~ ~4.;7~100·to
224.70-140, 224.11-100 to.224.71-·145.·224.7~100to~4~7.a;.;·120
(~4 4Q, 2~4 4], 244 4i, 224 50, 224 GO,~24 lO, 2~l11t~4 '7~J
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 146.220~ 146;.241~'~··146.270t
146.410, 146~450, 146.460,· 146.465, 224.1();;;100~ .224.t&-OSO.
224.16-060~ 224.7~100, 224.70-110, 40C.F.R. ·Pa.rts·.t30, .~]
131, 16 U.S.C~ 1271 et seq.., 1531et seq., ·33 ·U,.S~(:~13l1,·1313:
1314, 1315, 1316, 1341, 1342, 1344 . ". .
NECESS'ITY, FUNCTlON,ANDCONFORMITY: K~S 224.1(}'
100 requires the Natural Resources and Environmental ProteCtion .
Cabinet to develop and conduct a comprehensive"program" f«the
management of water resources and to provide for the~evenfiQn•.
abatement, and control of all water· pollUtion.. KRS····224~7o-100.
deClares that the policy of the Commonwealth is' toCOOserve its
waters for legitimate uses and' to: safeguard· from pOitution the.
uncontaminated waters of the Commonwealth. prevent·the aeation
of any newpoltution ·in the waters 'of the' Com'f1lOOWealth~ :and·
abate any existing pollution. This administrative regUlatiOn and 401
KAR 5:002, 5:026, 5:029, and 5:031 establish procedures. to pro-..
tect the surface waters of the Commonwealth, and thus' prote~·
water resources. This administrative regulation. establishes a
methodology to· implement the antidegradation policy contained ·in .
401 KAR 5:029 by establishing procedures. to control.water pollu-
tion in waters affected by that policy.
Section ·1. Categorization and Implementation. TtJe following
procedures shall govern implementation of the 'antidegra~tiOn
policy of 401 KAR 5:029, Section 1, for a poia)t source· discharge.
These antidegradation procedures shall not preempt the P9Wer· or
authority of a local government to provide byordinah~·for ahigher
level of protection. through antid~dation implementation fOr' a
discharger located within that 'Iocal governments jurisdiCtion'10-a
surface water of 'the Commonwealth. Surface waterS" shall be
placed. into one (1) of four (4) categories listed in this. $~ction and
each category shall have implementation 'procedures as foltows:
(1) Outstanding national resource water~ Surface waters of the
Commonwealth categoriZed as outstanding national resource wa-
ters are listed in Table 1 of·this subsection.
Table 1
SURFACE WATERS CATEGORIZED AS OUTSTANDING NATIONAL RESOURCE WATER
{
Stream Segment River Miles County·
Red River Upstream to Island off SR 1067 to Downstream Wild ·River Boundary at SR 49.2-68".6 ·MenifeeJWoIfe·
746
.......
Underground River Sys- Within Mammoth Cave National Park Boundary EdmonSQnI
tern . 'Hart/Barren
Big South Fork of Ctm- Downstream Wild River Boundary to Tennessee Stateline . 45.0-55.2 McCreaty
berland River
(3) Categonzation cntena. A surface water shall be categonzed as an outstanding national resource water .f the surface water meets, at a
minimum, the requirements for an outstanding state resource water as provided in 401 KAR 5:031, Section 8, and if the surface water' demon-
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strates national ecological or recreational significance.
(b) Implementation procedure. Water quality shall be inaintainedand protected in outstanding national resource water. A new discharger
or expanded discharge which may result in permanent or long-teon changes in water quality is prohibited. The cabinet may approve temp<xary
or short-leon changes in water: quality if the changes to the outstanding national resource water have no demonstrable impad on the ability· of
the water to support the designated uses. '.
(2) Exceptional water. Surface waters of the Commonwealth categorized as exceptional water are listed in Table 2 of this subsection.
Table 2
SURFACE WATERS CATEGORIZED AS EXCEPTIONAL WATER
Stream
Hobbs Fork·
Segment·
BIG SANDY RIVER BASIN
Mouth to Headwaters
River Miles
. 0.0-3.8
Hobbs Fork Unidentified Tributary·
lower PigeOn Branch·
Russell Fork·
Toms Branch·
Arabs Fork·
Big Caney Creek·
Big'Sinking Creek·
Meadow Branch·
Mid~le Fork Uttle Sandy River*
Nichols·Fork*
laurel Creek·
BI43ckwater Creek*
Botts Fork
Brushy Fork
Brushy Fork*
Bucket Branch·
Craney Creek
Devils Fork·
Grovers Creek·
Hobbs Fork to Headwaters
Left Fork to Headwaters
Clinch Field RR Yard off HWY 80 to Virginia Stateline
Mouth to Headwaters
LITTLE SANDY RIVER BASIN
~Iay Fork to Headwaters
Grayson.Lake to Headwaters
SR 986 to Clay Fork and Arab Fork
Mouth to Headwaters
.Mouth to Sheepskin Branch
Green Branch to Headwaters
Carter School Rd Bridge to Headwaters
LICKING RIVER BASIN
Eaton Creek to Greasy Fork
Mouth to landuse.Change
Cave Run lake Backwaters to Headwaters
Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth to Headwaters
Kincaid lake Backwaters to Unidentified Tributary
0.0-0.55
0.5-1.7
14.4-16
0.0-1.4
0.0-4.7
0:0-14.9
'10.7-1"5.2 .
0:0-1.4
0.0-3.6
O.~·1~9
·0.0-2.1
·0.6-5.0
0.0-5.7·
0.0-1.9
0.0-10.0
. 0.5-3.4
Martin
Pike
Pike
Pike
.carter
.....~:.
Elliott· .
EIIi.ott···
Elliott
.:~~~n ..
Menifee
. M~san.
Rowan
Pendleton
licking River
North Fork of Ucking River*
Siabcamp Creek
South Fork Grassy Creek·
Welch Fork·
West Creek*
SR ~11 to unnamed Rd off Slatey·Point.Rd
Cave Run lake Backwaters to Devils' Fork .
Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth to Greasy Creek
Mouth to First Road Crossing
Mouth to Headwaters
KENTUCKY RIVER BASIN
154:5-165.0 .
0.0-1.0,
0.0-9.5
Rowan·'·-'--0':,.'"
Pendleton
"Menifee
Robertson
Bi9.Double Creek·
Bill Branch·
Buffalo Creek·
Cavanaugh Creek·
CawOod Branch*
Cedar Creek Unidentified Tributary·
Chester Creek~
Clear Creek·
Clemons Fork·
Coles ·Fork·
Drennon Creek·
East Fork of Indian Creek*
Elisha Creek*
E.mily Run
Evans Fork·
Falling Rock Branch·
Mouth to Headwaters
:Mouth to Right Fork and left Fork'Creek
Mouth to Right Fork and left Fork .
South Fork of Station Camp Creek to Foxtown Rd
Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth to East Fort.ClearCreek
Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth to Headwaters .
Flat Bottom Road Crossing to Town Branch
West Fork of Indian Creek to Headwaters
Elisha Creek Rd Crossing to Right·Fork and Middle Fork Elisha
Creek
Mouth to Unidentified Tributary
Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth to 'Headwaters
e-6
0.0-6.5 .Clay.
o'
0.0-2.2 Leslie -
0.0-1..6 ()Nsl~Y'
0.0-5.3. Jackson··
0.0-2.1 Leslie
0.0-1.4 Owe'n
0.0-2.8 Wolfe. "
0.0-8.8 WoodfQrd
0.0-4.7 .BreaUlitt
0.0-5.5' Breathitt.
10.5-11.9 .Henty-··
0.0-8.5 Men~fee
0.95-1.7 lesli~---
0.0-3.9 Henry
0.0-2.9 Es·till
0.0-0.6 Br~thi"
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Gladie Creek* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-8.4 Menifee
Glenns Creek Unidentified Tributary Landuse Change to Headwaters 0..2-1.3 Woodford
Goose Creek Mouth to Laurel Creek 0.0-9.3 Oay
Griers Creek* Urban Area to Unidentified Tributary 2.9-3.4 Woodford
Grindstone Creek* Mouth to Headvlaters 0.0-2.2 Franklin
Hardwick Creek Mouth to Little Hardwick Creek 0.0-3.2 Powell
Hell For Certain Mouth to Big·Fork 0.0-2.1 LesUe
Hines Creek* Mouth to Hines Creek Road Crossing 0.0-2.4 Madison
Honey Branch Mouth toHeadwat~rs 0.0-1.4 leslie
Hopper Cave* Branch Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-1.6 Ja<;kson
Indian Cree.k· BaCkwater Kentucky River to Headwaters 0.55-4..7 Carroll
Indian Fork* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-3.3 Shelby
John carpenter Fork* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-1.5 BreaU:litt
Left Fork Big DolIble Creek* Mouth to Headwaters O.O~1.5 Clay
UneFork* .Defeated Creek ·to ·Headwaters 11.6-27..5 Letcher
Une Fork Uni~ntifiedTributary* (LCW) Mouth lo..Headwa_ers 0..0-0.55 LetCtl~
Uttle MiUseat :8rclnCh· Mouth to Headwaters O.G-1.2 are~lhitt
UtUe Sixmite Creek~ Mouth to Headwaters O.()';~.2 H.en!y
Lulbegrud Creek .. MQUth to F·alls Branch 0.0-7..3 OarklPowell
Middle FO!"< ·of.Kentugky River Moo·th to Upper Twin Creek O.Q-.12.5 Lee
Middl.e Fork·Of KentuCky River Hyden; Kentu,*y to Greasy Creek 76.1·-84.0 Leslie
·Middle Fork Of Red River Sou.tIl ·Fork Red River to Natoral 8ri~ge Slate· Park lake 1.8-8.3 Powell
MHI~.Cr~~· Mputh to Headwaters 0.0-8.3 Owen
Mitlseat~eta1lctl~ . Mou'th ·to t1eadwaters· 0.0-1,.9 Btea~i~
.-
Muddy Creek* EDiston, Kentycky to Viney Creek .. 1·3~4-20.2 Ma~fsoo
Musselman Cr~1<* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-8.4 Grant
Red ·Bird River Mouth to Big Creek ·0.0-15.0 Clay
Right Fork of Buffalo Creek· Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-11·.2 Owsley
Roaring. Fork* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-0.85 Breathitt
Sand Ripple Creek* Mouth to Headwaters 0..0-3.9 Henry
SevemCreek· Mouth. to· North Fork Severn Creek 0.0-2.8 Owen
Shelly Rock Fork* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-0.6 Breathitt
Sixmile Creek· Little Sixmile to Dam 6.9-14.7 Henry
South Fork of Kentucky River Mouth to Sexton Creek 0.0-27.7 .Owsley
South Fork of Red River Mouth to Sandlid< Fork 0.0-3.9 Powell
South Fork ofStation Camp·Creek* Mouth to Rock Lick Creek 0.0-9.6 Jackson
Spruce Branch· Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-1.1 ·leslie
Station Camp Creek* landuse Change.to South Fork Station ~mp Creek 19.0-22.3 Estill
Steer· Fork* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-2.9 Jackson
Sturgeon Creek· Duck Fork to Little Sturgeon Creek 1.3-13~7 lee
Sugar Creek* Landuse Change to Headwaters 0.8-3.8 leslie·
WarFork* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-13.7 Jackson
Wolfpen Creek* Mouth to Headwaters O~O-3.2 Menifee
SALT RIVER BASIN
Brashears Creek Guist Creek to Bullskin and .Clear Creek 13.0-25.5 Shelby
Cedar Creek* Mouth to Greens Branch 0.0-5.1 Bullitt
Chaplin Rive'" . Thompson Creek to Comishville,.KY 40.1-53.7 Washington
GuistCreek Mouth to Jeptha Creek 0.0-15.4 Spencer
Harts Run* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-2.3 Bullitt
Otter Creek* Landuse Change to East Fork and Midd1e Fork Otter Creek 1.7-2.7 Larue
Overalls Creek· Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-1.3 Butlitt
Salt Lick Creek· Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-8.4 Marion
Sulphur Creek* Mouth to Chesse Uck and Brush Creek 0.0-9.7 Anderson
West Fork Otter Creek* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-4.7 Larue
C-7
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Wilson .Creek* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-17.0 Bullitt
GREEN RIVER BASIN
Beaverdam Creek* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-14.1 Edmonson
cane Run* Nolin River Backwaters to Headwaters 1-6.5 Hart
caney Fork· Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-6.6 Barren
Clifty··Creek* Barton Run to Western Kentucky Parkway 7.3-17.2 Grayson
Clifty Creek* Utde Clifty Creek to SUlphur Uck 7.7~13.2 Todd.. _--
EastFork little Barren· River~ Red Uck Creek to Flat Creek 19-20.2 Me.t~lfe
BUs.Fork· Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-3..2 -Adair
Falling Timber Creek* Land~seChange to.Headwaters 7-15.5 - _Metcalfe-.
Rddlers Creek* - Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-5.8 Breckinridge
Forbes Creek· Mouth to Unidentified Tributary 0.0-3.9 Christian
Gasper River* Oear Fork to Wiggington Creek 17.0-35.2 Lg9an
Goose Creek·' Mouth to' Uttle Goose Creek 0.0-8.1 CaseY
Green·River Downstream Mammoth Cave National Park-Bou-ndary to Lynn 181.7-207.8 Edmonson
Camp Creek
Green River-Unidentified Tributary* Landuse Change to Headwaters 0.8-3.2 Adair-
Halls Creek* Unidentified Tributary to Headwaters 9.6-12.1 -Ohio'
UckCreek~ Mouth to Headwaters - : O.~9:9 -Simpson
_Unders· Creek· - Mouth to Sulzer Creek 0.Q~7.7 Hardin
.Uttle·Beavei"dam Creek Mouthto'SR 743 '0.0-11'.3 Warren:
Uttle ShQrt Creek· Mouth.to-Headwaters 0.0-3.0 Grayson
~Ynn Camp.Creek* Mouth to Undy Creek 0.0-8.3 Hart
Mcfarland -Creek* Grays Branch· to Unidentified _Tributary 1.4-4.8 .Christian
Meeting Creek· Uttle Meeting Cre~ktQ P~tty Branch 5.2:'13.8 Hardin'
~.
Muddy Creek* Landuse'Change to Headwaters 13~0-15.5 Ohio
North. Fork Rough River* Buffalo Creek to- Reservoir Dam· 23.44-28.1 Breckinridge
Peter Creek* Caney Fork toDi)' Fork 11.6-18.5 Barren
Pond Run*· landuse Change' to Headwaters 1.4-6.8 Breckin-
ridge/Ohio
Rough River* linders.Creek to Vertrees.Creek' 136.9-147.8 Hardin·'
Russell Creek* Mouth to Columbia VVWTP 0~0-40~0 Adai-r
Russell'Creek* Reynolds Creek to Headwaters 55.9-68.2 Adair
Sixes.Creek* Wild Branch to Headwaters 2.0-7.5 Ohio
Sulphur Branch* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-2.0 . Edmonson
Trammel Fork* Mouth to Tennessee Stateline 0.0-30.15 Allen
West Fork Pond River· Unidentified Tributary to E;ast Branch Pond River 12.7-22.5 Christian
White Oak Creek Unidentified,'Tributary· Hovious·Rd Crossin9.to.SR 76 . 0.4-3.0 Adair
LOWER CUMBERLAND RIVER BASIN
Crooked Creek· lake Barkley Backwaters to H_eadwaters - 4.0-9.4 . Trigg
Donaldson Creek· Craig Branch to Unidentified Tributary 6.9-10.3' Trigg
ElkCreek* Tennessee Stateline to Dry Branch 7.5-9.8 togan-
Sugar Creek·* Uck Creek to Unidentified Tributary 2.1-6.7 UVi~gston
West Fork -of Red River· Tennessee Stateline to Montgomery Creek 16..1-26.5- Christian
Whippoorwill Creek* Mouth to Vicks Branch 0.0-13.0 logan .'
TENNESSEE RIVER BASIN
Blood River~ : McCullough Fork to Tennessee Stateline 12.2-15.65 Calloway
Oarks River Persimmon. Slough to Middle Fork Creek-- 26.6-28.4 - Marshall-
.Grindstone'Creek* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-2.3 Calloway
Panther.Creek· Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-5.1 Calloway
Pan.ther -Creek* Channelization to Impoundm~nt 1.1-6.0 Graves
Panther Creek Unidentified·Tributary· .Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-2.1 Graves
Soldier Creek· Mouth to South Fork Solider 0.0-5.3 Marshall
SUgar Creek· Kentucky lake Backwaters to Buzzard Roost Road 2.1-3.3 Calloway
Sugar Creek· Mouth to Unnamed Reservoir 0.0-4.0 Graves
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Trace Creek* Mouth to Neeley Branch 0.0-3.0 Graves
West Fork Clarks River* Soldier Creek to Duncan Creek 19.7-22.7 Grqves
Wildcat Creek* Ralph Wright Road Crossing to Headwaters 3.5-6.7 Calloway
TRADEWATER RIVER BASIN .
East Fork Flynn Fork* Landuse Change to Headwaters 2.54.6 CatdwelJ
Piney Creek* Lake Beshea.r Ba~aters to tif)adwaters 4.5-1.0.2 Cal_U
Pi~ey ~reek Unidentified Tributary·
SandOck Creek*
Mouth to. Headwaters
C~ITlP Creek to -Headwaters
'O.(}-2.9
4.9-9..0
~ldWell
Ch~stian
SandUd<. Creek,Unidentified Tributal)'*
Tradewater River· '
M~,to Headwaters
Drip~~ngSprif!9S Branch to Buntin:LakeDam
0.0-1.4
TdmQ1e
L~, ... ,
Crittefid~ '"
Boone
~'
3..2-5~,~
O~~t.4
1.+11.4
OHIO RIVER BASfN ' '
(Main Stem ~d"Mino1-Ttlblitaries)
S:R 725 to. UttieMassac Creek'
". . . . .... .. .' .. ".. .
private.Roa~ CrO$SiOO t~ Mea~tS'
RtJsh .Cree~.to Cft:y lake 'Oetm
Mouth to Headwaters
Yell9Wbank Cr$E!k*
W~t Fotk.MassaC·Creek*·
aiQ Sug~ Creek UnJden~~ed Tributary*
Double Ud< Creek·
Middle Fork· f:Aassac Creek*
Garrison'~1<~
Com Creek Unidentifi~TributatY*
Crooked~k*
Massac~~n~entifi~Tributary'"
Kinnioonick Creek*
·S~Creek*
MetropQlis
Swan
entirel~e
Entire~k~ Ballard
Jackson Creek*
~USSISS1P,PfRIVER BASIN
.(Ma~n St~'~d :Minor.T~Utari~$) .
Mouth to Hea,dwaters 0-.0-2.6 Graves
Obion Creek· Hum.cane Creek to Little Creek 25.2-35.5 Hickman
Ter:api" ·Creek· Tennessee Stateline to .Headwaters 2.8-7
Murphy'S Pond Entire Pond and Preserve Area Hickman
UPPER CUMBE'RLANO RIVERBAS1N
--aad ,lranch*----- Mouth to Headwaters
Bark Camp Creek· Mouth to Martins Fork 0.0-3.95
Beaver Creek* Mouth to Freeman Fork·and Middle Fork 0.0-6.5 'McCreary
Bee Uck Creek Mouth to Unidentified Tributary O~o-5.7 PtJ1aski
Browni~Creek· Blacksnake Branch to Headwaters 9.0-1.6.0 Bell
Brush Creek
'" .' .
. Wolf Creek to, Reemergence of Sinking Creek 1.1-7.6 Ro~casUe
Brushy Creek·
BuckCreek*
Bunches Creek*
Mouth to Headwaters
Lake Cumbertaod',Backwa,ters to Headwaters
Mouth to Headwater
.Pulaski
Cane Creek* Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-12.0 'laurel
OiftyCreek Mouth to Rocky Branch'
Cogur Fork* , Mouth to Headwaters 0.0-7.9 McCreary
Cumberland River
Dog Slaughter Creek*
Wild River Boundaries
Mouth to North Fork and South F()fk
558.5-574.6
0.0-1.1
MCCreary!
, Whitl~y
Eagle Creek·, Mouth to Hea~waters ,0.0-6.3 McCreary
Fugitt Creek*
Horse Lick Creek*
Howards Creek·
Land~eChange to Headwaters,
Mouth to Clover Bottom
Dale HollOW la~e Backwater~ to Headwaters' CUntPtl
Indian Creek*
.Jackie Branch*
Laurel fork to Barren Fork
MQU,th t().Headwaters
2.~.7
0.0-1.7
Kilburn Fork Mouth to Headwaters Q.0-6.3 McCreary .
laurel Creek M9uth to laurel Creek Dam 0.0-9.2 McCreary
e-g
Laurel Fork·' '.
Laurel Fork~
.UtUe South Fork·of Cumb.erland River*
.Marsh, Cre.ek* '.
Martins Fork of Cumberland River
McFadand Creek
Meshack CreeJ<
Middle Fork Rockcastle River*··
Mud Camp Creek*
Mud 'camp Creek*
Poor fork Cumberiand Riv~
Presl~~ House Branch*
Pundleoneamp Branch*
Rock Creek*
~~ Creek ~ni~~ntified Tributary*'
..'RocicCreek Unidentifie(j,Tributary~ .
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.Tennessee Statel.ine to Tiny Branch/Pine Creek
,Mouth to Headwaters
Mouth.to Langham·Branch
.Laurel Creek to Headwaters
Wild River Boundaries
'Little McFarland Creek to Spring Branch
. Moutht~lHeadwaters
'. Mouth to'Horse Lick Creek
Mouth to Collins Branch
Unidentified Tributary to Headwaters
Lake Cumberl~nd.·Backwaters to Carpenter Fork
Franks Creek fa Headwaters
.Mouth ·to Headwaters
Mouth to Headwaters
White Oak" Creek to Tennessee Stateline
Mouth totief3.dwaters
Mo~th to. Headwaters
. Wild' River'Boundaries
4.2-13.0
0.0-12.2
0.0':'35.6
8.6-26.2
27.4-31.3
0.8-6.2
0.0-2.8
0.0-7.8
3.7-8.4
14.5-22.0 .
46.1-51.7
0.0-1'.5
0.0-1.9
4.1-21.9
O.O~1.9
O.O~1.15·
8.5-24.4
Jackson
'McCreary
Harlan
Monroe
Jackson
Cumberland
MonrQ.~/Cum
berland
letCher
Letcher
McCreary
.McCreary
. MCCreary .
MCCreary
Laurell
·.polaski
ShilialcihCreek* ··Mouth to Headwaters
5inkjng .Crf;)e~* Mouth·to.White.Oak Creek
:SulPhur Creek.. ·· . ·Dale ·t:ftillow .Ba·cJ.<waters to Headwaters.
South ForkofOog·Slaughter.Creek* MouthJo Headwaters
South Fork. RockcastieRiver Mou:th to White Oak Creek
Watts Branch'" MoUth to··Headwaters
Watts Cr~e~* , Lake to Headwaters
*Waterbodies in the cabinet's reference· reach network
'0.0-5.5
0.0-9.8
0.0-4..6
O.O-5~6
2.2-4.3
Bell
Laurel
Whitley'.
Laurel
MCCreary
.Harian
.(alCategorization criteria~ A surface water shall be categorized
as·an ·exceptional.water. ifaoy·.ofthe: following criteria are met:·
1. Sunacewater is'designat~d'asa Kentucky··Wild River·and is
not categorized as an.outStanding· national resource water; ,
2. Surface,:water. .is. designated. as afl" outstanding' state .re-
·source water .that does. nQ1-supp6,l--.afederally threatened· :or en-
dangeredaquatic species;
3. Surface water contains either of.the.following:
a. A. fish ,community that is rated "excellent" by· the' use of the
Index of Biotic Integrity ·included in "Development and. Application
of the Kentucky Index of· Biotic Integrity (KISI,... 2003, incorp9rated
by reference in,Section;30fthis administrative'r~ulation;or "
&~:·.A maaoinvertebrate,::community that· is·· rated "excellent" by
the Macroinvertebrate Bioassessment Index itlduded in "The
KentU(;ky Macroinvertebrate Bioassessment Index", 2003',. incorpo- .
rated by reference in Section 3 of this administrative regulation; or
4.. Surface water in the ·cabinefs reference reach network.
(b) ImplementatiQn procedure.
1. Dischargers listed ·.in:' dauses··a through e···of this· subpara-
g'raph are·subject. to 'control by existing cabinet programs· induding
the Kentucky· Pollution . Discharge Elimination System; program.
Subparagraphs ·2 through 9 ..Of.·thIS· paragraph shall not apply to
those" dischargers identified in dauses a through. e of .this para'-
graph,.but·the .cabtnetshall,assure water quality. necessary ,to fully
· protect existing,·~ses.. .::,
a. Storm ,water discharge;'
b~' Coal mining discharge·. subject to -regulation under the Sur-
face Mining Control and'RedamationAct and 33 U.S.C. 1344;
Co DOmestic sewage:discharge·Jrom a-single-family residence;
,d~Concentrated :animal feeding'operations; and
·e. KPDES permitren'ewalsthat result in less than a twenty (20)
· Percent increase in pollutant loading from the previously permitted
"', pOllutant loading~ .' .
.I .2. Zones·of initiafdilution·are prohibited in exceptional water
,. unless assigned before the effective, date of this administrative
regulation.
3. A KPDES p~rmit for a new discharger or' exp'anded dis-'
Charge into· exceptional: water·· shall contain effluent limitations for
the entire effluent and shall.:have ·aneffluentquality of:
a. A· chronic:whole· effluent toxicity Urnitation shall.apply unless
an acute whole effluent toxicity limitation ·is. more.stringent; .and
b.. Chloride limitations: shall be based· on·. the. domestic water
supply criterion: of 250 ·mgll.. -
4. A KPDES, permit for: a. new domestic sewage discharger or
expanded domestic'sewage discharge into'exceptional Water shall
contain effluent· limitations for the entire effluent· and shall have an
effluent quality of:· . . .. ..
a. No. greater than ten (10) nigIJfive' (5) day carbonaceous
biochemical oxygen .demand; .. '
b. No greater..than two'(21mgll ammonia-nitrogen;
c. No greater than 0.01Q.'mg/itolaLresiduaLchlorine;
d. No greater than ten:(1"0lmgJItolalsuspended solids;
e~ No greater than on.e (1) .mgll total phosphorous:
f. A rninimum'ofseven (7) mglldissolved oxygen;
g. An arithmetic mean value for fecal coliform bacteria not to
exceed 200 colonies per ,100 milliliters during a period of thirty (30)
·consecutive days'or '400 colonies per 100 'milliliters during a period
of seven (7) consecutive·'days, or an arithmetic mean for Escher-
ichia .coli ·bacteria not to exceed 130 colonies per 100. milliliters
during a periOd of thirty (30) consecutive days· or 230 colonies per
100 milliliters during a period' of seven (7) consecutive days; and
h~ The discharge shall not cause the average instream dis-
solved oxygen concentration to be' less than six and zero-tenths
(6.0)mg/t
5. A KPOES permit for a new non-domestic discharger or an
expanded non-dom~stic discharge into exceptional water shall be
restricted to no more than one-half (1/2) of the water quality based
limitations that would have been permitted at standard design con-
ditions.
--6-.-11 the permit applicant accepts the effluent limitations re-
quired by this paragraph, the KPOES permit snail be issued with
these effluent limitations 'and additional requirements of the Ken-
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lucky:: P()1Iutign:·· Disd)ar9$ ~Iiminatioo· System. program'. without
fudttet~a~lS'datiDn,r=e"iewi
7~:··lf~~·aPP".~nt.:1iQes·not:~ccepthe efftuetltlimitations
reEJtri£~:by:~,thtS:'p~grapb~' f.he:~:fiIP~t shalf: demon$frate·~'to .the .
sa.~::-ottt1e;:cabk1et:.tI$t' no.technological1yof·eoonomically
feaSibte~~:alte~dti~s-:existand that allowing lower water' quality is
neceSsa!Y..·:t(l:·aGCQm~odate:;important economic or social devel-
op~t~::jl1i~·tfl6:;·afea;.~in:which the water is' 'ocated.' Analtemative
treatment shatt'be!deeme<l economically feasible, if the capital and
operating.cost does not exceed one hundred twenty (120) percent
of the ~pital and<:o~rating.cost of the discharge propo$aL The
·alternatives analysis and socioeconomic demonstration shall·follow
"e .g~idelines .in tllnterim Economic' Guid.~nce for' Water Quality
Standar(JsWorkbook'\ EPA, March 1995 incorporated by reference
in Section':,3 'of this· administrative regulation.· The. alternatives
analysis shall consider the following: .
a.Discharge tQ other treatment facilities;
b. Use Of Q"'er dischar~ locations;
c. Water reuse or recycle;
d~ Process and treatmenfaltematives;
e. On-site'orsubsurfa-ce:disposal; and'
f. Any:other: examination.of alternatives to lowering water qual,..
ity deemed appropriate by the cabinet or the applicant.' .
8. Apennit. applicant who. has failed to demonstrate to the
satisfaction"of.the cabinet the' necessity for lowering' water quality
.'shatl meet the effluent-·limitations required by this paragraph and
additional" requirements.of the Kentucky Pollutipn Discharge Elimi-
n(ition System. pfog(arn:'.. . . .
9. A permit-- applicant who demonstrates to the satisfaction'of
the' cabinet the necessity.::for lowering water·quality shall meet the
water quality'basedlimitatiQlls, as outlined in 401. KAR 5:031~'
·(3).High quality wa~er. . .
(a)Cate9oriz~tionqriteria. A surface water shall be categorized
as ahigh"quality water if:·the,.surface·Water fully supports all appli-
cable designated uses·and·if·the surface water is not listed in Table·
1.or 2 of this'section as' an Out$~nding national.resource water or
.anexceptiOnal water. ",
(b).lmplementation procedure..
1. Dischargers. "sled in dauses a through e of this SUbpara-
graph are subjecf to contrQIJ)Y existing cabinet programs induding
the Kentucky ~pUution' DisGt\arge.: Elimina.tiQn·Syslem program.
SUbp~ragraphs. 2.' thrQ\Jgh :6· of' this ·paragrapl1. shall.' not apply to
those dischargers: iden'tified'in' dauses a through' e' of' this para-
.graph. but the.~binet·shallassure water quality necessary·to fully
protect exis~ng tis.es~ Facilities that disCharg~.pollutants not found
iii Table ·1. of: Sectio:nJ;:of.401 KAR 5:031·are·subjeet'lo control by
existing, cabinet'programs ·and·mU$t demonstrate to thesatisfacti.on
of..the·cabinetan:altematives analysis and socioeconomic demon-
'strationpurSuant to this~paragraph~ '
.a: Stpnn water. ~ls~arge;. .'. '.
·b. Coal mirling'discharge subject .to regulatiQA' under the Sur-
···face.Mining·CQntrol and:Reciamati.on Act·anQ.33 U..S.C. 1344;
c. Oom~tie· sewa~'disCha!mffrOin a· single:-family residence;
d. Concentratedanimal:feeding:operatioos; and
e. KPDES.permit·renewals· tt:tat ·result in less than· a twenty (20) .
percent increase in pollutant.loading,from·the previously permitted
pollutantloading~
2. The pollutants of the entire effluent of a KPDES· permit for
discharge into high 'quality water shall be restricted to no more than
. one-half (112) aftha water·quality.based limitations that. would have
been' permitted ·under standard design conditions, for· .pollutants
.listed in Table 1 of Section 6 of 401 KAR 5:031.
3. If. the .permit applicant accepts the· effluent limitations· re-
quired QY this paragrapt:l•.·the KPDES·· permit shall be· issued with
these· effluent 'limitations:.arid·. any addition~I'requirements' of the
Ken~u~y POtlutiQn Oi~charg~ Elimination System~program 'without
furth~r antideg~dati9~1review:
4. Ifthe permit~ppiiCant'does·notaccep~ the effluent-lim'itations
r~uired' by~Jhis.p~r3'graph,· the.·applicanl-mayrequest water' quality
based Iimita.tions··permittedat-"'s~nd~·rddesigQ,conditions·:... ln mak..
ing this r~e.st. the·.applicant·shall··demonstrate to tt(e satisfaction
of ..the 'cabinet that· n9,··techngica.ly,'or economically "feasible al-
ternatives exist-,alJd th~t aUowing·lowerwater quality is necessary
to accommodat~ important economic or social development in the
area in·whidl·the,water is located. An a'temative;;.trealfnent·~~,t·
deemed ecOnomically feasible, if· the'" 'capjtat,:'~~d:'Q~~~~~£:
El~ti5~~~:ii&iJ/
analysis and socioeconomic demonstrati(jA:=f~r~·~~;:T~9r_~f_l!f~;... -·
The alternatives. analysis and socioeconomi(t:.dEUinon$1r.~!i.~i~_$~a~t<.,
consider the following: . .
a. Discharge' to other treatment facilities;
b. Use of other discharge loca~ons;
C., Water relise: or recyde;
d.Process.and treafinent alternatives;
e'. On-site or sub-surface ~isposal;
f. Any'other examination of altematives·'to lowering.water.gual-.
ity deemed appropriate by the cabinet or the applicant; .
".The positive or beneficial effect 'Qfthe'@cility on an exJsting·
environmental or public health problem; .. . . . -
h. The increase .or. avoidance of a decrease in employment;
i. The increase.in.production.level;
j .. The increasein·operational e.fficiency;
k. Industrial·..ar· commercial· b~nefit:to the community; and
[ Any :other economic or sociai'·benefit to the communitY'! ...' .'
5~ A pennit :.applicantwho .has:~'faile(f:to': demons~te' to' the····
satisf~ction ..of. ttte. "(;3bioet the necessity fOrloweriflg·)Y~tecqu~Uty:~
shall meet the effluent limitations. required' by: this paragraph '.. and,'
addition~I,.regUir~ments .of the Kentucky Pollu.tion.·DiScharge·;·Elimi-;
nation Syst~m program., . . ..
. 6. A' permit'applicant .who demonstrates. to' the·~tis·faction.of
the· cabinet the;f)ecessity· for lowering 'water quality ·shall,m~t:the·:
w~terquality.based IimitatiOl1s: as: ouUined in 401 ·~5:031~··.:·:.··· :... . '-.
(4llmpair~~ter. . . .
(a)Categprization criteria. A surface,·~ter. ~tegQnzed: as
.impaired for applicable designated uses .sha" be a wa~er iderltified.
pursuantto··33 ·U~S.C. 1315. SUrface··watercategorized·a.$'fT1P~ired
shaUbe assess~'bythe cabinet' as nof~lIy'suppoi]i1g'aoy~~ppli-'
cable desigriat~~ses. . . ". .' .
(b) Implementation procedure.. All existing. uses shall be prO-·
tecte.d and the.··level· of' water 'g~ality necesSary'to protect:those
existing t)ses shall.be assured.ilf imp~ifed:water.. The:proqess ·to:---
allow a discharge into an impaired-water' and toassure.::pl"Otectl'on '.
ofthe water is: regulated by ··the· requirements in- the. ~eotucky'Pol-"
lution Di$Cha,.ge; Elimination. System Program~. [1~pIQAlQ~tatig~.··of,:"·
A Ati~Qgr:adatigR R.gli~ . T~Q'·fgngu~A9 p~gQQd\lrQ~ .GRail .' gg"Q~';'­
i~pIQ~QAtatigA' gf. tRQ aAtidQgl=adatioA poli,¥·gf. "4'0.1 J(AR ·~·020r:>
SQ~tiOR 1 i for a. pgiAt GoyrGQ diG~~argQ' . '.' ..' '.
(1 ) Cat&9~R.;laliQA Syr;;faw ..,.IQnj Gt:.allbQ plaQQ"i~tOgRQ (1l;
of tRf.QQ (~.) ~·t8·gORQ6i.· ..' . ... ." -
(a~·O.YtGbAdiA9 AatioAal·~..gy~~· ."(at8r£· . . .
1 SYAa~ ¥QIQr lAat ~QQt&f 'at'81 ~iRi~\.IAl.i .\RQ ·rgquir&Al·QRtGif·
foraR'QUt&t4RdiR9 ~&ta'tg:' 'rQ&oY~'Q '~·~tQrQI:a&&ifi,.~tiQA fgYRd:i~':':401~~
t(AR 5'031 $Q~iQA.1i aA~. '..... .'. . ...
:2 SydaQQ u'atQr t~at dQ~g~~tmIQ .. tg ~Q'QfRatigAal QG~IQgi~Q~;'~
or FQQFQatioRal' ..igRifiGaRe.Q . . .
(bl:Exfi:QptiQAallt(aw,:g-
1 SyFta~Q ,.,~tQr dQ~igRatQda& a 'I(QRlu(;ky'Niid' ·Ri¥.r'·;~&ilAkJ.g,~)
it is GatQgQR%Qd aG aAo\.itGtaRdiAg.AatiQRal· :tQ&gurcQ ·'''a.~~ ~
2 OU'SbAdiAg. gtatQ FQGoyrgJ "gt~u;:·ttlat"- d<)Q'&" Agt'&'lp'pciJA~:ai:,~~
fgdQr'aIlY'U:u:QatQAQdor .QAdaA9Qf.Qd aquati.¢ &p9(Wie'&j.",
.3:" syaaeg· ,ft(.·'er ttlal f4.1lIy ~\lpportG' ':311', appA;~QtQ··;gg.i~t.:~:
YEQGaAd .QORbiAS·· . .
a '" A fiG~ QQA.1~YAity that is" F4i1tQd tlQ":QQI1Q1:.1t"~'by:-til.:·W&'.~:~Q~~t~;
IAdQX of Bioti,.' IAtg9Rty iAGIYd9diA ft••Qtf;lOd&··'fg'rrA'~'Qi_:~~~t.:;~~.
,.al IAtQgRty. gf ~t.laa~Q ' Alat8.r;;tI f. iA'Wgr=pgg1;Qd-:b)4:.'~fQ".AC8:~iA:::$Q¢::~
tiOA .·4 Qt..&hii adA.liAiQl(.atiQA a:QgYI'w1*~Rr.gr;· :
b" A '~aQroiw"'ttQb'r.alQ· ~gFR""Ai.,;:tfi~tJ;:,::~'~~g·)(¢Q1f~~!:b";!;.
thQ" ~b:qrgiR''''QAQIar:Qt9' -Sioa·&"G·Qc..g.UJAt~IA'd*~·iAdU~:,tiA~~;t.SZ'~·~;ij}.,
iA"QRGbrate SioaGGeGGFRQAt; ·IAdg""'"P':S·w&"~:''Qf';;'R.:,:I~~.'·~la.k
tQa....eegr9giQ~ i~'KQAtuQk¥'\ iAg~~r;aN'd·"b';~r:Q"J.i.~.;;j"·~;~QiQ.Il~
4 of"th'is' QdFRiRis·tI<atirtQ' rQgClfa·tiQAl'·.aAGI·s:
4 . "''alg'r iA U:lQ .QabiAQt't ·t:Qfat:Q~;··~a·gh>·;AQ~irgfiiki",· "
(~)'. I 'G8 p~t.~d;" "'at~"~·· I r~;Q'" p·~"Ct8'd·~,·(at~t:··i.':,;M~aN~;~A~·f.·,
UEleQl···ir:i :SQetiQA··3::·gf·t~&···ad"'iRi$1r.atPle-..rQg~lallQA:3·QQ':iQ.,.,.t$tal\'cIiAg~f""':''':'
AatiQRal ~QiQYf"8;U(atQFg~ .gXegpttQA31: t'aQt9f'-
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(4) ~a:oQQduA) fga: i~pler.:ReAtiAg. iRe .aAti'iiege:ad.tioA pgli~ iA
gYt£taAdiAg AatioAa' re&oua:QQ y 'at8a:&
{a) 'A~&Qr quality £~all ·bQ AlaiRtaiAed _Ad PFQtQ~tQd iA ·'out
£bRdiAg AatioAal Pi£OYFQQ "QlQRt '
'b) T~Q QabiA&t ~ay appi"ouQ t9~PO"r;y or Gl:eoa tQR+I ~~aAgQ£
iA v,.wr '1yalitiy if ,t~~ Q~aAgQG \0 \R,e Ulawri iA qUQitiQA ~a)'Q ,AO
deAlOA&trxable iAlpa~' OA'~9 ability of ll:eQ "<aw".£ tg' iUPPOi:t tAQir
dQ£igAateQ WiQi
(3) (2t:Qc;QdYI=Q for' i~plQAlQRtiAg tR9 aRtidQga:adatioA'pOU~ iA
QX~QptioAa' "QtQFi .'
~) A,K~DES p9~it fgr~RURpQrA:aitWd or 9XpaAdQ" diiQhac:g9
£l:eall Q~AbiR effh"9Rtli~itatioRGLfor tf.l~ QRUr=Q QfflU9At &Rat ilr=Q _i
~'
1 Cg~Qiti_. dii~aa:gQi if.lall f.lauQ' aR eUtw8At qYiI'ity of;
.a ~IQ' gr:ea18'r ~aA t9A' (10) ~gtI fiue~5) day ~arboAaQ)gYi
bio~Q~i~1OXygQA d9~aAdi
·b ~Io grQatea: tt:.aA tM'Q ~2) ~gqaAlAloRia Rit~gA;
Q ~Io gc:eawr ~aA 0 010 Al9L1 total reiid...al Ql:elOriAQi
d ~logreat9r tt.laA\QA ~-1 0) 'AlgA lotal ~YipeAd9d&olidi'j
e ~Io g~awr ~aR Q~e(1j"~gtl toblpt.lOipf.lORAii
f A AliRiAlYAl £8' '9R (7) A=lg~ dii&ol),ed oxygQRi
g, A~~AiQ"~o'~ ~UlW9At loxi~ity liAlit wAle£i aA aQu\Q,"~oIQ
QfftUQAt toxiQily Ii~itii ~o~ il;R~g~At;·· .
f;l A gQoA:letA~ AlQaA' "41I...Q fgr NQaI ~lifQ~ ba~tQRa Aot to
ex~e.d 200. GOIOAiei per 1OQ .~iUili\eridYr:iAg ~. PQRQ4. of ~i~'(30~
QQA&Q~WtiH8days or 400 QOIOAiQS per 100 AlilliliteFi dYriAg a P9Rod
~f se"eR ~) QOA'QQWli"Q daYE; aAd, . "'. :
i TRQ di&"~_tgQ ihall A'Ot ~aWGQ' t~e .a"8"99" 'iAstr:ea~ diG
soble" OXygQR QO~~eAta:alioA .lQ bel~s&'lhaA 5ix _Ad. ZQ~WAth&
'90) A:lgtl . " ',.,.. '•..
. .2 ,C~I~RdQ liA:li~i~aU .b9.ba~~", OA' U:ae:~o~Qiti~' "Q&Q·r·£·upply
~RteRgAgi'~50 Alg4 ' '.' '" .' ... _... '
;) .5toI=AlV'at8r ,dii~~ar:g8G&~an be exe~pt fJ;oR=l aAtid~~~ada
liOA iA:lpleAl8RbtioA p~Qe~r;Q& fgr ex~~pijgAafi"awFi, byt,£f.lall bQ
&Wbj8~t tg.QOA,ta:ol'by QXi.&tiAg4:Qabh~lel pr.gg:ra~G '.
4 CtlFQAi" u4lQlQ eWY8At lQxiQity UAlik &~aU ,apply uAle,. aR
a~yte "~019 efQYeAt toxi~ity li~it ii~gr:g &lriAg9R&" .._.
. ,5 'Alaite ."i'Ql:eargQ& tbata~ ~gt dOrAe~li~'i"'aGte or GtQr:A;pualgr
dii~t:.arg8& £~all be 'rQ&tri~~d tQ"R'O AlorQ tAaR .gR8~alf (1 (.4) Qf lAQ
lirAi*atio~that "'Qwld ~a"Q.b~~R 'p~~i~" fgr' Y""8 pr:otQQtQd ",.181=&
at Eta'Ada", d8i.igR·QQAditiQA'S" ,':,' .
'ij KI2CEliS pQr;rAit' r:QA8";al&'~at'r:Q'Ylt iR IQi& t~"A a t-"QAty ~~O)
p8r~~Rt iA~r:eai8 i~ .poUYtaAt·I~~,diA9 '~I=Q QX8Alpt W'QC:R iAlpl8R:\8Ab
'~,OA P~~Q~~,U~& for ex"eptiQRai t"~lgR;" _Rd ihall' be regulated by
'.the ~~\lirQA:1eAtG iA' &ybG9~tigR (4),a) aAd ~b) of tl:eiG adA:liAiitr:atiJ'Q
rQgwk~tioA , . ":''" ... ". ' . '
. (b) ·If··'~e 'pQ~it .appli~aA~· dQ~e'r:r:i1iAei~at it <MiA, rA9Ql'Q"h.a9At
.~i~itatioR&· ~qui~d b~tpar:agrap~(al'ofUliG i..,biQ~tiOR, t~Q~I2CES
. ',pGFA:lit, &~~II .bQ i~iUQd \"ith t~~ QUlUQAt liI~ibtigA," ,.,ithoyl ~rtb9r
. .;jAti"Qgr:ad~ti~A RJ"i9'" 3G d9&;ribQ'" iR 'GWb&QQtiOR (4) of t~ii iQ~
, tiOR' fgr YE'~ ·pr.QWQle"."'\aleA» If a KRDES P8~it appli~aAt ~aRAot
~QQf&he .Q~~~~t_.,II,~i~~gR~,U;'Q··.appn~~tAlay RJ'IY8&t a.·I~~G itAR
9~~t li~ita~QA,· ,IA "~akiAg Ili,; ',i'8q~Qiti v.le appliQilAt '~all."eA1gA
, ,"ate loiRe satiibQtioAof ~~ ~abiAQt that alioudRg 'ouler "Qter
'1yali&y is AQ~QiFi31¥ toa,Q~g~~odateiAlpoa:taAt e~oAgMi~ or Go~ial
dQ\IQ'Op~eAtiA '~Q a~QaiR' \f(~i~"Q ",;aler; as:e 10~al9d follguAAg
tRQ gYideliAQG iA "IRt8A~'EQORorAiQ c.....idaRGQ fgr \MawrCyality
.StaRdaJ'4i \Algr:kbook"', EPA i a4arQf.1·1 gg5iA~OrpOr:atQd by RifQr8RGe
iR SQ~tiOA 4 o( tRi" ad~iAi"trath'e r;gg..,latioR ,aR" iA~h.lde aA alter
RatiJ'Q& aAa')i~iG 'lA'at I;~all GOA,~idQr ~Q fgllou<iAg' . '
1 CiG~~ar.ge to other tr:ea~QAt f,adUti9ii
:l UiQ of o'Uun giS_~aa:g9IQ~tioA"i
3 'Af;ater RJyse or ~q'c;lei
4 P~G8iG aAd tl:Qa~QRt a(t8a:Aati'~ij aAd
5 OR i;i'w or G"'b&yt=b~Q"d'i,pgGal'.IA allou<iRg ~Q FQiYltaAt
IO'''QRRg of u'~fQr: qYallt¥~ tRQ ~abiRgt·· i~all a;,yr;e "'alQa: q..,3lity
RQ"QG;ar:y ~. ~lIy prgtQ~t e"iitii;1g Ui~& .
(Q) ZOAQ~ of jRitia' dilytiQR cire,'prol:libitQQ iA QXGeptiQRal "Qterf.
YRI~~G' ai&igRed b9fga:9, ~Q gffgGti"e datQ of ttl;" ad~iAiGtl=ati"Q
a:9g\A~4tiQA .. ,
~4) PFQG8dYFQ foe: i~pl9rAQRtiRg tAe aRtid9griiQatiQA poliQ¥ iA
WGe-proteQQd "QtQrg for: poi'Rt GQYC:OQ disGRargQG All iydd~9 \U81
lQr& Rgf1iit9d iA S9~tioR J gf tRiG adAliAiitrati)lQ FQ9YlatioA 3i g...t
ibRdiAg RatioRal rQGOyrbQ "QtQrG or QX~9ptigAal '''at9rG iRall bQ
~atQgoriilQd aG Yie prQ\Q,~ted 'vatQrG . "
<al All QxiiliAg' Y&QG ,s~all be p.-.owQlQd aAd tAe 19' '91 of "'at9r,
q",ality AQQQ'GSapt tQ. prolg~~Q "'&9" &~all bQ a&$t.lr:ed iA \A£Qpr-o
t8GtQd ,.~ter .
.(blThepa:oQQ&£·to aUo'" a diiQ~arge to·a YGQprglgdgd \"atQr
aAd tg aii....re tA9 "QtQr'". protQbtigA ii. a:&gYlat9d 'by tRQ· rQ'1Yil=9
~QRti ,iA tAQ·, I(QA~'-kyf2glh.ltiOR Cii~~aJg9. EIIJ::RiAa"tiQA·· Sy"tQ~
P~graA:a '. , .
(5)TI;lQ aAtidQgr-adatiQA pC:O~9dua:Qi Gban: Rot· pr9Ql=Apt lAg
pg"'Qr or at.itRORty of a lo~al gg\'Qr:AA:lQRt to' pr:o"idQ by ordiAaR~e
fgc: a h.i9f.l~U. 'QuQI gf protedioR thJ"Q",gt.:a aAtidQghidatiQR iR=lpl9AlQR
tatioA fg( di"G~atger:i.to__",d "~t~iA,tt.latloQ2i1 'go'~r+lc:ReRt'i jYri..
di~oA to iyrfaG8 ,!'a\Qr:s of tt:..e COAolI::ROA"'QaltR] . ,
. Section 2~ .~rocedure,for,Recategorizing Water.l~].· This
section shall~pply to the recategorization ofsurtacewater (wat9A;]
to outstanding natiOnal resource ·water (~)and.exceptional
water [~). 'The redesignation of water [~] .to.outstanding
s~te resource waterl~] shall be: governed by the 'procedures
in 401 KARS:026. "..
. (1) The cabinet,~may· ·,propose. to..recategorize. certain water
[~ltQ outstanding national resource water,.(~] and, ex-
ceptional'Water,{~l·· . .
. (a)'lf the cabinet proposes to recategorize thesewat~rst it shall
provide notice· and;~n opportunity. for·pUQlic hearing. . "
(b)Th& ,cabine~;~~Ii provide the documentation ·requirements
of this section, for thOse'surface, waters itproposes ·to recategorizc.
(2) A person :maY:"'request 'recategorization of a sUrface·water
to an outstanding nationalresQurce'water or exceptional water by
filing a petitiQnwith the cabinet.
(a) Thepetitio.t.·st1alrlnd~dethe. name ·andaddress.of·the.
petitioner:and the', infOrmation ,and 'd9CUmen~tion neCessary to
recategOriZe· the 'particular water: as required by'subsection (4) of
this section;' . . .. ..,., ,. .', '" ,"
(b) The peti~ooer shalt.:have. :·the burden· .of proof that the re-
categorization is:.-appropriate.' ",
(e) Thecabinetshall.provide notice otthe petition and an op-
portunity 'for a public>he.aring.
(d) The :cabinet shall. review' the: pe.tition, supporting documen-
tatiOn, and any commentS received·fram·the public to determine if
the pn;>po~~wate·r.qUalifies:for·recategorization.
(el The· cabinel'shan·,documentthe"detennination. to .grant or
deny recateg9rization as·a' result of·a; petition. and shall provide· a
copy of ttle decision.to, the petitioner and other interested parties.
(3) If.·a··water,.·isto ,be recategorized* the cabinet shall publish
notice of the. ·cecategorization. Any' permit issued after the date of
publication shall.be issued.with limitations based on the newcate.;.
gory. When-the cabinetre.vJews..its,water ..qualitystandards pursu-
ant to the,'provisions 'of·Section 303 of the: C~ean Water Act, the '.
caqinet' shaH, ·propose.'to:· have;aU' re,categorized' water, [wal8A;] ...
promUlgated. ~s',ao: a~enqment :tQ,:this adt:ninistrative'.regulation.·
(4) The... following ipfonn3ti90•. ~oCumentation,· and. data shall
S\)Pport a·petitionfor..recategorization:·
(a) A petition., ~or o~tstandi'og national resource water (wal8A;J-
shall indude: . .
1. A United States Ge()logical Survey 7.5 minute topographic
map or'Us equivalent as approved by ~e cabinet· showing' those
surface waters to be' recategonzed inclUding a description consist-
ingot a river mile index with any existing and proposed discharge
~~~. '. . '.
2. Existing uses and. water. quality data for the surfaqe water
[~] fOr which the·' recategorization is proposed. If adequate
data 'are' unavailable, additional" studies may be required by the
cabinet;
3. Descriptions of general land uses and specific land uses
adjacent 'to the surface water,[~] for ·which. the reeategoriza-
lion is proposed;. -- .'
4. The existing and· designated uses ,of·the water (watQr.G] up-
stream and downstream of the proposed' recategorized water {Wd-
~];
5. General physical- charaGteristics of the surface water indud-
ing width. depth, bottom composition, and slope;
6. The frequen~yof occasions when there is no natural flow in
the surface water. and the 7Q10 and hannonic mean flow values for
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LiQkiAg Rh'QF Ri"Qr; .4i1Q 165 Q to Ri"9r Batt:alRO'¥a
~4i1Q 154 5 A
t>IQtlR FOr:k of LiQkiRg Soyr;Q to Ri"9r ~4i19 13 Q ~-.
~
J(Et>IT' 'CKV RI"ER SOSIf>J
awfblo CFQek* Rh'QF .4i1Q 12 B to Ri"9r ~
MiI8-()..i
,Ca"aRaugl:a CrQgk Riner .4i1Q 53 to SQ~tR ~
liork gf Sta&igA C~i+lp
~
Ct~ar CJ'QQk*' SoyrQQ tg Ri"Qr.4iIQ 4 1 \Olgodford
CI9a+aOAGFOr:k* SQYFQQ to £h..Gkt:lorA BrQdttliU
~
Section 3. (S\l~QQ \A'awr CatQggriQG SyrfaQQ "'atQrG Gat9g'l
R.Qd IQr aRtid·9g~da~iQR PyrpOG9G arQ 1iGtQ~ iR ~Q fgll9'''iAg' tablQG
The QQYRty ~IYAl~. iRdi~'9G tAQ QQYRty iA "1~iQ~ thQ AloyUl or
'lYtle' gf tR9 Gl.lrbG9 '''~t9r iG IgcatQd .
the surface water and adjacent surface waters:
7. All assessment of the existing and potential aquatic life
habitat in the surface water [wal8A;] under consideration and the
adjacent upstream surface waters. The existing aquatic life shall be
documented induding the· occurrence of individuals or populations,
indices of diverSity and well-being, and ·abundance .of species of
any unique native biota;
8. A documented rationale as to why the water [~]qualify
for the r~tegorization; and --
9~ The rationale' used to support the national -significance of the
water. . .
(b) A petitiOn for exceptional- water [~] shall indude the
foUowing: --
1. A United States- GeolOgical Survey 7.5 minute topographic
map or its equivalent a,s approved by the cabinet showing ,the sur-
face water [~] to· be recategorized induding a description
'consisting of a' river mile index with existing 'and proposed dis-
charge points;
2. DescriptiOns of general land uses, induding·mining, agricul-
tural~ .recreational, low, medium, and high 'density residential,
commercial, and industrial, and specific land uses .adjacent to- the
surface water [~lforwhich the recategorization is proposed;
3. The frequency of occasions when there is no natural flOw in
the surface water, and the 70,0 and annual mean ·flow 'values for
the surface water; and
4. Fish or benthic macroinvertebrate collection' data and an
Index of Biotic Integrity or Macroinvertebrate Bioassessmerit Index
calculation .~Qm a waterbody if criteria specified in Section1~
.[~J of this administrative regUlation are utilized.
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Extension' Office•. 101 lakeview Court, Frankfort. Kentucky. Indi-
viduals int~rested in being heard at this hearing shall notify this
agency in writing by October 16. 2003. five workdays prior to the
.~earing.,of their intent to attend. If no notification of intent to attend
th~ hea'ring is re.ceivedby that date, the hearing may bE) canceled.
ThiS.he;lring.is. open to the public. Any person who wishes' to be
.heard will be given an opportunity to comment on the p~oposed
adl11!niSl(ative regc':Jlation.. If you request a ·transcript. you. may be
· r~9plred to' pay ~o~ illf you do not wish to be heard ·at the public .
h~GI~ng7 .you may ~ubmifwritten cOmments on the proposed ad- ,
mlnlstrcl1ive regulation. Written comments shaUb~ accepted until. ~
October31.2p03.Send writte~ notification of intent. to be heard at
the. public hearing. or written comments on· the proposed adminis~·
~tive regulation.t~the contact person. .
...CON~ACT. PERS'ON: Jeffrey W. Pratt. Director,·Oivision of
Water, ..Department.. for Environmental Protection, 14 Reilly .Road.
Ff3nkfort, Kentucky 40E5q1 •. (502)~64.;.3410,.fa~ (5~2) 564-0111.
. RE.GlJLATORYIMPACT ANALYSH, AND TIERING STATEMENT
· .Cont.actP.e~son: Jeffrey W~ Pratt, Director .
(1) fl~6vjdea .brief summary of: . . .'
. (a)'Wt1~t ~is ~dm;nistrative regulation does: This .administra-
tive.regulati<?n· :implem.ents the antidegradation' policy. of.:ap,en9·ed
~01 ..KAR 5:029·. by. :establishing procedures to control weiIter .pouu-
· ~on Inwate(s .. affected by that policy. This administrative·regulation
provi~es cat~ori:za~on criteria, lists many·.surface waters assi.gned
..t~ specific,·categorjes.and provide.~·for-re~tegorizatiQ.n.:ofwater.. .
(b):Th~ .oecessity·. of this adininistrcitive ·regulatlon:Tbisadmin..
iSffatiye regYlatiqn. i~' .necessa.ry to .manage ·wa.ter:.r:e~ources·and to
'~fovide for #le ··p(e~ention,'abatement, and control of' water po'UU",
.. lion ' ,..'. ; ',.,'
(c) HOvv}tlis administrativ~ regulatiqn.· <;Qnforms to the,cootent
.of the authq(i~~fl9.s~tutes: This admin,stra~'ve'regulation conforms
~o ·KRS 224.10""~.OO. which requires ·.the··N~tlJral.: ~esources.~nd
E~vironr:nental.P(otectionCabinet to d~v~lop and Cqn~~ct .a.com-
prehensive p~ogram fO( the management of water. resources and to
provide for..the p~e,!ention, abateme~t.· and. contro(of .~terpoUu­
.lion.. KRS· 22.4.70:'100 dedares. that the policy.·"of the 'Common-
wealthi~ t~ conserve its wa.ters for legitimate use~and. ,to:. Sette-
g~~r~ from .. polilitic.jn.the unoontar11inated .~a'ters· of .the.Common-
wealth, preve~t'tti~ creation of any new.pOllution·inthewaters of
the Commonweafth, 'a'no .abate any existing pollution.' This"admin-
istrative.feglJ~C:ltion.and 401 KAR 5:002, !):026, 5:029, and: 5:031
establish .... procedt)res. to prqtect the surface waters of the. Com-
monwealth,and~lJs .ll1anage water resources and prevent water
pollution. This' adlJl1tiistrative regulation establishes arnethOdQlogy
to .implerr'.e~~th,e.an~idegradationpolicy con~jn~~ ··irl·401 ··KAR
5:029 by 'establishil19 procedures to control water P9"utionin wa-
ters ~ffec~~.. by"~a~ policy~· . .' . .. .'. .,. .... ...... ..:., .'
~ (d) .Ho~ thi~·ad~'nist~.tiveregulation currently.assistS·:o(:wiU
'. assist..in: .th~ effe~tive·.a.dininistration. of· the statutes':.This .adtnii1is~
trative': reg~lation"~i~I·~ssist.in the administfati~)n ofJhe'~:~t...te$:·by -
impleme.nijng "the antidegradation policy for the' pro~ection' ·of sur-
.face \Vat~rs'of.' the .Com91onwealth as required by the authorizing
statutes.. . . .'
(2) If this .~s an amendment to an existing administrative· regu-'
lation, provide a bri~f summary of:. . .
(a) How the amendment will change this existing administrative
regula~on:. This. amendment revises surface water .categories· to
indude th~ new categories. of high quality water and impaired wa-
ter.· The amendment .reorganizes much of the Section t text This
amendment also inci~des 1E)6' surface waters newly categorized as
exceptiQnalwa.ter t~at are reorganized into'a new table.and include
the waterw~y segments for each water. Two new documents are
incorporated by reference' and two documents previousiy' incorpo-
rated by' reference have been removed from this administrative
regUlation. '
(b) .. The .necessity of the amendment to this administrative
reg~lation:This amendment is n~cessary to address outs~nding
U.S. EPA disapproval. The U.S. EPA disapproved this regulation
after promulgation on August 7, 1997 and did not act on the disap-
proved provision on August 20, 2000. At 67 Fed. Reg. 68971 (No-
vember 14,2002), U.S. EPA proposed a substitute rule that is sub-
R.i' 'er .4ile 5 3 19 Ri, '9'r ~.af:&ball
~
~i"Qr ,.UQ 574 i to Ri,"Q'r .~4QCrQaa:y(
'.f.i:le·5585 ·(~~a~"ater.G" ~
of Lake 'CY~b~rtaAd)
River .4ile '24 4· lQ.: Riu~r ~
~ ~'.
Ri"QF a4i1e. 82 G tg Rh"Qr ~
~~ile 28 g
.RiVQr .·4i1e ..3·1 3 .tg.. 'RiuQr '~'
.14i1Q 27 4
TQARQt&8Q I(QRtlsld(y
. Slaw 'LiRQ .'. (Ril'e... · . 1·4ile·
:21 0) to .,oLtlit8 Oak Creek'
a.r$$I·SSIPPfRI)'ER SAS'~I(••aiASte~4lRd l.iAor·TAbytaAQG)
a.yrpby',,· POAd Ei::atirQ l20Ad 3Rd f2r;QG9Pt'Q HiQkA;181R
, Av.a
Lillie SgutR . Fork gf
CYA:1bQ~aA'IIRhIQ(
D4a~AG ~gr:k' gf
CYr;:RDerlaAd Rh'Qr
Ca~QCt:QQk* .
••Q~pgli& ERtire L81ke • 4,CFa~kQt:1
$waR '~Atir;Q L81kQ .~ .
SaJik C81~P CreQk*
HENRY C~ LIST, Secretary
APPROVED BY AGENCY: September 10.2003
FILED WITH LRC: September 12~ 2003 at 9 a.m.
PUBLIC HEARING AND PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD: A
public hearing on this administrative regulation shall be held on
October 23. 2003 at 7 p.m~ (Eastern time) at the Franklin County
Sad'Sr:aAC~* S04aIrQQ 'to I2ggr f;gr;kgf .~'
CU~bQt=laA'"RhlQr .
TRADE1AtATER RI)lER SASIt>I
.YQII~.,b~AkCF8Qk*. S.gYr~Q tg Rh'QF '.Ue 4 4 '~ "
Mga'
Tr:4deu gterRh'Qr* $.Q\UCQ tg Riu 8r ~4i18' CRRGti~R
~
Seai0A 4 ] tncorporationby Reference. (1) The folloWing mate-
·rial is inCorporated by reference:· '.
(a) -Development and· Application. of ·the 'Kentucky Index -of
Biotic Integrity· (KIBI)". 2003, Kentucky Division of Water; Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet;
. (b) ""The Kentucky Macroinvertebrate·· Bioassessment Index",
2003~'.KentuckY Division'''ofWaler, Natural Resources: and Envi-
ronmental Protection Cabinet: and "l=~4g:&bgd, 'fgr' A G&8G&iRg Dig
IggiQarIAwgri\y' gt· S·.II:f;aQQ·'Al3~r'''''·OdObQt 1903, I(QRWCky OU<;
~igA gf lOlalQr, ~Iaw-=-I RQ£o...r~G aAd ERuiroARclQAtal' f2rot8~tiOR
~
(b) .A~4aQ"QiR)(Qr;tQbr:4tQ atoaG&QGG~QRrIRdQxfo'r 'Stl=Q81~G' gf
&t~Q IAt&rior Plateau EGQr;QgioRiA l(eA'Y~ky",· JQRQ 1999,···I(Qi.liIslQky
Oil (i£h~R of \Olawr:,' ~181tural ReGQyr:Qe& 3Ad ER"iI=QR'~QRbl f2f'.QtQQ
tigA CabiRQti]
. (cl "Interim Economic 'Guidan'ce for Water Quality-Standards
Workbook-, EPA,MarCh 1995 Publication EPA~823-B-95-002,U·.S.
Environmental Protection. 'Agency, 'Office of Water, Washington,
D.C. .> . \ ..-
(2) Thismaterial'may'~ inspected, copied, or obtained,··sub..
ject to applicable copYright law, at 'the Division of Water, 14 R~my
Road~ Frankfort, Kentucky, Monday through Friday. 8 'a·in. to 4:30
p.m..,
ISQloIth ~ Qt. egg $QUK;8·· tg. egg St.....gl:4&er WI:lU&eySlal.lgbtQr CF8QJ<~'Q:QQk
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stantialy;'tAe~'as',401 KAR~,:5:m9l1)~- The' proposali· if'.enaded~.
WIt'jf~:J<enlOd<y~,::wittkJuti~on'proceduresrfor its:, an-
~.~~:
(e)':: Hot¥: the> amend1i'feftt~:· COllNtms' to ' the-:· COt1tem:-" of' the
autf"i~ingrs:tatutest.This" amendR1ent-'coofoR'l1S,-" to'.KftS:: 22'+.1 O~
'106:~'~ requires" ~~·Naturat'·.R~()urces .and: Environmental
Pr~-cabinet::to'devefop ·and<conduct a·· Comprehensive' pro-
.gram:f«t~;·~ntofwater ,resources and to provide for the
prevenffon.' abatement" and control of water poUution~·KRS 224.70-
100.declates·,th.'·'the policy of' the' COmmonwealth is ·to conserve
.'·its.'waters :for'legitimate uses and 'to: safeguard from pollUtion the
un~taminated·watersofthe Commonwealth," prevent the creation
Of any .new potlutionih' the waters, of the. Commonwealth, and
. abate' any existing' pollution~,This' amendment establishes. proce-
, ,'dun~s:' to protect the su.rfa(:e· ~ers'Qf ,tt)~', COmmOnwealth. and
thus- protect water resources. This amendment, es'tablishes a
'methodology to imple~ent the antidegradation policY: contained in
401 ~R 5:029 by'establishing procedures to'controlpoint Source
,wa.ter pollution in waters affected by thatpOliCy'. '
(d) Hovv the amendment' will :assist in ,the effective· administra-
tion of the statutes: This amendment: will assist in the' administra-,
lion of the statutes by providing· a·. reVised" scheme'of'antidegrada-
tion categories and listing' '166 surfa'ce'waters, newlY. categorized as
,~x~ptiQn-al·water.:This is' a cruclat:.reference:· tOot· to: establish ,the
.·:~tegories of' the'newly" assigned~"exceptidnal' 'waters and is', sup-
'·pOrti"e·to achieving compUance'witn'this ·administrative· regulation.
, (3)' Ust the typeandnumber,o"indiVidual~ businesses, organi-
~,''"zatiOns~'Oisfate··and:local· governmentS ~ffecte(fby;thisadminis­
ti'ative r~ulation:'This adminislrativeragulation ,indudes 166 sur-
ra'Ct;f"waters newly categorized.·'as' exqeptiqn~l.waterS and ·by de-
, fault categorizes manysurfacewaters"'3S,' 'high' quality':. Individuals.
:'businesses~ organizations, and 'governments' that Wilt. have· new.or
expanded. wastewater discharges .into streams categorized'·· CiS
'exceptional 'water or high' quality wat.er could~ be .affected by either
, . str:tcte~ discharge limi~tion~ or.an ~Itemativesanalysis and'sodo-
ecof)~ic dem<:>nstration. Stann water' disCharges are'nof subject
to antidegradation~The 'cabinet' concluded' tha(excellent and high
quality water receivin~j-'dischargesr~lated,solely"tostorm water are
, ':protected .under' existing' cabinet programs., This is consistent with
the existing requirements of this administrative regUlation. Coal
mining discharge is not SUbject toadditionCl' ~ntidegradationreview
.in e~CE!ptional and high' quaHty watet; ho¥.'eyer, coal'mining is sub-
jecttoregulation under the Surface.Mining COntrol· and, Reclama-
tion'Act an(l404 Dredge and Fill permits issued by 'the U.S. Army
Corps ().fEn9ineers~,which· indude 401· Water Quality Certifications
Issu~d·by'this' cabinet-.··The 404 permitS' require 'the ,investigation· of
alternatives and the selection oftechnologically and economically
" feasible: alternatives with the least,' environmental" impacland so-
:' .: .. :cloeconomic demonstrations for coal: minin'Q ,activities~ Given these
'":evaluations; .the cabinet has 'conduded that additional· antidegra..
dation analysis is' nof necessary for exeelfent" arid high quality· wa-
ter~ Domestic sewage discharge from"a'single~familyresidence is
:alsO not;~subjecfto'additional: 'antidegradation ··review·ili' exceptional
and high qtialitywater ifthecabinel' deems' thaf no- feasible: alter-
n·atives'·· exist The' cabinet~risider!faltematives':analysis for do-
mesticsewage. dischalllers. COncentrated'Animal Feeding Opera-
tions must already comp,ly with· a no discharge to waters of the,
.Commonwealth pennit; therefore t the 'cabinet conCluded that Con-
centrated Animal Feeding·.Operations~located:next- to'excellent and
:hiilh quality water:' are protected' under .existing'· cabinet programs
and need'not 'beu subjecte<fto. additional' antidegradation·· analysis.
Operations' that ·expand:"bY less·than',tWenty" percent'over-currently
permitted pollutant: loadings' are: not:subject. to;' further· antidegrada-
tion 'analysis~ Tl1is:' is' ·consistent.:Witt" ·the:·' existi'ng:' requirements: of
.this:..administnlUve?-reguJationi:-,Tl1el cabinet. stiaar:'a'ssure"water qual-
ity:,necessa"Y" to:"-fuUy:-prote'ct: 'exi"stirig~~,uses;'~: Th"e:H:abitieft-'cortdOded'
that~a::::J:]01Ws:::approvaFof:ilr.,egi(jttabfaciUty':pfa·(f':pursuant;, to··· 401
KARiS':l:)06f(201:: Planning"·OOcurnent);wi'f'demonstrate.-cortlJiliance
wittt;1hsi.altamstives analysis::aAd/soCioeconomlc:'def110nstration~
(4;)j~Pr()'vide::'an:,' asses'sment'of:hew,~.,me·::· abnve:','group~.or->groups
wilf~b~'··impacted~,by:ejtherth~:'impl~ntatiol1·of~tms··-adf111l1islrative
reg~ati&n~ .if ':new~ orr'by' :-th~,'·'chang~:;,if'it: is: '"an' amendment The
permit:limUations..imposed: on new·, or 'expanded: 'point source· dis-
chargers'info'water bodies couldresutl:'in, addiUooal treatment out-
lays, ltaiRihg.,COSls i and operatiooaf,.:charige$~·N'~~:ot,'~~~
dischargers~rnay~,incur costs Of:aJtemafive$·:·and'::ptJ(fOti0ri;prev~
tioo'a~,"'SOGiOO¢Onomic,ana'ys~ otmd· and' indtt~·;sav~wtit::
be realiZed:trfrougb' redUced'~:.water·ff~Went::cosfS;, n1ajft~·.,:,:
~~a::=:=:.':\'==~a.:r·
state' and, federal'law'~ The· amended·adrniniS~e::,r~~d~">;
not create additional' obligations· for· dfsatat~FS~ Thtsf:~atYiEwftfeot
administrative:· regutation sets "forth speCific~prementatioo;.~ ,'
dures· ,to comply" with already existing antidegradatioll requitei:
ments:.
(5) Provide an ,estimate of how much it will cost to implem¢nt~
this: administrative regulation:
(allnitially: Given current bUdgetary limitations, additiooaft':
.workload 'will:·. be' •absorbed ~thinexistinglevels"of funding, and~:~
staffing.
(b) On a continuing basis:· The· cabinet~ in· implementit'ig,th~:
requirements of, 'thi~·.·ame~ded·' administrative··regulati()n~· win·' inteF~,
nalize"mosl as_s0ci3:ted costS-wi.~'nonraal·budget appropriations~;:
Socioeconomic demonstrations:·,will , be'· reviewed and,deteri1iina~­
tions made· as: to' 'their: adequacy. ,CostS· may increase.: ifthe:,:divi:;;,,··,·
sian's' findings, 'are"contested. ' , " . .
(tll What, is m'e',source of theJunding, to be used·· for' the impt~·:· ,.
mentation· and enforcement" of this administrative- regulatioo::-:Th~/
source of,revenue" Will· be'· the:General,'Fund andfederal',ftjnds~'asr
appropriated by the·Kentuckyc;eneral~AssembiY. ,~.
(7) Provide an, assessmentdf'whether an:increase' infeeS"'or'
funding will be: necessary to implement.this, administrative -regula'~' ,
lion. if new,. or·by··:the,"chang~'~,if' it·is,an' amendment Fees'or,fund~~
ingincreases .:are~ tiot antidpated,', to',. be necesS3iyto: the' implE!+:
mentation of this'atneodmenl'
(8) State whether·or not this,:administrativeregulatiQn,.estao.-',
lishes' any fees-"qrditectly"ori~directl.yincreases:any,'·fees:~.'Tl1i$":
administrative}regwlation.does:nof.,establish any. fees nor ditecUyor-: ,
indirecUy increase'any fees., '" ' " .,. ,': ., .
(9) TIERING: Is 'tiering· applied? Yes, tiering is ·used,'in<·this~i,
administrative'regulation. Storm water discharges are', not· subject:;:
to antidegrada,tion:.'a"alysis~·The' cabinet concluded. tha,t exceUentf
and highquality·:'.Water ,receiVing discharges', felated~ so(eJYtosteRt1:~~'
water are protected under ~xisting.cabinet programs. This iscoli~, '
sisteofwith the exi$ting .. re,quirements·, of this -adrnin,strative~reQtJla:''''
lion. Coal mining. discharge .is: not subject 'to additional antid~ra~'~
dation review· in· exceptional· and 'high ... quality water;· however~:';ooa'~': , '
mining is. sUbject·.to· regulation. under the Surface Mining··Controf.':
and Reclamation Act ~nd 404:Dredge and· Fill pefTtlits. issuedby:~~'
the U.S. 'AnnyCorps of·Engineersi,which includ.e401·Water.Qual~':
ity Certifi<;ationsissued·.by this"c;abinet. The 404 pe.rmits:re·quire "the,:.- .
investigation of- alternatives and the selection of te~noIOglcaU'y:·;
and economicallY. feasible aJtemativeswith the least:envir~niefltali
impact and,.sodoeCOnomicdemonstr3tiOfis ·fQr coal' mining;:a=eti\ti~<·
ties. Given. these: 'evaluations" .the· cabinet hascondudet;f;(fIat'adtiif::·.
tionalantidegradation analysh~is not.necessary,.for-excellefl¥:~oi:·
high quafity· water:' OOmesti"c~' sewage. discharge;:, 'tr()('tV:;a;;;smgJ~'
family"residence·,;s" also ·not' subject·,· to::.:.:additional.'antideg~*,,~
review; in. exceptional' and high, qualitywatet::if..ttie':cabjflettooetri5i~
that no feasible, alternatives" exist\; ,The icabiftet:;'considem~1D·rem'a~·"
tives· analysiS .for·. domestic' sewage':', diSGtfat~.~~· cQfI~limetl:~­
Animal· Feeding.· O~rations-"must~alteady. COf11PIy: .wi$~c<f~i10:t-di~~~,'
charge to waters,of the Commoowealffi:,permit theref<Jt6i~dt~~~~'
net conduded that Concentrated": 'Animal;: Feeding~:}OIi~(jn~q~"
cated' ne)(t to .excellent and·higi:l· qtiali~: wat~:.:are;,pt(Jt~t~t.tJn~Eftt'
existingcabinefprograms'and need· net;bei:sOtijifOf~tt:(jf.;aotittRlAl~l1':
antidegradation' analysis. Operations~·ttlat: ex~tt~;bY'~rl~~:ftl1an~:;
twenty percent··over' curtenUy"permitted-:,·pbliutatn~JoacJ_ar,ertnJff~~
~~~;~;r;~~]~i~s!i5i
plan:;pursoanl:lo·401·· KAR 5~:OG~(2(J';~~I~ffftmur~m~lnt.tnf~~~
used;' by" publtoly~ oWned;:·tr~atmettt~:wotX~::t~'d~(jIfStRfti~:;"ootff~~· ..
ance with:;the'·altf.jmatives;·aRal'SiSrM~SOGI~~~WtJ~,
tion'i
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FEDERAL MANDATE.ANALYSIS COMPARISON
1. Federal statute or regulation constituting the federal man-
date. There is no federal statute or regulation mandatingtl1at Ken-
tucky implement a water pollution control program. For Kentucky to
maintain its d~legation over.the NPDES permit program, the Clean
Water Act reqUires· that Kentucky review its water quality standards
every- three years and· comply ·with. the·programmatic· requirements
of 40 C.f.R Part 1-31. indudin9. the r.equirement- for iinplementing
an antidegradation policy. The federal. regulations require· the
adoption of an antidegradation policy for. .delegated .. states. The
U~S. Environmental Protection ·Agency does provide guidance to
the. states, but ·individual deciSions concerning the .·stateS water
quality .pf0S¥3ms are left to the s~tes. . .
·2. State compliance standards. 401 KAR 5:00~~5:026. 5:029,
5:030. and 5:031, the water quality standards. regulations. .
3. Minimum or unifonn standards contained in the federal
mandate;, The Clean Water Act requires· designate<:luses7 criteria.
stand~rds·and antidegradatiQn polides in water quality·standards.
4.. Will this administrative regulation impose stricter· require-
ments•. or .additional· or· different responsibilities or requirements
than·-those ....equired by the federal mandate? No.
. 5. :JU$tificatiOfl: for. th~ imP9Sition· of the stri~ter standard, or
additional·or ~fferentr~~Ponsib~liti.esor requirements. There·is·no
stricter" standard or additional ~ ;or different responsibilities. or re-
quirements. ..
.. .
FIS.CA~ NOTE QN.(OGAL .~OVERNM·ENT
1. Does.:thi~ administrative regulation relate. to: a.ny aspect of a
local goverr1ment, inducting any;~rvice provided~by .that local·gOv-
ernment? Yes . .
2~ .State· what. unit,part. or· ciivi-sioo of. local. government .this
administ(ative regulatiOn will affect. This amende~ :administrative
regulation· .may..~ff~ct ·the .wa~le~ter .treatin~t ,djvisions .of .~ocal
gov~rnn:tE!nt if they will have new .orexpan·d~.dischc;lfges . into
outstanding national resource. waters, exceptional wa'ters.or high
quality.waters. . . ... . .
3. ·State. in detail. the aspeCt or service of local government to
which this ..aQmini~trative regulation. relates, including identification
of the. applicable. state or federal. ·statute or ·regulcltion that man-
dates the ·aspect c;>,r· service· or authorizes th~ ... action taken by the
administ~.tive regUlation.· This amended'administrative regulation
relates to local.gQvemments'· wastewater treatment service..KRS
224.to-1QO~.224.70-100i·and·.224.70-110mandateactiontaken by
this administrative: (egulation.· .
4. Estimate: the effect.. of. this administrative regulation on the
. e,xpend.itvr~s ~':ld rev~nues of.~. ~9-cal. go.verr-meritforthe first full
. year ·the .administrative· regulation is to be in effect If speCific dollar
.. estimateS:'eannot'-be ,determin~. provide a· brief narrative to ex-
.pl.ain ·.the. fiscal impact o~ th~.administr:ative regulation.
R~venues (+/~):.Cannot·.be. d~teimined.
·E}(pen~itures.(tl-):Cannot b.e detennined.
Other'Explanation: .Wastewater treatment.. costs· may increase
for those local governments that will have new or expanded ~is­
charges into exceptional waters and high· quality waters. Local
governments withdrawing drinking water from these waterS may
have lower treatment cos·ts. because these waters should have
lower pollutant loads. The permit limitations .imposed·on new or
exp.andoo. point source dischargers· into water bodies could result
in additional treatment outlays.· training costs. and operational
changes. New or' expanded dischargers may incur costs of alter-
·natives andpoflution prevention analyses. Direct and indirect sav-
ings·" will- be. :realized through- red~ced drinking water treatment
C9sts. .maintenance..of good. ~gricultural water. maintenance -of
fisheries. and healthy recreational waters. This requirement al-
ready exists in state ·and federal law. The amended administrative
regulation does not create additional. obligations for dischargers.
This amended administrative regulation sets forth specific imple-
mentation procedures to comply with already existing antidegrada-
lion requirements. This administrative regulation allows regional
publidy-owned· treatment works to use their Regional Facility Plan
(201 Planning Document) as an exception to· compliance with the
socioeconomic demonstration and alternatives analysis.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
Department for Environmental Protection
Division of Water
(Amendment)
401. KAR 5:031. Surface water standards.
RELATES TO: KRS 146.200 to 146.360•. 146.410 to 146.~35.·­
146.550 to 146.570. ·146.600 to 146.619. 146.990. ·224.01~10·
[224 01 100], 224.01-400. 224.16-050. 224.16-070, 224.70-100 ·to ~.
224.70-140. 224.71-100 to 224.71-145, 224.73-100 to 224~_73-120
[224 4·0. 22.4 43. 2~4 4~, 224 50•. 224 .&Q•• 2:24 70, 224 71, 224. 73] .
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 146.220.. 1'46.241.146.270•..
146~410~ 146~450. .146.460,·. 146.465. 224.10..:·100. 224.:16-050•.
224.16-060. 224.70-100. 224.70-110. 40 C.F.R. Part :13.1, ·16 .
U.S.C. 1271 et seq.• 1531 et seq.• 33 U.S.C. 1311, 1313~ ·13-14.
1341 . ... .. .' '
NECESSITY. FUNCTION. AND CONFORMITY: ·KRS.22~~.10­
100 requires .. the Natural· Resources and Environmen~1 pr6.te~on
Cabinet··to develop and conduct a oomprehensive progrartlJoc· the
management otwater·resources and to provide for the··pr~vention•
abatement. and contrQl of ·water pollution.· This administr,ative,
regulation an~ 401 KA~ 5:002. 5:026. 5:029. and '5:0~Oestatilish
procedures to protect the. surface. waters· of. the COmmonwealth,
. and thus· protect water resources. This adininistra~ve regula:tion
establishes· Water. quality standards wtlich ~s.st of;deSign~ted
legitimate· uses of the surface waters.:of th~··;CommQnwealtl1".and
the associated water. qualitY criteria necessary; ·to .p·rotect. ~,tI).ose
uses.,. These '. water.. quality· standards .are.minim.urn· f~.quir~m~n~:"·
that!lpply .t9;all surfa~ waters .in· theCommonwealth·:..of:.Ken<t~cky·
·in order to maintain and protect them .fOrd~signated.·~s.eS. Jh~se
water quaUty standards are subject to peri9di~:"r~vJew·.~ndrevision
in accordance with federal and state laws.·· . .. . .. ..
. .
Section 1. Nutrient. limits. 'In lakes· ancl·:·rese~oi~::a~([ttieir·.
tributarie$. :and other surface waters where· .:E~utrOphicati6n'·.prob­
lems may exist. n.itrogen. phosphorus., carbon.·' and· contrjbuting
trace element discharges shall be limited inaccordaliee·vnth;.·· ..
(1) The scope -of the.problem; . .-
(2) The·geographyof the affected area;.~nd· . . .
(3) Relative cOntributions from· exi5~ng and proposed ·s6~r~s~·
5ection2.•Minimum Criteria .Applicable to All: S~rf~~.w~ters•.
(1) The follOWing minimum· water quaUtycriteria· ·are .:app~ica~le .to
all surface watersinduding mixing z9nes•. with .the· ~xcepti~:that­
toxicity· to aquatic.life in·mixing zones. shall·be: subject :toJJJ~:'"pro'J.l­
sions of4Q1 KAR 5:029. Section 4. SUrface:waters.:.shaJl,nOf:be
aesthetically or. otherwise .degraded ~Y. subslance$· ~"~t; '.... :.. :;~.:,::/~?:~:: .
(a) S~tUe tofonn objectionable ~eposits; .. .... . .. ' .. ....
(b) Float as· .debris. scum~oi~i Of oth~f":~~tter ta~<;>rm,:~.;'ui-
sance; , .
(c) Produce. ,objectionable COlor. odor. taste, Qr ~~idity; ··c·;· .
(d) Injure. are chronically or acutely toxic to."orp~.u:~·.·a~ve.rse
physioIOgical·or·behavioral responses in humanst·,ahiinals.:;~sh·.and
other aquaticUf ;:: : :.... ..
.. (e) Produce undesirable aquatic life ~ result in the ~~i~a~ce
of nuisance species; . .'
(f) Cause fish flesh tainting. The concentratiorf.of-all.ph~~oli~··
compounds Which cause fish flesh taInting st1all.·riot"'eX~.five(5)
J,lgli as an instream value; .
(9) Cause the following changes in radionudides:. . :
1·~ The QfQSS total alpha partide activitY. induding·raQium~226 ..
but exduding radon and uranium, to exceed ·fifteen.·(1~);ppili;·:<.' ..
2. Combined radium-226 and radium-228. to exqeed::,fl.,,:e(.(5)
. pCilt. Specific dete·rminations of radium-226. ··~nd .·.~dfu{1l~228;.··ate
not necessary :it dissolved. gross alpha ·p~rtide·:~ctiVity·.·d~s·liot
exceed five (5) pCill; ... .,. ..... .
3. The. concentration of total gross beta particle :activ,ty Jo.ex-
ceed fifty (50) pCin; . ...
4. The concentration of tritium to exceed20.000pCill;····.
5. The concentration of total Strontium-90 to· exceed eigtlf (8)
pCill; . .
6. The concentration of uranium to exceed thirt\t·(30) ugll.:
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1(entucky Waterways Jl[fiance
854 Horton Lane, :Munfor£vi{fe, 1(rt42765-8135
270-524-1774· {[)irector@1(W;I{[iance. ore
Jeffrey W. Pratt
Division of Water
Department of Environmental Protection
14 Reilly Road
Frankfort, KY 40601
October 23, 2003
RE: Comments on the.proposed changes to 401 KAR 5:002, 5:026, 5:029, 5:030 and 5:031
Dear Mr. Pratt:
Kentucky Waterways Alliance, Inc. (KWA) and the Environmental Law & Policy Center of the
Midwest (ELPC) submit these comments on the proposed changes to 40lKAR 5:002, 5:026,
5:029, 5:030 and 5:031. KWA is a statewide nonprofit membership organization dedicated to
protecting and restoring Kentucky's waterways and their watersheds by building effective
alliances for their stewardship. ELPC is a regional nonprofit organization that has worked.to
protect and improve water quality through improved implementation of the Clean Water Act in a
number of states in the Mississippi River and Great Lakes watersheds.
The administrative regulations proposed by the Division of Water (DOW) on October 1, 2003,
do not begin to establish the bare minimum protections of Kentucky waters that are required by
the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. The proposed regulations offer only very
minor improvell1ents to Kentucky"s antidegradation implementation procedures. They
improperly exclude a large number of Kentucky waters from federally-mandated protections
against degradation of water quality that has not been shown to be economically or socially
necessary. Even'worse, the protections the draft purports to affordthe waters that are covered are
largely illusory.
No valid KPDES pennits c~ be issued for new or increased discharges into Kentucky waters
until legal antidegradation standards and implementation regulations are established by or for the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. The DOW must cease issuing permits that should be governed by
valid antidegradation regulations until such rules are established. If DOW is unwilling to do this,
United States Enviromnental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), pursuant to 40 CFR 123.44, must
prevent the issuance ~fpermits that allow any lowering in quality of Kentucky waters.
Alternatively, U.S. EPA should remove the federal delegation to Kentucky over permitting under
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) pursuant to 40 CFR 123~63.
This is DOW's third attempt to promulgate antidegradation regulations to.maintain water quality
and to remove U.S. EPA's 1997 disapproval of this critical portion of Kentucky's regulations.
Unfortunately, the DOW has been unable or unwilling to propose proper regulations required by
the Clean Water Act. Three strikes and you're out Accordingly, U.S. EPA should establish
antidegradation standards and implementation rules under 33 ·U.S.C. §1313(c).
Tab Three
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We do generally support changes to 401. KAR·S:002, 5:026, 5:029 and 5:031 as detailed in our
comments.below. There ~e, however, a number of other changes that are needed to these
provisions that were not proposed by DOW.
Background and General Comments
KWA and ELPC supports the following proposed changes or additions to the regulations:
• Adding approximately 166 waterways to the list of Exceptional Waters.
,. Adding 5 waterways to the list of Outstanding State Resource Waters.
• Adding a stand<:rrd for E. coli to meet safe recreational standards.
• Updating and or adding criteria in 401 KAR 5:031 for parameters ~ased on EPA's
updated recommendations.
• Prohibiting new mixing zones for bio-accumulative to'xins and phasing out existing
mixing zones for these toxic pollutants within 10 years. .
• Using a default designation of "high.quality" for waters nototherwise classified but
we believe that all waters should be protected from unnecessary new pollution.
However, with its proposed changes to,40lKAR 5:030 itappears that the DOW "ignored the'
approximately 40Q comment letters specifically related to antidegradation implementation
procedures that were submitted to the U.S. EPA months ·ago. Equally disheartening, DOW
continues to ignore federal regulations at 40 CFR 13 1. 12(a)(2) that requires each state to
establish a policy and implementation rules to prohibit degradation of water quality unless it is
ne'cessary to allow such degradation to accommodate important social or economic development.
These protections against unnecessary lowering of water quality,·which requires a consideration
. ofalternatives and proof that the proposed new pollution loading is necessary to accommodate
important economic or social development, kn9wn~as "Tier II" protections, do not now exist in
Kentucky. The only Tier II protections DOW h~ been willing to establish were deficient·and
properly disapproved by EPA in 1997 and again in 2000..
While the new proposed administrative regulations are a minor improvement over the Division's
last try (the 1999 submittal to u.s. EPA), they do not come close to protecting Kentucky waters
or-complying with the law. In particular, this proposal fails in part because: "
. It continues to follow the deficient "designational" or "waterbody-by-waterbody"
approach to coverage instead of Il"rotecting all of Kentucky's waters.
Many waters are denied all Tier II antidegraqatiop. protection even if they· have
high biological quality or great value asa recreation resource. .
Antidegradation protections for "Exceptional" and t1High Quality" waters are
further compromised by a list of exemptions, waivers and "loopholes" to the
extent that there are _basically no real protections offered by the proposal for any
waters.
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Rules are not set forth for considering NPDES applicatio.nsproposing new
loadings of pollutants and provisions for allowing public participation in the
decision are not set forth.
Nothing is provided regarding how Kentucky is goingto implement
antidegradation with regard to water quality certifications under Section 401 of
the Clean Water Act.
In general, under the proposed regulations, Exceptional Waters, which DOW has implied receive
"Tier II ~" protections that are better than Tier II protections, actually rec.eive only a small
portion of the basic federally-mandated Tier II protections. The protections for ffigh Quality
Water amount to even less.
A-
I. All Kentucky waters should. be protected against. .unnecessary degradation~
401 K.AR 5:030 should require the application of antidegradatiol1 on a pararrieter-by-parameter
basis and require application of the parameter-based review even to those water~ on the 303(d)
list for parameters not violating standards. .
The necessity of creating this administrative regulation is to implement and comply with KRS
224.70-100. KRS 224.70-100 declares that the policy ofthe Commonwealth is to conserve its
waters for legitimate uses and to: safeguardfrom pollution the uncontaminated waters ofthe
Commonwealth, prevent the creation ofany new pollution in the w.atersofthe Commonwealth, ...
(emphasis added). The Statute makes it clear that the Cabinet's regulatory duty is to keep new
contaminates out of the waters of the Commonwealth, not t9 create shortcuts for allowing new or
increased pollution.
A. Levels of water quality should be protected on a parameter-by-parameter. basis.
In the proposed changes to 401 KAR 5:030 DOW continues to take a waterbody-by-waterbody
(or "designational") approach to Tier II protection coverage, rather than use the parameter-by-
parameter (or "pollutant-by-pollutant"}app~oach.Under the designational approac~ the DOW
has designated a subset of its waters as "high quality" and protects only these "high quality"
water bodies from unnecessary degradation. Under a parameter-by-parameter approac~ levels of
water quality better than the minimum necessary to meet standards are protected even if the
water body is partially impaired. For example, a water body that has low levels of cyanide is
protected from unnecessary new loadings'of cyanide even if the water body is suffering from
excess loadings of fecal coliform.
The DOW should accept the parameter-by parameter approach. Limiting the protection against
unnecessary pollution to "high quality" waters is inconsistent both with attaining the' goals of the
Clean Water Act and the langu~geof40 CFR 131.12(a)(2).
The basic goal of the Clean Water Act - to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation's
waters (§101(a)) - is certainly not advanced by allowing an unnecessary new loading' ofa
pollutant to be added to a water body just because the water is already in need ofrestoration with,
regard to a different pollutant. u.s. EPA's major guidance document on water quality 'standards,
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the Water Quality Standards Handbook, EPA-823-B-94-005a (2d. Ed. 1994)("Handbook")
makes clear that the parameter-by-parameter approach is generally' needed to meet the goals of
the Clean Water Act:
EPA believes it is best to apply aiztidegradation on a parameter-by-parameterbasis. Otherwise
there is potentialfor a1arge number ofwaters not to receive antidegradation.protection, which is
important to attaining the goals ofthe Clean Water Act to restore and maintain the integrity ofthe
Nation's waters. (at 4-7)1
40 CFR 131.12(a)(2) does not suggest its coverage is limited to "high quality" waters. The
regulation'does not read "waters which fully support propagation·offish, shellfish, and wildlife
and recreation in and on the water, should be protected." What it actually says is that where
there are levels of quality that quality should be protected. Thus, where the "level" of cyanide is
low enough "to support propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the
water" that "quality" should be protected. It is impossible to read the waterbody-by:-waterbody
approach into the words of the current version of 131.12(a)(2). Section 131..12(a)(2) speaks of
"levels" of water quality and requires that 'such "quality" is to be maintained unless it is really
necessary to allow degradation.
The only principled argument for the designational approach is that it allows states to focus
. resources on waters that they. think are most important. Butthe factthat a water body is not
meeting one or more water quality standards does not make·the water any more or less important
to the people of Kentucky. Directing state resourc~s away from waters simply because they are_
failing to meet one or more water qqality standards makes about as much sense as saying that the
police should patrol less in 'areas where there has already been criminal activity.
There are much better ways to foclls resources other than to' deny arbitrarily Tier II protections to
broad classes of waters. Obviously,other things being equal, big new loadings of pollutants
should get more attention from the DOW than smaller sources. Proposals for new loadings of
pollutants that will persist in the environment might be given more attention than prop<?sals for
new or increased loadings of pollutants that rapidly dissipate. WateJ;s containing sensitive species
1 U.S. EPA mentions in the Handbook that it has not strictly require4 the paramete~-by-parameterapproach stating:
However, ifa State has an official interpretation thatdifJersfrom'this interpretation, EPA will
. evaluate the State interpretationfor conformance with thestatutory·and regulatory intent ofthe
antidegradation pqlicy. EPA has accepted approaches that do not .uSe a strict pollutant-by- .
pollutant basis. (Id.).
That U.S. EPA has in the past not strictly required the parameter-by-parameter approach.does not prove the
waterbody-by-waterbody approach is appropriate or legal. ~oreover, when u.s. EPA wrote the antidegradation
standards it used the parameter-by-parameter approach~ The antidegradation regulations applicable to the Great
Lakes, unlike 131.12(a)(2), do use the term "high q~ality" but "high quality waters"'is defined so as to make clear
that quality is to be treated on a parameter-by-parameter basis and that a water is. "high quality" if it has high quality
for any water quality parameter: -
High quality waters are water bodies in which, on a parameter by parameter
basis, the quality ofthe waters exceeds levels necessary to support propagation
offish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the water. 40 CFR pt 132
App. E.ILA. .
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should receive more protection and the DOW might more carefully review proposed new
pollution loadings to waters heavily.used for recreation or near population areas.
It is'possible to tailor the extent of resources used in considering the need for allowing a
particular proposed loading to fit the situation posed by that loading or type of loading.2 But in .
determining the extent ofTier'II analysis necessary, a case-by-case approach is needed that takes
into account all relevant factors, rather than allowing an open season on vast reaches of many
Kentucky waters for .unnecessary new pollution.
B. It is irrational to limit Tier II protections to water meeting.all applicable
water quality standards; protection must be granted to impaired waters.
Under proposed 401 KAR 5:030 Section 1 (3) and (4) all waters listed as impaired for any
applicable designated use are denied Tier II protection. This makes no sense and directly
conflicts with th~ recent decision in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Horinko, 2003 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 15359 (S.D. W.Va 2003). Whether a water body meets'or fails to meet all water
quality standards has little to do with .whether a water body is deserving 'ofprotection from.
degradation. Indeed, as recognized by the court in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, the
mere fact that a water has one or more impairments does not show that the water does not-have
overall high quality. - -
A- water body i~ impaired if it does not meet the stan4ards applicable to ~he particular use
designation applicable to it. For example, a water body designated as a primary contact
recreational.water(see present 401 KAR 5:031 Sect~on 6 proposed to be renumbered as Section
7) might be impaired even though it is actually cleaner than a water body that is not listed as
impaired.because the second water is designated as secondary contact recreation water. If
Kentucky designated a~l of its water as a source of untreated drinking water, most everything
would be impaired. Conversely, if Kentucky removed all the recreational use designations from
its waters, the bacterial impainnents would all go away.without improvingwGiter quality a bit or
'~aking the waterbodies.more or less worthy of Tier II protection.
There are, in fact, many Kentucky waters with rare and important aquatic communities that
certainly are deserving of at least Tier II protection although they are impaired for one or more
pollutant. For example:
• The Upper Green River is listed as impaired for primary contact recreation due to
pathogens from RM 183.5 - 250.2. Yet this Section of the river has one of most .
biologically diverse populations of aquatic' life in the entire United· States (4th), ,and is
ranked as the most diverse waterway in the entire Ohio River basin. More than 150
species of fish, 71 species of mussels - twenty-nine of which are imperiled or
_vulnerable and 7 ofwhich are listed as federally endangered rely upon the river for
aquatic habitat. Still, this river will not receive protections against unnecessary new
pollution under the current proposal.
• Bucks Branch of Jellico Creek in Whitley/McCreary Counties is currently recognized
by POW as'an Outstanding State Resource Water (O~SRW)because it provides
habitat 'for federally-listed endangered species but it is also listed as impaired for
2 See 35 III. Adm. Code 302.105{c)(2); Ohio Administrative Code 3745-1-05(C)(8)
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primary contact and aquatic life due to low pH from resource extraction.3 Thus, under
DOW"s current proposal this "outstanding" water would not receive any Tier II
protection.
• The South Fork of Bayou de Chien Creek in Graves County is also' classified as
OSRW because of federally listed species in the stream, yet it is listed as impaired
and nonsupport for aquatic life due to siltation from agriculture related sources.
Rather than protect the federally endangered species and work with area farmers to
address the NPS problems in the watershed, DOW offers rules with no Tier II
protection for this stream from new point sources or other regulatedactivities.4
It is irrational to deny Tier II protections to such waters simply because they fail to meet<bne or
more of the water quality standards for a particular use some portion of the time.
II.,. Even the water that the proposal purports to protect as "Exceptional" or
"High Quality" does not receive real protection because of huge exemptions
'and loopholes provid.ed in the proposed regulations.
The proposed regulations (401 KAR5:030 Section 1 (2)} would redesignate a number of waters
as UExceptional". KWA and ELPC recognizes and supports the additional listing of 166 wa~er
segments to this category in the proposed regulations. We believe that when biological or water
quality data supports the inclusion ofwaters ,into this category that it is incumbent upon the
Cabinet to propose such additions and provide such waters with protections that exceed the fe<;leral
Tier II minimum. We support the additional monitoring the Cabinet h~ undertaken as a part ofthe
Watershed' Framework Initiative apd believe that a better understanding of the quality ofour waters
is a critical factor in protecting it
.While 'we support the redesignations, they are of very little comfort. That is because the proposed
regulation does nothing to correct the existing loopholes in Kentucky's pro~ectionsof waters that
the DOW has designated as "Exceptional". These loopholes are so large that there is effectively
little or no additional protection of Exceptional waters.
The proposed regulations" also create the category of"High Quality Water" (proposed 401 KAR
.. 5:030 Section 1 (3)) .and purport to give these waters Tier II protections. Adoption ofTier II
protections' is a necessary part of addressing the current U .8. EPA disapproval of Kentucky's
regulations and is required" by federal law tinder the Clean Water Act However, in fact, the
pr~tections the DOW proposes to give such High Quality water are virtually nil. .Actually, the
3 This an example of the DOW's' current permitting program for coal mining not even protecting existing uses, let
alone offering anything like Tier II protection.
'4 Conversely, under DOW's proposed regulations White Oak Creek in Greenup County is "High Quality" water
because·th~ creek is meeting secondary contact standards according to DOW's most recent assessment Similarly,
Paddy's Run in Jefferson ~ounty is designated for primary and secondary contact recreation only and is not listed as
~mpaired for either of these uses. Therefore Paddy's Run is a ~'High Quality" stream under the DOW's proposed
regulation. While we agree that White Oak Creek and Paddy's Run should be protected from new pollution, it is
absurd to allow the Green River and other waters to be degraded so that the DOW can focus on White Oak Creek
and Paddy's Run.
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loopholes in protection for both Exceptional and High Quality water are so large that they will
allow virtually all applications for p.ew loadings to any water to avoid any TierII review.
A. Th~ exemptions. from· Tier II Protection for polluting activities (proposed 401
KAR5:030 Section 1 (2) (b) 1 a. throughd. and Section 1 (3) (~) 1 a. through
d. that frequently operate under a general permit are illegal and irrational.
T4e provisions for the implementation procedures for both Exceptional andHig~ Qu~lity waters
begin with a list of activities that are totally excluded from Tier II coverage: stonn water
activities,.coal mining discharge, domestic sewage from a single family residences ahd
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).We tecognize that these types ·ofdischarges -
listed in clauses a through d. ofproposed 401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(2)(b)1 and clauses a. thorough
d. ofproposed 401 KAR 5:030 Section, 1 (3)(b)1 - are subject to some control by existing Cabinet
programs including the KPDES program and that under current· regulations the Cabinet is
supposed to always fully protect existing uses. This does notme~ however, that such discharges
, are or c~ be exemptedfro~being covered by the Tier II protections of40 CFR 131.12 (1)(b). 40
C.F.R. 131.12(1)(b) does 'not recognize any of the exceptions to antidegradationprovided by the
proposed rules. Contrary to the implications of DOW's discussion of its' proposal in the
, Regulatory Impact Analysis and Tiering Statement (RIATS), Kentucky's existing regulation of
these act~vities certai~y does·not fulfill the federal antidegradation requirements.
1. Wholesale permitting of new and increased loadings under general
permits cannot satisfy CWA antidegradation requirements.
,The four types of polluting activities that DOW proposes to exerp.pt generically from Tier II
requirements, to the ,extent they are regulated now a~ all, are· normally-handled under general
'pennits.The existing Kentucky treatment of these activities is absolutely no substitute for the
. federally require,d Tier II protections.
Firs~ it cannot go without mention that the current Kentucky regulatory use of general pennits is
illegal, even without consideration of the Tier II an~idegradation requirements. The facts are
clear that the current regulatory system does not protect existing uses from damage from CAPOs,
.stonnwater and. coal mining5 and allows discharges that cause or contribute to violations of
5 Resource Extraction accounts for 15% or over 366 miles ofimpair~d ~aterways as a result of coal mining
activities. Ifexisting cabinet permit programs including the general coal pennit served to maintain the quality of
Kentucky rivers and streams additional listings of impaired waters due to resource extraction would be almost
nonexistent. Instead ,we see from the 2002 303(d) list an increasing number ofstream miles in every watershed
where surface ~ining is active that do not support basic uses due to resource extraction. A few examples include:
B'ear Creek of the South Fork ofthe Cumberland River, RM o~o - 3.2 is nonsupport for aquatic life due. to resource
extraction (surface mining'an<i subsurface mining). Yet this ,~reek then flows into the Big South Fork degrading
water quality in the ONRW designated Big South Fork of the Cumberland River.
. Stoney 'Fork of straightCreek, in Bell County (RM 0.0 to 2.4) is use nonsupport for aquatic life. Resource extraction
is listed as one ofthe causes of the impainnent, yet in October 2002 the cabinet proposed and subsequently renewed
an individual KPpES permit that was v~ally identical to the general permit for resource extraction on this creek.
Left Fork ofMillstone Creek' in ,Breathitt County. (RM 1.5 - 2.7) is nonsupport for aquatic life because of siltation
aild l~w pH problems due to reso~ce extraction.
General storm water permits, Phase I cities of Louisville and Lexington:
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·numeric and narrative water quality standards. Thus, the current scheme is allowing violations of
40 CFR 122.44(d) and the Tier I protections required by 40 CFR 131.12(a)(I). Moreover, the
existing Kentucky general permits do not require the individual DOW review and opportunity
for public comment required by the Clean Water Act. See Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v.
U.S.EPA, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 19073 (9th Cir. 2003). -
Further, it is doubtful that activities licensed under a general pennit can ever satisfy CWA Tier II
requirements unless individualized consideration is given to new or increased loading. As was
explained by the court in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition:
Under § 131.12(a)(2), water quality cannot be lowered unless doing so is
"necessary to ·accommodate important economic or social development
in the area in which the waters are located." This standard, by its terms;
is location-specific. When a general pennit is issued under Section 402
or Section 404, the State simply does not know the specific locations of·
discharges that might be covered by the general pennit; discharge
locations are not known until individuals seek pennission to discharge
under the.general permit. In light of this fact,~ the court does not .
understand 110W the State could detennine, at the time the general pennit
is issued, that each potential discharge that might some day be ~overed
by the general pennit is "necessary to accommodate important economic
or social development in the area in which the waters are located."
.§ 131.12(a)(2)~ (emphasis in original)
As~uming hypothetically that general pennits can be developed that will satisfy Tier II
requirements under some circumstances, it js inconceivable that Kentucky's current permits for
stormwater, coal mining, individual residences or CAPOs do so. The DOW did not have any
valid antidegradation rules in place when these permitting schemes were developed and made no
pretense of 4Pplying Tier II principles in developing the permits. The existing permits do not
take into account the individual facts regarding the loadings, alternatives and the nature of the
receiving water that must be considered for any valid scheme.
Town;Branch of Elkhom Creek in Fayette County (RM 0.0 - 11.5) is nonsupport for swimming and partial support
for aquatic life due in part to urban runoff and storm sewers.
Floyds Fork (RM-O.O - 67.0) along with most of it's major tributaries including Chenoweth ·Run (RM 0.0 - 9.1),
Curry's Fork (0.0 - 4.8), Long Fork (RM 0.0 - 9.5), Pennsylvania Run (RM 0.0 - 3.1) are all listed as nonsupport
for swimming andrnost are also· listed as partial support for aquatic life due in part to urban runoff and stonn
sewers.
The Phase II general storm water (MS4) pennit system is so new that there are no good new examples to use herein,
however requiring the use ofBMPs while a good frrst step is not the thoughtful·consideration that is suppose to
accompany an antidegradation analysis.
CAFO General Permits:
In ~e Licking River Basin a long-tenn problem with intensive animal feeding operations has _used significant 319(h)
funding and was designated a Clean Water Action Priority Watershed in Kentucky. Fleming Creek and most of it's
major tributaries are designated as aquatic life and/or swimming non-support due to these operations. Fleming Creek
(RM O~O-:- 39.2) and tributaries including Allison Creek (RM 0.0 - 4.7), Cassidy Creek (RM.O.O - 3.9), Craintown
Branch (RM 0.0 - 3.5), Logan Run (RM 0.0 - 2.3), Poplar Creek (RM 0.0 -.3.1), Sleepy Run(RM 0.0 - 2.8), Town
Branch (RM 0.0 - 4.0), Wilson Run (RM 0.0 - 5.1) and an unnamed tributary at RM 4.28 of Fleming Creek (RM
0.0 - 2.8) are all listed as impaired with the only source being animal feeding operations. .
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2. Existing Kentucky Regulations do not provide Tier II protection as to
the activities that DOW proposes to exempt.
The statements made in DOW's RlATS in defense of,these broad exemptionsfroffi.Tier II
protections are invalid. ,First, contrary to the RlATS, it is simply false that any Kentucky waters
receive anything like Tier II protections from Kentucky's exi~ting storm water programs.
Kentucky waters receive only a "one size fits all" set ofprotections consisting of certain under-
enforced best.management practices requirements.
The discussion ofthe coal mining loophole in the RIATS ~seems calculated to mislead. It implies
that Tier II protections 'are not needed as to coal mining because coal mining is subject to
regulation under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) and Section 404
and Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.·But the DOW must know full well that SMCRA was '
never designed to give antidegradation protections for sensitive waters and was designed instead
to require minimum technology-based standards for coal mining operations. Section 404 does
not app~y to all coal. mining operations arid, when it applies to a mining operation, may apply
only to a small 'portion of the activities that potentially will degrade water quality. Even as to that
portion of the mining activities to which. Section 404 is applied, the analysis done by the Corps
of Engineers was never conceived as a substitute for Tier II antidegradation analysis. DOW"s
reference to the CWA Section 401 must be whimsical given that DOW does not propose in this
proposal or elsewhere any Tier IIstandards·or implementation rules of Tier II to govern 401
certificatio~ for Kentucky waters.
Similarly, existing CAFO regulatory,programs·:do not serve the 'function that the required Tier II ,
protections are to provide.CAFOs are not subject to "no discharge" requirements, they are
allowed to discharge under high -rainfall conditions (the so-called 25 year rainfall that seems to
happen every year) and waste generated at CAFOs is frequently sprayed on fields from which it
runs into streams, causing serious water quality degradation. 40 CFR 13 1. 12(a)(2) does not make
any exception for CAFOs and the DOW cannot legally allow CAFOs to begin operation if they
may lead to new polllJtant loadings without requiring compliance with Tier II protection.6
B. The exemption from Tier II Protection for expansion of existing loadings (401
KAR 5:030 Section 1(2) (b}le. and Section 1 (3) (b) Ie. is arbitrary and '
illegaL
The proposed r~':llation also provides a cOJJ.?plete. exemption for certain expansions of existing
discharges. As to both Exceptional waters and High Quality water, the proposed regulation
exempts:
KPDES permit renewals that result in less than a tw~nty (20)perceni increase in pollutant loading
from the previous!y pern2ittedpollutant ~oading. .
This exception is completely improper.
6 Just what the DOW means to say in the RIATS abou~ domesti~ waste from single-family residences is unclear. It is
clear that 40 CFR 131.12 provides no exceptions to· Tier II protections for such discharges and that protections
equivalent to Tier II protections are not currently in place in Kentucky as to such discharges.
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° First, the language is ambiguous in the situation in which there is more than one existing pennit
for discharges to the water. Arguably if permit holder A has a pennit to discharge 100 units of a
pollutant and B also has a permit to discharge 100 units, A could seek a renewed pennit that
raised its discharge by 39.units because that increase would be less than"20% of the "previously
pennitted pollutant loading." We believe the exception is only intended to allow increases of
20% by tl1at applicant, but the wording i$ unclear.
Equally unclear, does the current regulation ·mean that the increased loading of each pollutant
must be less that 20% of the current loading·of that pollutant or could a discharger ask to
discharge more than 20% more of some pollutants ifits total flow stayed under 20% more than
its current flow? The typical case will perhaps be sewage treatment plant expansions that have
roughly the same mix ofpollutants as the plant expands. But how does this exception treat the -
situation in which the expanded plant, while expanding its design average flow by under 20%,
\will increase its discharge of some pollutants by more than 20%1 In otherwords~ is this
exception applied on a- par~eter-by-parameter basis?"
But the ambiguous drafting is nottheo biggest problem here. All NPDES permits or 401
certifications allowing for new or' increased loadings should be subject to at least some
antidegradation review. As a matter of law, any detectable increaSe in pollutants constitutes
degradation. Columbus & Franklin County Metropolitan Park District v. Shank, 65 Ohio St.86~
- 600 N.E.2d 1042, 1055 (Ohio 1992). All new loadings· constitute degradation and are significant.
Allowing any degradation that has not been shown to be necessary to accommodate important
development conflicts with the goals of the Clean Water Act.. Letting polluters appropriate even
small bites of a public resource, clean water, on a "first come, first served basis" until clean
water becomes scarce, is not in the pu"blic interest and makes no sense as a matter "of economics
or environmental protection. ·The fIrst applicant that comes along should not be able" to exhaust
unnecessarily a portion of a public resource when.a later applicant, that needs to use the available
capacity~ may come thatwould.supply more economic or social development to the area.
Moreover, as a practIcal matt~r, there is little value to a "significance" threshold or "de minimis"
exception. A limitation or exception from the antidegradation demonstration requirement does
not help p~rmit writers or applicants at all if it is as hard to detenninewhether something is
"insignificant" or fits into an" exemption, as it is to do an antidegradation demonstration. A
pr~per analysis of whether something is significant or de minimis involves gauging at least seven
factors:
~ assimilation capacity of the stream that will be removed by the proposed new pollution
- assimilation capacity of the stream that will remain if the new pollution is allowed
- total amount 9f the discharge --
- sensitivity and rarity of the aquatic species that might be affected
- toxicity and scientific uncertainly associated with the pollutants involved
- likelihood that others will need to use the requested assimilation capacity and
~ ease with which potential alternatives might be identified.
It is as ·easy to "perform and document a simple antidegradation analysis as it.is to weigh these
factors and document a decision that the new loading is insignificant.
Further, alternatives to allowing new pollution ~lways should always be considered. Guidance by
u.s. EPA Region' VIII allowed· for a very limited "significance" provision in a state
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antidegradation regulati0Il:. The th!eshold in the Region VIII Guidance for significance is that the
new pollution must use less than 5% of the remaining assimilation capacity. More importantly
the Region VIII Guidance provides that analysis of alternatives should be done even for
degradations using less than 5% of the capacity.7
The proposed broad exemptions for 20% increases cannot properly be characterized as de
minimis. In Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition the court held that allowing ·cumulative
.discharges of20% of total assimilative capacity as "de minimis" .was unjustified. Actually, in
many cases, a 20% increase in the exi~tingdisehargecould take up 100% or .more of the
remaining assimilative capacity..In cases whe~e there is already a large discharge,a 20% increase
could involve a huge increased loading.
Moreover, it is unclear if this exception will only apply to renewals at the end ofa 5-year pennit
period. Could.a discharger come in for a "renewal" within the life of its permit and use the 20%
allowance? .
The RIATS attempts to defend this exemption with the claim that publicly·owned sewage
treatment works (POTWs) expansions are regulatecl through approvals ofregional ~acility plans
pursuant to 401 KAR 5:006~ ,It does not seem, however, that the 20% exemption is· limited to
POTW expansions. Ifitis supposed to be, the language certainly must be clarified. Moreover;
approvals of POTW regional facilitY plans do not consider all the factors that should be
considered under 131.12(a)(2) and there are huge numbers.ofexisting POTWs that did· not go·
through any sort ofalternatives analysis at all.
In summary, the exemption from Tier II protection for expansion of existing loadings (401 KAR
5:030 Section 1(2)(b)le. and Section 1(3)(b)le. is unjustifiable and illegaL
·c. The provisions regarding mixing zones and whole.effluent toxicity in
Exceptional and High Quality Water are not. sufficiently protective.
It is good that it is proposed to prohibit new zones of initial dilution (ZID) in Exceptional waters
(proposed 401 KAR 5:030 Section 1 (2)(b)2) although we would like to see ZIDseiiminated or
at le~t more strictly limited.
The provision requiring chronic whole effluent toxicity limits, proposed Section .1 (2)(b)3, for
Exceptional use ~aters is not written clearly. What is the limit to be placed in the permits? If this
means only that t4ere should· not ·be chronic toxicity at the edge of the mixing zone, it·does no.
more thari what the DOW should require of all KPDES permits.
Chronic WET testing should be required for all dischargers that might have toxic discharges no
matter the water to which they discharge to prevent violations of the general toxicity staIidard~
40.1 KAR 5:031 Section. 4 (1) G).
7 EPA Region VIII Guidance: ANTIDEGRDATION IMPLEMENTATION requirements, Options and EPA
Recommendations Pertaining to State/Tribal Antidegradation Progralns, August.1993 (page 18).
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D.Theexemption from Tier II Protection for pennit applicants willing to accept
certain discharge limits (proposed 401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(2) (b)4-5 and
·Section 1 (3)(b)2) is illegal and irrational.
The proposed regulations provide still another exemption from proper Tier II coverage for permit
applicants willing to· accept certain KPDES permit effluent limits. Here the proposed protections I
(or rather lack of protections) for Exceptional and High Quality water differ in that Exceptional
water receives some protection against certain pollutants that are frequently discharged by
domestic sewage treatment plants (CBOD5, ammonia-nitrogen, total residual chlorine, total
suspended solids, phosphorus, fecal coliform) while High Quality waters apparently have little or
no Tier II protections against domestic s'ewage discharges.
1. The Protections .forExceptional Waters are totally -inadequate.
a. Domestic Wastewater Loophole
There are' yet more loopholes that will allow permit applicants for new or increased
loadings to Exceptional water to avoid ever ·having to show that the new or increased
pollution is ne~essary. Under proposed 401 KAR 5:030 Section I(2)(b)4, new·or
increased dischm;ges by domestic sewage dischargers to Exc~ptio:p.alwater bodies are
permitted if the pennit has certain specified effluent ~il1?-its on carbonaceous biochemical
oxygen demand (CBOD5), ammonia, total residual chloride, total suspended solids,
phosphorus, dissolved oxygen, w~ole effluent toxicity, and fecal coliform.
If the specified effluent limits, that allow short-circuiting a proper antidegradation analysis ~for
Exception waters were stringent and invariably protective, 401 KAR5:030 Section 1(2) (b) 4
.might protect Exceptional waters. But the effluent limits set forth in the proposed rule do not
provide protection that is extraordinary or even adequate in many cases. The specified ammonia
limit of 2 mg/L is much looser than limits that can routinely be met by sewage treatment plants,
with advanced treatment and is ~ot sufficiently tight to prevent toxic conditions under many pH
and temperature conditions. See U.S. EPA Ammonia National Criteria Document (1999).
Similarly, the effluent limit of 1 mg/L total phosphorus is the minimum treatment standard .
required of every discharger to the Great Lakes watershed and, according to applicable EPA
nutrient standard guidance .documents, is many times the concentration of phosphorus that
should be in Kentucky waters. See e.g.. , Ambient 'Waterouality Criteria Recommendatio·ns,
Lakes and Reservoirs Nutrient Ecoregion IX, EPA 822-B-OO-Oll (Dec. 2000); Ambient Water
Quality Criteria Recommendations, Rivers and Streams in Nutrient Ecoregion XI, EPA 822-B-
00-020 (Dec. 2000). Inq.eed, none 'of the proposed effluent limits that allow a discharger to ·avoid
showing a need to discharge more pollutants into Exceptional waters are exceptional.
Further, the proposed rule is very' unclear as to whetp.er domestic sewage dischargers have to
meetany special effluent limits as to pollutants other than the pollutants listed in Section 1, (2)
(b)4 to avoid having to show a need to discharge into E~Geptionalwaters. Do domestic sewerage
dischargers have to meet the ~ WQBEL limits? There are domestic sewage dischargers with
significant discharges of zinc, copper and other pollutants not mentioned by Section I(2)(b)4.
We have been told that it is intended by DOW that domestic sewage dischargers will have to
meet the ~ the WQBEL requirement for pollutants not covered by Section 1(2)(b)4 to qualify for
the exemption from having-to prove necessity, but the proposed rule does not seem to say that.
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On the other hand, given that industrial dischargers also often discharge ammonia, phosphorus,
chlorine, and CBOD5, clarification is needed as whether industrial dischargers must meetat least
the effluent limits required of domestic sewage dischargers for these pollutants in order to skip
having to show need for adding pollutant loadings to an Exceptional water. The proposal does
nqt appear to require this. It appears that industrial dischargers may avoid Tier·II review while
discharging more ammonia-nitrogen, phosphorus, CBOD5 and <other pollutants th.an the leyels
specified in Section 1(2)(b)4. 8 What justification, however, is there for not requiring industrial
dischargers who want to discharge into Exceptional waters to meet the effluent limits set forth by
the rule for ammonia-nitrogen, P, CBODS, etc. for domestic sewage treatment plants?
b. 50% of WQBEL. loophole for non-domestic waste dischargers.
Non-domestic waste dischargers also·are given a short cut that will allow them to avoid making
any showing of need before DOW licenses them to add a pollutant loading to Exceptional
Kentucky water. Non-domestic dischargers need only to accept limits equivalent to one-half <;If
the WQBEL to obtain a pass. As mentioned, to qualify for the loophole, non-domestic waste
disch~gersshould at least have to meet the (generous) effluent limits for ammonia~nitrogen,
CBOD5, TRC, P, TSS, and DO required of domestic sewage dischargers to qualify for the
shortcut.
First, there are no numeric limits for nutrients, including phosphorus.·Accordingly, non-domestic
dischargers apparently need not limit their discharge ofphosphorus at all and 'stillcan qualify for
an exemption from any requirement to show that their discharge is economically or socially
necessary.
But even as to the pollutants for which the ~ WQBEL is at all meaningful, Section 1(2)(b)6 is a
huge loophole from Tier II (let alone purported Tier II Y2) protections. If there is substantial
dilution available when the permit is considered, a Y2 WQBEL effluent limit maybe practically·
no limit at all. If there is little dilution available, this is in effect a de minimis that can approach
50% of the total assimilation value, clearly not anything that can properlY be called "de minimis"
in Latin, English or law. All of the comments above regarding allowing a 20% increase of
pollution fr9m existing pollution sources that has not been proven to be necessary apply with
equal or greater force to this loophole allowing unnecessary new pollution as long as it stays
under 50% of the WQBEL. . .
2. High Quality Water gets no protection from d01?estic sewage
discharge given proposed 401 KAR S·:030Section 1(3)(b)2.
The DOW's proposed protections for Exceptional waters are far weaker than the federal ,
minimum Tier II protections. For High Quality water (i.e. water meeti!1ga11applicable water
quality standards but not designated as Exceptional) the DOW proposes protections that are still
further below the minimum. A huge loophole apparently allows discharge of most of the
pollutants associated with domestic sewage to be discharged into High Quality waters without
any showing of need or consideration of alternatives. Under Section 1(3)(b)2 and 3, a permit
applicant need only agree.to a pennitwith limits at" no more than one-half(1/2) ofthe water
quality based limitations that would have been permitted under standard design conditions for
l .
8 We aSSUlne that an industrial discharger that discharges alnmonia-nitrogenthat wants to av()idTier II review would .
have to meet the ~ WQBELlirnit of Section 1 (2)(b)5. ).
Printed on recycled paper
C - 29
po~lutants listed in Table 1 of Section 60f 401 KAR 5:031." Absent from Table 1 is any mention
ofammonia~nitrogen,phosphorus or BOD.
Limiting protection of High Quality waters to protections against the pollutants listed in Table 1
also further weakens Tier II protections againstn~n-domesticwaste dischargers. There are, of,
course, thousands of potential water pollutants'not listed in Table 1. High Quality waters receive
no Tier II antidegrad~tion protection against these pollutants.
Finally, all of the loopholes that DOW proposesto allow an applicant to add new pollution to
Exceptional'water without antidegradation review, are also proposed for applicants seeking.to
degrade High Quality water. These loopholes are as illegal as to High Quality water as they are,
to Exceptional water. (1;
E. The Proposed Rules do not propose the correct standards for consideration of'
proposals to degrade.
If, given a~l the loopholes and shortcuts, a'Tier II analysis'were ever to ,be done in Kentucky, it 'is'
unlikely it would be done properly. The rules establish a presumption that the fairly loose
effluent limits provided for CBOD5, ammonia-nitrogen, total residual chlorine, total suspended '
solids and phosphorus will be adopted for POTWs and that the ~ WQBEL limits will be adopted
for other dischargers. Thus, there will·probably never bea free consideration ofalternatives to
the discharge _but only an effort by the applicant's engineersto show that one of the presumed
effluent limits should be waived because-itraises costs 120% or more~'
The rule is correct that an alternative is feasible if it only cost 120% of the discharge proposal,
but it must be made clear that something thatcostffiuch m<;)re, than 120% ofthe discharge'
proposal may also be feasible. As the 1995 USEPA Interim Economic Guidance for Water
OualityStandards (http://www.epa.gov/ostwater/econ/ makes clear, that an alternative ismuch-"
more expensive does 'not make it impossible if the economic or social development can still be_
achieved.
All alternatives should be considered on a pollutant-by-pollutant 'basis. The choice should not
simply be discharge or no discharge. An alternative (e.g. enhanced treatment)that reduces the
toxicity or other potential enviro.nmental damage ofa discharge should b~ required ifit is
'feasible. .
DOW is correct in using the 1995 USEPA Interim Economic Guidance for Water Quality
Standards-in'considering discharges to Exceptional water. DOW should also use the
Interim Economic Guidance as to all other Tier II alternatives analyses and
socioeconomi~demonstrations unless DOW can come'up with some other analytical
method that is as protective and gives as much real-guidance to applicants, the public and
DOW. The proposed rule does not proyide a standard ,as to high quality water.
III. . The regulations need much more implementation procedures.
It is perhaps understandable that the DOW would not want to spend time drafting regulati<?ns
- spelling out the procedures for proving that a loading is necessary to accommodate important
economic or social development. Given the small scope of Tier II coverag~ and the myriad of
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loopholes allowing unrestricted degradation of virtually all Kentucky's waters~ rules regarding
how an applicant is to show that degradation is necessary will almost never be used. Similarly,
rules regarding how the federally- required opportunity fo'r public participation in Tier II
decisions is.to be facilitated would probably get less work, than the Maytag repairman given all
the loopholes avoiding Tier II review under DOW's prop<?sal.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that, after this proposed set of antidegradation regulations is
replaced with something that complies with federal ,and. state law, Kentucky will need rules that
spell out what sort of showing, must be made to justify lowering water quality levels. It will also
be n~cessaryto set forth how the public will get a chance t9 comment on such proposed
degradation. How will the DOW give notice of propo~als'to lower water quality? What sort of
findings need to be made and in what sort of·documents will 'be provided to the public? It would
naturally be preferable that the procedures necessary to make the decision required under 40 .
CFR 131.12(a)(2) be integrated into existing Kentucky procedures to the extent consistent with
allowing full public participation in these decisions.
IV. The Proposed ~egulationmakes no provision for antidegradation in 401
.certifications.
A state's antidegradation policy must be fully implemented in making water quality certification
decisions under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act and must also be applied ip.·other existing
state regulatory schemes. See USEPA, WQSHandbook (2d Ed.) 4.8.1. The proposed rules,
ho.wever, do not even attempt to fulfill this necessary func~ion.
v. Additional changes to the mixing zone rules (401 KAR 5:029 Section 4) are
needed.' .
DOW in this proposal only proposes to change the mixing zone regulations to phase out mixing
zones for bio-accumulative pollutants. We support the change that is propose~ but also believe
that there are other serious flaws in Kentucky's regulation of mixing zones that must be add~essed. .
There should be.no. new mixing zones in any of Kentucky's waters and a schedule should be
developed to phase out existing mixing zones.. By defmition a mixing zonepenllits the discharge
ofpollutants in concentrations above the limits setfo~ the protection ofuses in the wate~ body and
essentially. designates a portion of the water body for the illegal use ofwaste as~imilation.A
mixing zone, therefore, does not protect or ·maintain the existing water quality'. In. fact, we questi~n
the Cabinet's continued ability to· protect existing and designated uses in segments of streams
where mixing zones have been penllitted.
Certainly there should be no new mixing zones in waters meeting water quality standards without a
more'rigoro.us examination of alternatives, a finding by the Cabinet-that to allow this new or
. expanded discharge will require a lowering of the existing water quality and a clear and compelling
basis for social and economic benefit to the community and to downstream users. In other words .
there should 'be no more new mixing zones without a rigorous and proper antidegradation analysis.,
401 KAR 5:029 Section 1 (2) (b) 2. Prohibits the establishment of Zones of Initial Dilution (ZID)
in an Exceptional water unless assigned before the effective date of this administrative regulation.
KWA supports the prohibition ofnew ZIDs in Exceptionalwaters. We believe that the pennitting
ofnew ZIDs, wherein discharge limits exceed the acute values set to protect human health and
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aquatic life, in waters that exceed all water quality criteria would be inappropriate and inconsistent .
with the statutory duty to ~aintain the quality ofthe waters of the Commonwealth and protect ~
existing uses. Many ofthe waters designated as Exceptionalwaters are known to support ·rich
pollutant-intolerant populations of_aquatic life.. It the Cabinet's duty not to just to maintain some
aquatic life in the streams but to maintain the existing healthy diverse, population ofnative aquatic
speCies.
401 KAR 5:029 Section 4(3) (a) states: "The'Cabinet shall require the applicant to· provide a
technical evaluation for a zone ofinitial dilution;" This is not particularly reassuring. E?Cactly
what justification does an applicant need to provide to obtain a five~year peimitto discharge
toxic substances into Kentucky~s waters at levels known to cause death or "unacceptable"
harmful effects with short term exposure of ninety-six (96) hours or less? ~
401 KAR 5:029 Section 4 (4) states: "Unless assigned on orbefore'the effective date of this
administrative regulation, a zone of initial dilution for a pollutant'shall be available only to a
submerged high-rate multiport outfall structure and shall be limited in size to the most restrictive
.of the following: ....." There should be no new zones ofinitial dilution (ZIDs) in any:Kentucky
waters and certainly no new ZIDs in Tier II waters.
If for any reason a ZID is approved and assigned for·a new or expanded pennit, then regular
monitoring should be required of the permittee at the 'edge ofthe assigned ZIDandat the edge of
.the assigned mixing zone for compliance~ KWA recognizes that this may be physically difficult in···
some instances but nonetheless this must be a required compliance feature in the permit when such
toxic levels ofpollutants are permitted by DOW to enter into Kentucky's waters.
Furthermore, there should no mixing zone or ZID in any stream with a low 7Q10 flow ofzero or in
any other water where the mixing zone will take up more that ~ ofthe stream. Such streams have
no capacity to dilute toxic pollutants for. at least some portion of the year.
401 KAR 5:029 Section 4. (5) states: "The location ofa mixing zone shall not interfere with fish
spawning or nursery areas, fish migration routes, public water supply intakes, or' bathing areas, nor
preclude the free passage of fish or other aquatic life" nor jeopardize the continued existence ofany
. endangered or threatened aquatic species listed Under Section 4 of the Federal Endangered Spe~ies
Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., nor result. in the destruction or adverse modification ofsuch species' '
critical habitat..." KWA supports the new language in this subSection. Ho~ever"wedo not .
believe that any mixing zone should be assignedto a waterway with'known populati~ns'of
federally listed threatened or endangered species. KWA andELPC remain unconvinced'that the
same water quality criteria developed and adopted for the protection ofany warm water:aqu~tic
habitat is protective of water quality conditions necessary to fully protect federally listed species.
Therefore a waiver of these criteria makes even less sense in a regulatory or legal scheme. If DOW.
continues to pennit mixing zones in waters with federally listed species we believe a more rigorous
antidegradation analysis and a higher standard should'be set for alternatives a~ysis and '
social/economic benefit demonstrations. Even if a pennit ~pplicantcan satisfy these more :stringent .
requirements we believe that additional, regular on-going in-stream'biological assessments funded.
by the pennittee to a third party qualifiifed to contact such analysis should be required to
continually monitor the federally listed species in the waterbody. -
401 KAR5:029 Section 4 (10) provides that "Unless assigned by the Cabinet on orbefore'the·
effective date of this administrative regulation, there shall be no mixing zones for bioaccumulative
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chemicals ofconcern. . .." KWA andELPC support the proposed additional restrictions on
mixing zones. The very nature of bioaccumulative chemicals of concern makes these toxic
pollutants unsuitable for discharge in mixing zones. We urge the Cabinet to expedite the proposed
ten-year phasing out ofthese toxic chemicals and .at a-minimum to set up a compliance schedule
for the phase out in any permit renewals.
-VI. Other comments ~nproposed regulations
401 KAR 5:031. Surface water standards.
401-KAR5:031-Section 6, Table 1 contains some numeric limits we believe are inconsistent with
EPA's Nationally Recommended Water Quality-Criteria: 2002 (EPA-822-R-02-047). We·request
that the DOW adopt the more stringent criteria below from this reference9 or provide a ratIonal .
why citizens· of this Commonwealth should accept less stringent limits.
• . WAH criteria for Chloride .{p. 23) CMC=860,OOO and CCC=230,OOO
• No' criteria is proposed for -fish .consumption for methylmercury (CAS 22967926)
limit is listed as 0.3 lll:g/kg '.
• WAH criteria for Mercury (P.l2)}s CMC=~.4-andCCC=0.77 .
• Criteria for human health protection (DWS) for. Total Dissolved Solids should be 250
mg/lnot750mg/1
In additio~DOW has not adopted drinking water - human health criteria for a number of
parameters recommended by the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). We ask that DOW adoptthe
following numeric limits for DWS IO or explain why. they chose not to so protect Kentucky citizens.
• Aluminum, SDWA limits are 0.05 -2 mg/l
• Copper SDWAlimit is'! mg/l
• Cyanide, Free SDWA limit is 2 mg/l
• Iron SDWA limit for Iron is 0.3 mg/l
• Manganese SDWA limit is 0..05 mg/l
• Sel~nium SDWAlimit is 0.05 mg/l
• Silver SDWA·limit is 0.1 mg/l
• Toluene SDWA limit is 1 mg/l
• Zinc SDWA limit is- 5 mg/l
·We also. note that DOW has not adopted standards for all the priority pollutantS listed in
reference #9 nor have they adopted standards for all.the SDWA pollutants in reference #10 and
we urge DOW to adopt these additional standards.
As noted previously, DOW has not adopted criteria for nutrients (phosphor~sand nitrogen) yet
there are two documents applicable to Kentucky_ Rivers and Streams in Nutrient Ecoregion XI,
EPA-822-B-OO-020 provides EPA's recommended criteria for nutrients for eastern Kentucky.
Rivers and Streams in Nutrient Ecoregion IX, EPA -822-B-OO-O~9provides recommended
criteria for nutrients in central and western Kentucky. In these .documents EPA makes it clear
that:
9 EPA Nationally Recommended Water Quality Criteria 2002, EPA-822-R-02-047, November 2002
10 http://www.epa.gov/safewater/mcl.htrnl
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These criteria provide EPA's recommendations to States and authorized Tribes for use in
establishing their water quality stand~rdsconsistentwith Section 303(c) of CWA. EPA
recommends the following approaches, in order of preference:
(1) Wherever possible, develop nutrient criteria that fully reflect localized
conditions and protect specific designated uses using the process described in
EPA's Technical Guidance Manuals for nutrient criteria development. Such
criteria may be expressed either as numeric criteria or as procedures to translate a
State or Tribal narrative cr,iteri<?n into a quantified endpoint in State or Tribal
water quality· standards.
(2) Adopt EPA's Section 304(a) water quality criteria for nutrients, either·as .
numeric criteria or as procedures to translate a State or Tribal narrative nutrient
criterion into a quantified endpoint.
(3) Develop nutrient criteria protective of designated, uses using other
scientifically'defensible methods and appropriate water quality data.
EPA recommendations published under Section 304(a) of the CWA serve several purposes,
including providing guidance to .Sta~es and Tribes in adopting water quality standards for
nutrients that ultimately provide a basis for controlling discharges or releases ofpollutants. State
water quality inventories and listings of impaired waters consistently rank nutrient over-.
enrichment as a top.contributor to use impainnents. EPA ~s water quality standards regulations at~·.
40 CFR §131.11(a) require States and Tribes to adopt criteria that contain sufficient parameters
and constituents to protect the designated uses of their waters. EPA expects States and Tribes to
address nutrient over-enrichment in their water quality standards, and to build on existing S~te
and Tribal initiated efforts where possible.
DOW should adopt nutrient criteria as soon as possible as excess nutrients are responsible for
approximately 400 of the assessed impaired river miles in Kentucky and are. a significant
contributor to the "Dead Zone" in Gulf ofMexico. DOW should immediately requir~ that new
discharges be designed to 'discharge the lowest levels of nutrients that can be practically
achieved. Diversion of nutrient-laden discharges to farm fields, golf courses, restored wetlands.
and other areas where the nutrients can be of benefit should be implemented to the extent
possible.-· '.
401 KAR 5:031 Section 7 details standards for the protection ofprimary contact recreation. The
Division proposes to add a second use support test ofEscherichia coli (e coli).KWA andELPC
support this alternative use support criteria since it is a more accurate indication ofhuman
pathogen problems in the stream and since US EPA has published criteria based on e coli.
KWA further urges' the QOW to adopt an e coli standard for the ot4er designated uses tnathavea
pathogen standard i.e. secondary contact recreation- and domestic water supply, in this triennial
review.
401 KAR 5:0~1 Section 8. (2) (b) details protections for OSRW waters. How can existing water
quality be maintained ifan OSRW receives only Tier I protections? Tier I protections are designed
to protect uses but do not purport to maintain existing water quality. The regulation is deliberately
misleading as written. OSRW waters with federally listed species should be at a minimum listed
and protected as Tier II waters to maintain existing water quality.
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401 KAR 5:029. General provisions.
401· KAR 5:029 Section·l. (2) applies to High Quality (Tier II) and Exceptional Waters (Tier If~)
and states that the existing }iJater quality shall be maintained andprotected unless the cabinet
finds .... However, this is not true in.practice nor is the Cabinet's intent in the implementation of
this Section.in 401 KAR 5:030 to maintain and protect existing water quality. Instead the
regulation contains a long list of reasons pennits that will lower existing water quality are exempt
from ·antidegradation considerations. Equally alarming is the second list ofpre-detennined KPDES
permit limitations that short-cut the entire consideration ofalternatives, a fmding that it is
necessary to lower water quality and an analysis ofsocial and economic benefits to the comm.unity.
(See our more detailed comments above on the illegal and improper exemptions and "short-euts"
. in401.KAR5:.03.0)
401 KAR 5:029 Section 5 provides for water ·quality·based variances for coal remining operations.
Such variances should only be granted when the applicant will improve the quality of the water in
. the receiving water. The Cabinet already has provisions and exceptions for the withdrawal of
contaminated water.
Conclusion
While some of the changes proposed are good and do make small advances in protecting the
waters of the Commo.nwealth,·the changes to the critical antidegradation implement3:tion
procedUre still fall far short of the requirements' mandated under the Clean Water Act. The -
Division ofWater must cease granting peniUts that allow new or increased discharges until valid I
antidegradation. regulations are adopted.
Sincerely, .
.(~0.~
, Ju{JthD. Petersen
Executive.Director, KWA.
Albert F. Ettinger
'. Senior S~ffAttorney, ELPC
CC: G. Tracy Mehan III, US EPA Office of Water
J. I. Palmer, Jr., EPA Region 4, Regional Administrator
James D. Giattina, EPA Region 4, Director, Water Management Division
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Tab Four
My name is Lloyd Cress and I am the Environmental Director for the Kentucky Chamber
of Commerce on whose behalf this statement is presented. The Kentucky Chamber of
Commerce is an association representing business interests with thousands of members across
Kentucky. The Kentucky Chamber has been deeply involved in the form~lation of Kentucky's
policy on water quality issues for many years and welcomes the opportunity to present its views
on the Division of Water's proposed revisions to its water quality standards.
The Kentucky Chamber's comments at this hearing will address only the general issues
raised by the Division's antidegradation proposal. The Kentucky Chamber will submit additional
written comments regarding specific issues prior to the close of the public comment period.
The formulation of an antidegradation implementation regulation that is both acceptable
to USEPA and consistent with Kentucky law has been one of the most intractable issues
confronted by the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet in the recent past.
This conflict should not be unexpected since Kentucky's water pollution control statute provides
very limited authority for the implementation of an antidegradation program. Kentucky'S statutes
direct the Cabinet to promulgate regulations which prevent and abate water pollution and define
water pollution in terms of interference with legitimate uses of the waters of the Commonwealth.
Thus the Cabinet's statutory mandate is to conserve waters for use rather than to preserve
existing water quality without regard to use.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of satisfying both federal and state requirements, the
Division of Water in 1999 succeeded in developing an antidegradation implementation program
which secured full approval by USEPA except in one very limited aspect. In August 2000
USEPA approved all provisions ofKentucky's present antidegradation regulation 401 KAR
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5:030 relating to Tier I use-protected waters and all provisions relating to Tier III outstanding
national resource waters. USEPA also approved 401 KAR 5:030 as it related to Tier II high
quality waters except for the selection criteria for the elevation of Tier I waters to Tier II or Tier
III status. The Division of Water could easily remedy the single deficiency identified by USEPA
in its August 2000 review of Kentucky's antidegradation implementation regulation by
broadening the Tier II selection criteria to include all waters of the Commonwealth that the
Division of Water determines to have quality better than mandated by state water quality
standards.
Unfortunately the Division of Water's current antidegradation proposal does not build on
the previous progress toward federal approval but instead embarks on a very different approach
to antidegradation implementation. This different approach incorporates a four-tier
categorization system instead of USEPA's three-tier system, eliminates the use-protected
category despite its full approval by USEPA and includes a 120% test for economic infeasibility
of alternatives which is far more stringent than the test utilized in other states. The Division of
Water's proposed revision of401 KAR 5:030 represents an abandonment of the progress made to
date on antidegradation implementation and will likely further delay resolution of this issue.
As the Division of Water and the general public deliberate this important issue regarding
the management of Kentucky's water resources, it is important to bear in mind that the agency's
decision does not involve a choice between clean water and polluted water since the KPDES
permit program requires that new and expanded wastewater discharges be consistent with
Kentucky's water quality standards. Accordingly, Kentuckians can be assured that such new and
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expanded discharges will not jeopardize our clean water goals even in the absence of an
antidegradation program.
Instead the antidegradation program involves a choice between clean water and cleaner
~ water and provides an opportunity for Kentucky to make value judgments as to the social and
economic burdens that must be borne if our choice is to have cleaner water rather than clean
water. Since Kentucky's environmental values will be fully protected without regard to the
antidegradation program, the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce urges the Division of Water to
structure its antidegradation program in a manner that does not impose unnecessary burdens on
further social and economic development in Kentucky. The Kentucky Chamber of Commerce
believes that this objective can best be achieved by a narrow revision of its present regulation in a
manner tailored to respond to USEPA's limited disapproval of the present regulation.
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The Kentucky Chamber ofCommerce requests that the following comments be considered
in the promulgation of revised water quality standards for Kentucky.
401 KAR 5:029 Section 1 (2). This regulation imposes procedural requirements that must be
satisfied prior to "allowing lower quality" but does not delineate conditions that represent a lowering
ofwater quality. The term "lower water quality" could be interpreted to mean any increase in mass
loading of substances in the water body. Such an interpretation would be unreasonable, however,
since many substances have a positive effect on water quality and the absence of all substances in
the water bodywould render it incapable ofsupporting aquatic life. The Kentucky Chamberbelieves
that it is more reasonable to interpret the term "lower water quality" in light ofthe Clean Water Act
objective "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." Consistent with that interpretation, the Kentucky Chamber suggests that 401 KAR 5:029
or 401 KAR 5:030 be amended to include the following provision:
"Water quality shall be deemed to be maintained an~ protected if the
Division determines that the activity under consideration will not
result in a lowering in the Index of Biotic Integrity or the
Macroinvertebrate Bioassessment Index for the stream, will not
inhibit recreation in and on the water, and will not cause or contribute
to a violation of the water quality standards established under 401
KAR 5:031."
Additionally, the Kentucky Chamber requests that the Division confirm its understanding that the
[mal sentence of 401 KAR 5:029 Section 1(2) relates only to the pollutant for which the Division
has approved a lowering of water quality.
401 KAR 5:209 Section 4(5). The Kentucky Chamber suggests that this regulation not be revised
in the manner proposed. USEPA has fully approved 401 KAR 5:029 including its provisions
relating to mixing zones and revision ofthe regulation will raise unnecessary issues as to its approval
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status. It is the Kentucky Chamber's understanding that the proposed revision reflects a potential
change in ORSANCO standards that is under consideration. The Kentucky Chamber urges the
Division to withhold action on this issue until final action has been taken by ORSANCO.
Ifthe Divisionproceeds with its proposed revision, the Kentucky Chamber urges the Division
to exempt from the provisions those mixing zones that have been previously established.
Additionally, the Kentucky Chamber urges the Division to delete the reference in the final sentence
to "adverse modification of such species' critical habitat" since the concept is too vague to be
meaningfully applied through the KPDES permit program.
401 KAR 5:029 Section 4(10). The Kentucky Chamber suggests that this regulation not be revised
in the manner proposed. USEPA has fully approved 401 KAR 5:029 including its provisions
relating to mixing zones and revision ofthe regulation will raise unnecessary issues as to its approval
status. It is the Kentucky Chamber's understanding that the proposed revision reflects a potential
change in ORSANCO standards that is under consideration. The Kentucky Chamber urges the
Division to withhold action on this issue until final action has been taken by ORSANCO.
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1 - The Kentucky Chamber recommends that the second sentence of the
introductoryparagraph be deleted. The KPDES pennit program was intended to be a comprehensive
state-wide program to regulate wastewater discharges and their effect on the water quality of
receiving streams. Unlike other Cabinet programs, the protection of in-stream water quality has
always been viewed as a matter for state rather than local control. Since streams flow through many
local jurisdictions, local regulation of in-stream water quality raises the potential for inter-
jurisdictional conflicts that would not be in the best interest of the state or its environment. Local
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land use control through planning and zoning affords sufficient opportunity for local decision-
making without involvement in the regulation of in-stream water quality.
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(2). The Kentucky Chamber suggests that the Division of Water
implement a three-tier antidegradation implementation program consistent with USEPA policies
rather than the proposed four-tier program. This could be accomplished by categorizing the
exceptional waters as high quality waters and utilizing the implementation procedures proposed for
high quality waters.
401 KAR Section 1(2)(b)l.e. This provision should apply to permit modifications as well as permit
renewals.
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(2)(b)3., 4., 5.,. These special effluent limitations are intended to be
optional for permit applicants that desire to avoid Tier II review; however, the proposed wording
could be interpreted to be mandatory. The Kentucky Chamber suggests that each ofthese provisions
be prefaced by the wording "Except as provided in 7. below."
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(2)(b.)7. The initial sentence, as proposed, could be interpreted to impose
separate tests for technical infeasibility ofalternatives and for economic i.nfeasibility ofalternatives
as well as separate requirements for demonstration ofnecessity and economic or social development.
The Kentucky Chamber suggests that the sentence be revised to provide:
"If the permit applicant does not accept the effluent limitations set
forth in this paragraph, the applicant shall demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Cabinet that allowing lower water quality is
necessary to accommodate important economic or social development
in the area in which the water is located based upon an alternatives
analysis and socioeconomic demonstration."
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The Kentucky Chamber opposes the proposed requirement that no technologically or
economically feasible alternative exist and that the test for economic infeasibility be 120% of the
capital and operating cost of the discharge proposal. This provision is far more stringent than
. required byUSEPA's antidegradation policies and far more stringent than the requirements ofstates
that compete with Kentucky for economic development. Accordingly, the Kentucky Chamber
strongly urges the Division to delete such provisions and to replace them with the concept of
"reasonably available alternatives consistent with the objectives of the project application."
The Kentucky Chamber does not believe that the federal guidelines referenced in this
provision constitute a reasonable basis for evaluating the social and economic desirability of
applications and urges the Division to delete references to such guidelines. Additionally, the
Kentucky Chamber is of the opinion that evaluation of the social and economic desirability of
proposed projects involves consideration ofmatters that are not within the areas ofexpertise of the
Division of Water. The Kentucky Chamber suggests that the Division of Water defer to the
judgment of the Cabinet for Economic Development in the evaluation of social and economic
demonstrations.
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(2l(bl8. The Kentucky Chamber does not believe that a failure to
demonstrate the necessity for lowering water quality should result in imposition of the special
effluent limitations required by this paragraph but rather should result in the issuance of a KPDES
permit with effluent limitations that would not lower water quality. Since the special effluent
limitations apply to the entire effluent, their imposition could have a perverse effect.
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(3)(a). The Kentucky Chamber understands that the reference to "fully
supports all designated uses" is intended to exclude all waters that are considered "impaired" under
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401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(4). This should be clarified by adding the wording "or is not an impaired
water under subsection (4)."
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(3)(b)1. The second sentence is confusing and conflicts with the
remainder of this provision. Since all discharges include substances not found- in Table 1, this
sentence would have the effect of subjecting all new and expanded discharges to Tier II review
without exception. Clearly this was not the intent of the provision and the Kentucky Chamber
recommends that the sentence be deleted.
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(3)(b)l.e. This provision should apply to permit modifications as well
as permit renewals.
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(3)(b)2. These special effluent limitations are intended to be optional for
pennit applicants that desire to avoid Tier II review; however, the proposed wording could be
interpreted to be mandatory. The Kentucky Chamber suggests that the provision be prefaced by the
wording "Except as provided in 4. below."
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(3)(b)4. The second sentence, as proposed, could be interpreted to
impose separate tests for technical infeasibility of alternatives and for economic infeasibility of
alternatives as well as separate requirements for demonstration ofnecessity and economic or social
development. The Kentucky Chamber suggests that the sentence be revised to provide:
"If the permit applicant does not accept the effluent limitations set
forth in this paragraph, the applicant shall demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Cabinet that allowing lower water quality is
necessary to accommodate important economic or social development
in the area in which the water is located based upon an alternatives
analysis and socioeconomic demonstration."
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The Kentucky Chamber opposes the proposed requirement that no technologically or
economically feasible alternative exists and that the test for economic infeasibility be 120% of the
capital and operating cost of the discharge proposal. This provision is far more stringent than
required by USEPA's antidegradation policies and far more stringent than the requirements ofstates
that compete with Kentucky for economic development. Accordingly, the Kentucky Cha~ber
strongly urges the Division to delete such provisions and to replace them with the concept of
"reasonably available alternatives consistent with the objectives of the project application."
The Kentucky Chamber is of the opinion that evaluation of the social and economic
desirability of proposed projects involves consideration of matters that are not within the areas of
expertise ofthe Division ofWater. The Kentucky Chamber suggest that the Division ofWater defer
to the judgment ofthe Cabinet for Economic Development in the evaluation ofsocial and economic
demonstrations.
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(3)(b)5. The Kentucky Chamber does not believe that a failure to
demonstrate the necessity for lowering water quality should result in imposition of the special
effluent limitations required by this paragraph but rather should result in the issuance of a KPDES
pennit with effluent limitations that would not lower water quality. Since the special effluent
limitations apply to the entire effluent, their imposition could have a perverse effect.
401 KAR 5:030 Section 1(4)(a). Waters which are, in fact, impaired but which have not been
identified pursuant to 33 USC 13 15 should also be categorized as impaired for purposes of
antidegradation review. The Kentucky Chamber suggests that permit applicants be afforded the
opportunity to document stream impairment as a part ofthe KPDES permit procedure. Accordingly,
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the Kentucky Chamber suggests that the following sentence be added to 401 KAR 5:030 Section
1(4)(a):
"Impaired water shall include any water which the Division ofWater,
on the basis of all available information, determines to have quality
that does not comply with all applicable water quality standards."
401 KAR 5:030 Section 3(1)(c). This interim federal guidance document has been in existence for
nearly 10 years but has not been afforded regulatory effect by USEPA. The Kentucky Chamber does
not believe that the document is appropriate for regulatory decisions in Kentucky and recommends
that references to the document be deleted.
401 KAR 5:030 General Comments. This proposed regulation reflects an effort by the Division
of Water to balance its overall impact on new and expanded discharges in Kentucky by imposing
more stringent requirements generally but ameliorating their effect in certain instances. The
Kentucky Chamber is greatly concerned that, through the process ofUSEPA approval/disapproval
and judicial review, some of the provisions of the regulation may be voided leaving the remainder
ofthe regulation in a form that would never have been promulgated as a stand-alone regulation. The
Kentucky Chamber strongly urges the Division ofWater to avoid such unintended consequences by
adding to 401 KAR 5:030 the following provision:
"The provisions ofthis regulation are interdependent and interrelated
and shall be deemed nonseverable for all purposes."
Since the proposed revisions to 401 KAR 5:030 will not become effective for federal
purposes until they have been approved by USEPA, it is important that the revised regulation not
become applicable at the state level until federal approval/disapproval action has been completed.
Otherwise, there would temporarilybe different state and federal water quality standards and KPDES
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pennit actions taken under the revised state regulation might be rendered meaningless by the
subsequent federal action. To avoid this potentially chaotic result, the Kentucky Chamber suggests
that the regulation include a provision restricting its applicability to KPDES pennit applications
submitted on and after approval/disapproval action by USEPA. An additional provision should be
included in the final regulation confinning that KPDES permit applications submitted prior to
USEPA approval/disapproval action shall continue to be processed under 401 KAR 5:030 in its
present fonn.
In January 2003 USEPA issued its final Water Quality Trading Policy and specifically
approved its use in administration of the Clean Water Act antidegradation program. Although
USEPA stated that the Water Quality Trading Policy could be utilized without additional regulatory
action, the Kentucky Chamber believes that the Division ofWater should specifically provide in 401
KAR 5:030 for utilization of the USEPA Water Quality Trading Policy.
Alternatively, the Kentucky Chamber requests that the Division of Water confirm that
USEPA's Water Quality Trading Policy can be utilized bypennit applicants in complying with 401
KAR 5:030 without further regulatory action.
401 KAR 5:031 Section 2(2). Since these criteria are based upon the protection of human health
from the consumption offish tissue, there is no rational basis for applying them in waters that do not
have the physical capacity to serve as a fishery resource. The Kentucky Chamber recommends that
the regulation be revised to include a provision allowing regulated entities to demonstrate that
specific waters do not have the physical capability to serve as a fishery resource and providing that
such criteria would not be applicable to such waters.
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BANKRUPTCY ISSUES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYERS
I. Overview of Bankruptcy Process
A. Chapter 7
B. Chapter 11
C. Chapters 9, 12 and 13
II. Key Bankruptcy Issues
A. Automatic Stay -11 U.S.C. §362
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) ofthis section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor
Protection Act of1970, operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, ofa judicial, administrative, or other action orproceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the commencement ofthe case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement ofthe case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement ofthe case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession ofproperty ofthe estate or ofpropertyfrom the estate
or to exercise control over property ofthe estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property ofthe estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce againstproperty ofthe debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement ofthe case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement ofthe case under this title;
(7) the setoffofany debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation ofa proceeding before the United States Tax
Court concerning the debtor.
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(b) The filing ofa petition under section 301, 302, or 303 ofthis title, or ofan application
under section 5(a)(3) ofthe Securities Investor Protection Act of1970, does not operate as a stay-
(1) under subsection (a) ofthis section, ofthe commencement or continuation ofa
criminal action or proceeding against the debtor;
(2) under subsection (a) ofthis section--
(A) ofthe commencement or continuation ofan action or proceedingfor--
(i) the establishment ofpaternity; or
(ii) the establishment or modification of an order for alimony,
maintenance, or support; or
(B) ofthe collection ofalimony, maintenance, or supportfrom property that is
not property ofthe estate;
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect, or to maintain or
continue the perfection of, an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights andpowers
are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the extent that such act is
accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) ofthis title;
(4) under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, of the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit or any
organization·exercising authority under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for
signature on January 13, 1993, to enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police and
regulatorypower, including the enforcement ofajudgment other than a moneyjudgment, obtained
in an action or proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's or
organization's police or regulatory power;
[(5) Repealed. Pub.L. 105-277, Div. L Title VL § 603(1), Oct. 21,1998,112 Stat.
2681-886]
(6) under subsection (a) ofthis section, ofthe setoffby a commodity broker, forward
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities clearing agency ofany mutual
debt and claim under or in connection with commodity contracts, as defined in section 761 ofthis
title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 741 ofthis title, that constitutes
the setoffofa claim against the debtorfor a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or 761
of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this title, arising out of
commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other
property held by or due from such commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker,
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financial institutions, or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle
commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts;
(7) under subsection (a) ofthis section, of the setoff by a repo participant, ofany
mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase agreements that constitutes the setoff
ofa claim against the debtorfor a margin payment, as defined in section 741 or 761 ofthis title, or
settlement payment, as defined in section 741 ofthis title, arising out ofrepurchase agreements
against cash, securities, or other property held by or due from such repo participant to margin,
guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agreements;
(8) under subsection (a) ofthis section, ofthe commencement ofany action by the
Secretary ofHousing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed oftrust in any case
in which the mortgage or deed oftrust held by the Secretary is insured or was formerly insured
under the National Housing Act and covers property, or combinations ofproperty, consisting offive
or more living units;
(9) under subsection (a), o/--
(A) an audit by a governmental unit to determine tax liability;
(B) the issuance to the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax
deficiency;
(C) a demandfor tax returns; or
(D) the making ofan assessment for any tax and issuance ofa notice and
demandfor payment ofsuch an assessment (but any tax lien that would otherwise attach toproperty
ofthe estate by reason ofsuch an assessment shall not take effect unless such tax is a debt ofthe
debtor that will not be discharged in the case and such property or its proceeds are transferred out
ofthe estate to, or otherwise revested in, the debtor).
(10) under subsection (a) ofthis section, ofany act by a lessor to the debtor under a
lease ofnonresidential real property that has terminated by the expiration ofthe stated term ofthe
lease before the commencement ofor during a case under this title to obtain possession ofsuch
property;
(11) under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a negotiable
instrument and the giving ofnotice ofandprotesting dishonor ofsuch an instrument;
(12) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90 days after the
filing ofsuch petition, ofthe commencement or continuation, and conclusion to the entry offinal
judgment, ofan action which involves a debtor subject to reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of
this title and which was brought by the Secretary ofTransportation under section 31325 oftitle 46
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(including distribution ofanyproceeds ofsale) toforeclose a preferred ship orfleet mortgage, or a
security interest in or relating to a vessel or vessel under construction, held by the Secretary of
Transportation under section 207 or title XI ofthe Merchant Marine Act, 1936, or under applicable
State law;
(13) under subsection (a) ofthis section, after the date which is 90 days after the
filing ofsuch petition, ofthe commencement or continuation, and conclusion to the entry offinal
judgment, ofan action which involves a debtor subject to reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of
this title and which was brought by the Secretary of Commerce under section 31325 of title 46
(including distribution ofany proceeds ofsale) to foreclose a preferred ship orfleet l1lortgage in a
vessel or a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security interest in a fishing facility held by the
Secretary ofCommerce under section 207 or title XI ofthe Merchant Marine Act, 1936;
(14) under subsection (a) of this section, ofany action by an accrediting agency
regarding the accreditation status ofthe debtor as an educational institution;
(15) under subsection (a) of this section, ofany action by a State licensing body
regarding the licensure ofthe debtor as an educational institution;
(16) under subsection (a) of this section, ofany action by a guaranty agency, as
defined in section 4350) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 or the Secretary of Education
regarding the eligibility ofthe debtor to participate in programs authorized under such Act;
(17) under subsection (a) ofthis section, ofthe setoffby a swap participant, ofany
mutual debt and claim under or in connection with any swap agreement that constitutes the setoffof
a claim against the debtor for any payment due from the debtor under or in connection.with any
swap agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant under or in
connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, or otherproperty ofthe debtor held
by or due from such swap participant to guarantee, secure or settle any swap agreement; or
(18) under subsection (a) ofthe creation or perfection ofa statutory lien for an ad
valorem property tax imposed by the District ofColumbia, or a political subdivision ofa State, if
such tax comes due after the filing ofthe petition.
The provisions ofparagraphs (12) and (13) ofthis subsection shall apply with respect
to any such petition filed on or before December 31, 1989.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (j) ofthis section-
(1) the stay ofan act againstproperty ofthe estate under subsection (a) ofthis section
continues until such property is no longer property ofthe estate; and
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(2) the stay ofany other act under subsection (a) ofthis section continues until the
earliest of-
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) ifthe case is a case under chapter 7 ofthis title concerning an individual
or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 ofthis title, the time a discharge is granted or denied.
(d) On request ofa party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant
relieffrom the stayprovided under subsection (a) ofthis section, such as by terminating, annulling,
modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack ofadequate protection ofan interest in property of
such party in interest;
(2) with respect to a stay ofan act against property under subsection (a) of this
section, if--..
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization; or
(3) with respect to a stay ofan act against single asset real estate under subsection
(a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real estate, unless, not later than the
date that is 90 days after the .entry of the order for relief (or such later date as the court may
determine for cause by order entered within that 90-day period)--
(A) the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that has a reasonable
possibility ofbeing confirmed within a reasonable time; or
(B) the debtor has commencedmonthlypayments to each creditor whose claim
is secured by such real estate (other than a claim secured by ajudgment lien or by an unmatured
statutory lien), which payments are in an amount equal to interest at a currentfair market rate on
the value ofthe creditor's interest in the real estate.
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) ofthis sectionfor relieffrom the stay of
any act against property ofthe estate under subsection (a) ofthis section, such stay is terminated
with respect to theparty in interest making such request, unless the court, after notice and a hearing,
orders such stay continued in effectpending the conclusion of, or as a result of, afinal hearing and
determination under subsection (d) of this section. A hearing under this subsection may be a
preliminary hearing, or may be consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this
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section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of the final
hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party
opposing relieffrom such stay will prevail at the conclusion ofsuch final hearing. Ifthe hearing
under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then such final hearing shall be concluded not later
than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing, unless the 3D-day period is
extended with the consent ofthe parties in interest or for a specific time which the court finds is
required by compelling circumstances.
(f) Upon request ofa party in interest, the court, with or without a hearing, shall grant
such relieffrom the stay provided under subsection (a) ofthis section as is necessary to prevent
irreparable damage to the interest ofan entity in property, ifsuch interest will suffer such damage
before there is an opportunityfor notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) ofthis section.
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) ofthis section concerning relieffrom the
stay ofany act under subsection (a) ofthis section--
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden ofproof on the issue ofthe
debtor's equity in property; and
(2) the party opposing such reliefhas the burden ofproofon all other issues.
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation ofa stay provided by this section shall
recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys'fees, and, in appropriate circumstances,
may recover punitive damages.
1. Generally the automatic stayprohibits civil suits and civil enforcement actions
See In re 229 Main Street Limited Partnership, 262 F.3d 1 (1 st Cir. 2001); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski,
99 F.3d 505 (2nd Cir. 1996).
2. When a governmental unit uses its police and regulations power to prevent
environmental misconduct, such actions are excepted from the automatic stay. See Safety-Kleen Inc.
v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846 (4th Cir. 2001). In Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't ofEnvtl. Resources, 733 F.2d
267(3fd Cir. 1984), a coal mine operator entered into a consent order to abate violations. When the
operator filed a petition for bankruptcy, the regulatory agency sought an injunction in state court to
enforce the consent order. The court found that the injunction was within the state's police and
regulatory powers "to rectify harmful environmental hazards." Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274. The
court also stated that the injunction "was meant to prevent future harm to, and to restore, the
environment." Id. at 278.
B. Abandonment --11 U.S.C. §554
1. Debtors are generally permitted to abandon property which is "burdensome"
or of inconsequential value to the estate. Property that is contaminated and/or requires
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environmental remediation may have limited or negative value to the estate, and a debtor may wish
to abandon the property rather then address the environmental issues.
2. At odds with the abandonment provision is 28 U.S.C. §959(b), which requires
the trustee and a debtor-in-possession to "manage and operate the property in his possession ...
according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." Courts have stated that debtors are
obligated to comply with law, especially environmental laws. See,~, Cumberland Farms, Inc. v.
Florida Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 116 F.3d 16, 19-20(1st Cir. 1997) ("it is by now abundantly clear
that in state-regulated areas such as protection ofthe environment, a bankruptcy court must comply
with the laws of the state involved. Debtors in possession ... do not have carte blanche to ignore
state and local laws protecting the environment against pollution.") (citations omitted); In re Envt'l
Waste Control, Inc., 125 B.R. 546, 550-51 (N.D. Ind. 1991) ("[T]he established case law is clear that
a bankruptcy trustee or debtor ... is obligated to comply with environmental laws, particularly in
regards to property in its possession .... The law requires the debtor to take action to fulfill that
obligation, regardless of its financial situation.").
3. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court gave effect to §959 in Midlantic National
Bank v. N.J. Dept. ofEnvironmental Protection, 474 U.S. §494 (1986), held that a bankruptcy trustee
did not have "carte blanche" to abandon property in violation ofenvironmental laws which protect
the "public's health and safety from imminent and identifiable harm." Limiting the trustee's
abandonment powers the Court held as follows:
[t]he Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an
abandonment without formulating conditions that will adequately
protect the public's health and safety .... [W]e hold that a trustee
may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or
regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or
safety from identifiable hazards.
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
4. Since Midlantic, courts have generally addressed the issue ofwhat constitutes
"imminent and identifiable harm"and found that:
"To determine whether the violations of the environmental regulations present an
immediate risk to the public's health and safety, courts have focused on the following
factors:
(i) whether·the hazardous waste facility was in compliance with all
applicable regulations at the time that the debtor ceased operations;
(ii) whether conditions at the hazardous waste facility are regressing
or in any way immediately threaten the public;
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(iii) whether the applicable environmental regulators previouslyhave
taken action to require cleanup;
(iv) whether the site is listed on the state or national list of
contaminated sites;
(v) whether the environmental hazards are known or simply
speculative.
See, e.g., L.F. Jennings Oil Co., 4 F.3d at 890 (site was not listed on state's list of
contaminated sites); Borden, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass,
Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988) (lack ofimminent hann or danger to public was
evidenced by failure ofthe state EPA to take enforcement action despite existence of
violations, state inspection, and receipt of reports from the debtor). However, the
state's failure to act is not dispositive. In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. E.D.
N.C. 1989) ("For the purposes ofan abandonment controversy, the court, not EPA or
the state, must determine ifthere is an immediate threat to public health and safety.").
The Sixth Circuit applied Midlantic in In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118,
122 (6th Cir. 1987) where the court stated: "It follows that if the ... trustee could not have
abandoned the estate in contravention ofthe State's environmental law, neither then should
he have maintained or possessed the estate in continuous violation of that same law."
Referring to §959(b) the court recognized that the Supreme Court "noted Congress'
intentions that the trustee's efforts 'to marshal and distribute the assets of the estate' ,give
way to the governmental interest in public health and safety." In re Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at
122. Finally, the court stated that it would not allow creditors to benefit "while the debtor
violates the law." Id. at 123.
C. Claims in Bankruptcy
1. What is a claim?
a. 11 U.S.C. §101(5) provides:
"claim" means-
(A)' right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
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(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach ofperformance ifsuch breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
b. The Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 u.s. §274 (1985) held that
an injunctive order under environmental law which could be satisfied through the payment ofmoney
was a claim under the Bankruptcy Code.
c. However, since Kovacs, many courts have held that injunctions,
including injunctions related to environmental claims, which have an alternative right to payment are
not dischargeable because they are not claims. See generally In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d 997 (2nd
Cir. 1991); In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("the state's attempt ... to force a
party to clean up a waste site which poses an ongoing hazard is not a 'claim' as defined by the
Bankruptcy Code.").
2. When does a claim arise for- purposes of bankruptcy law?
See Ames and Bowles, Jr. The When and Where ofEnvironmental Claims in
Bankruptcy, 15 ABI Journal 8 (1996) (attached hereto as Exhibit A). See also In re M. Frenville Co.,
744 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir. 1984) (Non-CERCLA case where 3rd Circuit held that a claim would not arise
until claimant had right to commence lawsuit.)
3. 11 U.S.C. §502(e) contribution and indemnification claims for non-debtor
PRP.
11 U.S.C. §502(e) provides:
(e)(l) Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b), and (c) ofthis section and
paragraph (2) ofthis subsection, the court shall disallow any claim
for reimbursement or contribution ofan entity that is liable with the
debtor on or has secured the claim ofa creditor, to the extent that--
(A) such creditor's claim against the estate is disallowed;
(B) such claimfor reimbursement or contribution is contingent as ofthe time
ofallowance or disallowance ofsuch claim for reimbursement or contribution; or
(C) such entity asserts a right ofsubrogation to the rights ofsuch creditor
under section 509 ofthis title.
D - 9
(2) A claim for reimbursement or contribution ofsuch an entity that becomes fixed
after the commencement ofthe case shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a),
(b), or (c) ofthis section, or disallowed under subsection (d) ofthis section, the same as ifsuch claim
had becomefixed before the date ofthe filing ofthe petition.
This provision has been frequently used by Chapter 11 debtors in possession or bankruptcy
trustees to defeat environmental claims that parties may have against debtors for contributing and
indemnification under CERCLA and other environmental laws.
See C.R. Bowles, Jr., Old Bankruptcy Cases Never Die, They Merely Move to Higher Courts,
11 ABI Journal 18 (2000); C.R. Bowles, Jr., A Tale of Two Cities, 18 ABI Journal 10 (1999);
(Kathyat end ofYadd) and C.R. Bowles, Jr. Rewriting on Summarizing Hemingway Transport, 17
ABI Joumal18 (1998) (attached hereto as Exhibit A).
4. Administrative Claims -11 U.S.C. §503(b)(I)(A).
Under 11 U.S.C. §503(b)(1)(A), creditors can receive a priority claim in the debtor's
bankruptcy for "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate," including
expenses for services provided to or damages incurred by a debtor related to costs of operating a
debtor's business or assets.
Environmental claims may be given administrative priority. See generally In re Hemingway
Transport, Inc., 73 B.R. 494 (Bkrtcy. D. Mass. 1987), affd, 126 B.R. 656 (D. Mass 1991), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 993 3 F.2d 915 (1 st Cir. 1993) (allowing post-bankruptcy petition purchaser of
property from the administrative debt of property cleanup, cost paid to the government by the
purchaser); In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988) (lessor of property denied
administrative claim for clean up costs paid post-bankruptcy petition to the government for
contamination caused by debtor lessee because debtor did not own contaminated property and
therefore payments did not benefit debtor's estate); In re Mahoney-Troast Constr. Co., 189 B.R. 57,
61 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995) ("it appears amply clear that expenses incurred post-petition to clean up
continuing environmental hazards created pre-petition may be granted administrative expense
priority"); In re Coal Stripping, Inc., 222 B.R. 78, 82 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1998) (actual reclamation
costs incurred post-petition entitled to administrative priority even though debtor did not operate in
Chapter 11).
ill. Claims Against Secured Lenders - 11 U.S.C. §506(c) - Contribution Claims and Liabilityof
Secured Creditors Under CERCLA.
A. CERCLA Liability ofSecured Creditors: Prior to 1996, Lenders had a serious issue
as to whether they could be considered an operator under CERCLA for purposes ofclean up liability
See generally Kelley v. EPA, 15 3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994). However, in 1996 the Asset
Conservation, Lender Liability and Deport Insurance Protection Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") was
passed which greatly limits a secured creditor's liability for clean up costs under CERCLA See
generally 42 U.S.C. §960 (20)(E) and (20)(F), copies of which are attached as Exhibit B; See also
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East Bay Municipal Utility District v. U.S. Dept. ofCommerce, 142 F.3d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1998); U.S.
v. Presses, 1998 W.L. 937235 (W.D. Pa. 1998). In addition to protecting lenders, fiduciaries which
held contaminated property were also protected.
B. 11 U.S.C. §506(c)
Under 11 U.S.C. §506(c) a bankruptcy trustee or Chapter 11 debtor in possession may
recover from the collateral securing a secured creditor's claim "the reasonable and necessary costs
and expenses ofpreserving or dispensing ofsuch property to the extent ofany benefit to the holder
ofsuch claim." See generally In re Cuyahoga Equipt. Corp., 980 F.2d 110 (2nd Cir. 1992). Prior to
2000, most courts permitted parties other than the trustee to assert 506(c) claims against secured
creditors. However, in the case ofHartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters Bank NA, 530 U.S.
1 (2000), the Supreme Court limited the 506(c) surcharge powers to debtors in possession and
trustees. This greatly reduces the number of 11 U.S.C. §506(c) motions against secured creditors,
especially because many debtors waive their 506(c) rights as part of their post petition financing.
Section 506(c) prevents a secured creditor from obtaining a windfall. If remediation of a
property or other reduction of liability or shifting ofcosts associated with the property results in an
increased value, then it is not equitable for a secured creditor to reap the benefits of the increased
value while another party bears the cost. As discussed below, courts have used § 506(c) and
concerns for environmental harm to justify use of a secured creditor's collateral to address
environmental cleanup.
In In re Guterl Special Steel Corp., 198 B.R. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996), the court faced the
difficult question ofhow to fund an environmental cleanup when the majority ofthe debtor's assets
had already been distributed to a secured creditor. While recognizing that post-petition
administrative expenses generally are chargeable only against unencumbered estate assets, the court
recognized a common law exception codified at as § 506(c). Therefore, ifEPA cleaned up the site, it
would be entitled to an administrative claim for reasonable and necessary cleanup costs against the
property remaining in the estate to the extent that the creditor having a security interest in the
property had benefited. The secured creditors would benefit, the court found, by the increased value
ofthe property ifand when it became marketable as a result ofremediation. The court did not have
before it at that time any demand on funds in excess ofthe remaining estate funds. Despite this fact,
however, the court stated:
[W]e would be inclined to look favorably upon a request by EPA (or the trustee, ifhe
has to clean up the site) to grant it an administrative claim against estate funds
previously distributed to [the secured creditor] and to any other creditor and to direct
them to disgorge funds previously received to help pay remediation costs.
Id. at 137.
Other cases continue with this theme. In In re Envt'l Waste Control, Inc., 125 B.R. 546
(N.D. Ind. 1991), a secured creditor objected to use of the estate's limited funds to environmental
cleanup and monitoring. The court noted that the debtor "must proceed with environmental cleanup
D - 11
and corrective action ... notwithstanding the resulting financial burden," 125 B.R. at 550, and stated
that the secured creditor's interest "must yield in light ofthe competing environmental harms." 125
B.R. at 552. See also In re Paris Indus. Corp., 106 B.R. 339 (Bankr. D. Maine 1989) (secured
lenders, debtor, and state regulators reached settlement agreement on sale of property and use of
proceeds for clean up); In re Mowbray Eng'g Co., 67 B.R. 34, 35 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) ("EPA
stands in the shoes ofthe trustee in preserving the estate and is entitled, as the trustee would be but
for abandonment, to recover costs upon sale of the property prior to satisfying any secured claims
against the property.").
N. Discharge of CERCLA and Other Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy.
Under bankruptcy law, one ofthe most important benefits a debtor can receive is a discharge
of their pre-petition indebtedness. 11 U.S.C. §727 governs the discharge of indebtedness under
Chapter 7 cases and 11 U.S.C. §1141 under Chapter 11 cases. 11 U.S.C. §523 governs the
dischargeability of individual debts in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases.
Generally there are 5 issues·which must be considered in determining whether a debt is
dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings.
A. Is the obligation a claim under the Bankruptcy Code?
See Section ll(c)(I) of this outline.
B. Did the claim arise prior to the debtor's bankruptcy filing?
See Section ll(c)(2) of this outline.
C. Was the debt discharged under 11 U.S.C. §1141?
In Chapter 11 cases, a debtor will generally be granted a discharge ofits pre-petition debts 11
U.S.C. §1141. However, ifa plan provides for the liquidation ofthe debtor's assets, the debtor does
not engage in business after and would be denied a discharge under 11 U.S.C. §727(a). Therefore, if
a non-individual debtor files a liquidating plan it will not receive a discharge unless it continues
business operations. See also Articles attached hereto as Exhibit A and Exhibit B.
D. Was the debt discharged under 11 U.S.C. §727 and 523?
1. Initially it is important to note that corporations and other business entities do
not receive discharges under 11 U.S.C. §727. See 11 U.S.C. §727(a)(I).
2. Further, certain environmental debts may not be dischargeable under 11
U.S.C. §523.
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a. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6): No discharge for willful and malicious injuries.
b. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7): No discharge for fines, restitution or other
punitive monetary penalties assessed prior to bankruptcy.
3. Will the discharge matter if the debtors continue to own the contaminated
property?
Compare In re Chateauguy, 944 F.2d 997 (2nd Cir. 1991) (continued ownership of
contaminated property may subject reorganized debtor to liability under a post-confirmation
injunction) with In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992) (post-confirmation
liability for pre petition contamination if imminent and substantial endangerment to public health,
welfare or environment.)
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As all attorneys painfully remember, two of the first things taught in law school are when a party's claim
against another party arises and where suit should be filed on that claim. While you may have received "As" in
Torts and Civil Procedure, three recent cases show that in the area of bankruptcy law versus environmental
claims, these fundamental legal issues are still hotly contested.
When Do Environmental Claims Arise?
As faithful readers of this column know, identifying creditors and when their claims arise are frequently-
discussed issues. See "When is a Creditor a 'Known Creditor' for Notice Purposes," Vol. XV, No.2 ABI
Journal 8 (March, 1996). Recently, two cases have reviewed these issues in detail.
The first of these is In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co. ("Chicago III"), 78 F.3d 285 (7th
Cir. 1996). As noted by the court, this 1977 railroad reorganization, like the famous Energizer bunny, "keeps
going and going and going." 78 F.3d at 286. In the present chapter of this environmental nightmare, the 7th
Circuit had to consider whether the Union Pacific Railroad's ("UP") claims against the debtor railroad's
successor in interest, CMC Heartland Partners (tlCMC") arising under the 1989 Model Toxics Control Act of the
State of Washington ("Model Act"), were barred by the bankruptcy discharge.
The dispute between UP and CMC grew out of UP's purchase of the Tacoma Washington Railyard from the
debtor railroad's bankruptcy estate in 1980. After the purchase, UP learned of numerous environmental problems
at the Tacoma railyard. At a time when UP knew of the environmental claims, a claims bar date of September
10, 1985, was established in the debtor railroad's bankruptcy. UP did not file a claim in the debtor's bankruptcy
proceeding for any contingent environmental liability under either state or federal law.
In 1989, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notified UP that it was a potentially responsible party
U;11der CERCLA and could be liable for the clean-up of the Tacoma railyard. In October 1990, approximately one
year after the passage of the Model Act, the State of Washington notified UP that it was potentially liable for
clean-up costs under the Model Act. UP commenced litigation against CMC on these claims shortly thereafter.
In 1993, the 7th Circuit, in Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. ("Chicago Ir'), 3 F.3d 200
(7th Cir. 1993) ruled that because UP had at least constructive knowledge of possible CERCLA claims against
the debtor railroad prior to the 1985 bar date, its claims against CMC were barred due to its failure to file a
proof of claim in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. [FN1] However, it remanded the case back to district
court for further findings on whether UP's claims under the Model Act were also barred. The 7th Circuit noted
that while the Model Act was not passed until four years after the bar date, there remained an unresolved
question of whether UP had the same environmental liability under Washington statutes, which were in effect
prior to the bar date.
In Chicago III, the 7th Circuit reviewed its Chicago I and Chicago II decisions and discussed them and the
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relevant environmental statutes in some detail. The court affirmed the district court's decision not to bar UP's
claims under the Model Act, holding that claims based on statutes, passed after the bankruptcy claims bar date,
would not be barred due to the creditor's failure to file a timely proof of claim. The 7th Circuit also held that the
Washington Environmental Statutes, which had existed prior to the bar date, did not impose liability on UP
sufficient to require it to file a contingent environmental claim in the debtor railroad's bankruptcy.
The primary importance of Chicago III is its excellent review of earlier case law and underlying environmental
law in the context of determining when a creditor would have knowledge sufficient to be required to file a claim
in a bankruptcy proceeding. Further, its adoption of In re Penn Central Transport Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir.
1991), holding that claims arising from statutes enacted after the fmal bankruptcy bar date are not barred,
establishes a fairly strong line of authority that bankruptcy discharges do not _b~L~~Y!rQlill!~!!!~.~J~im~_n~t~iJJg_
from environmental legislation passed after the debtor received a discharge.
In The Ninth Avenue Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation, 1996 WL 204241 (N.D. Ind. 1996), the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana was confronted with the question of when a claim arises,
in the context of determining whether a purchaser of assets under an 11 U.S.C. §363 sale would be held liable
for CERCLA claims related to the debtor's operations prior to the sale. The facts of this case are fairly
straightforward.
In the 1970s the Ninth Avenue Dump ("Dump") in Gary, Ind., operated as a chemical and industrial waste
disposal facility and was heavily contaminated. In 1981, Apex Oil Company ("Apex") purchased the owner of
Ninth Avenue, Clark Oil & Refming Corp. ("Old Clark"). In 1987, Apex and Old Clark filed chapter 11 cases in
the Eastern District of Missouri. In November 1987, Clark Refming & Marketing Inc. ("New Clark") purchased
most of Old Clark's assets [FN2] through a sale under §363. Both the motion to approve the sale of assets and
the order approving the sale contained clear and unambiguous language that the assets were being sold free and
clear of any environmental claims against Old Clark.
In 1994, a voluntary association of corporations ("Association") that had been *40 ordered by the EPA to clean
up the Dump sued New Clark and other entities under CERCLA for contribution to the Dump's $20 million
clean-up costs" New Clark was sued as a "successor-in-interest" to Old Clark, which had once operated the
Dump. New Clark moved for dismissal of the complaint and/or summary judgment on two grounds. First, New
Clark argued that it had no successor liability for Old Clark's environmental problems under CERCLA. Second,
it contended that the §363 sale precluded any claims by the Association for CERCLA liability arising from Old
Clark's activities.
The district court denied New Clark's motion. Addressing frrst the CERCLA successor argument, the court
held that the standard that should be applied for determining successor liability under CERCLA was the
"substantial continuity of business test" set forth in Truck Drivers Union v. Tasemkin Inc", 59 F.3d 48 (7th Cir.
1995) (a non-CERCLA case). [FN3] The court held that under Tasemkin:
A successor will be liable for CERCLA claims.. .if the successor knew or had notice of the potential CERCLA
liability and there was substantial continuity in the operation of the business before and after the sale. In addition,
the court can fmd a successor liable.. .if plaintiffs show that there is identity of stocks, stockholders, and directors
between the asset seller and purchaser.
1996 WL 204241 at *9 [footnote omitted].
The court also ruled that the successor would have a defense to CERCLA claims if the entity that sold the assets
to the successor was still viable and could provide a remedy. Id. The court found that there were genuine issues
of material facts concerning New Clark's liability as a successor to Old Clark and that summary judgment should
not be granted.
However, from a bankruptcy practitioner's point of view, the most important part of the Ninth Avenue decision
is its discussion of §363 and whether it can be applied to sell assets of a debtor "free and clear" of CERCLA
successor liability claims.
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Initially, the court noted that it could filld no bankruptcy decision that discussed successor liability under
CERCLA in the context of a §363 sale. The court reviewed the extensive case law concerning successor liability
in the area of product liability based on assets purchased under an 11 U.S.C. §363 sale, and found that these
decisions should be applicable to CERCLA successor liability cases. Id. at *13-14. After reviewing the case law
and noting the two conflicting lines of authority [See, generally, In re White Motor Credit Corp., 75 B.R. 944
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (no successor liability after a §363 sale); In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910,
917 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 1995) (successor liability claims allowed after a §363 sale in certain circumstances)],
the court held that the issue of whether a §363 sale barred a successor liability claim depended upon whether the
creditor asserting the claim could have filed that claim against the debtor that sold the property in its bankruptcy
case. If such a claim could be ftied, then the §363 sale would bar the claim. However, if the claim arose after
"the bankruptcy proceeding concluded" then the §363 sale would not bar ~!lc~~SSOr liability .cl(i@s. The court _
went on to fmd that genuine issues of material fact concerning the Association's ability to file a claim in the
bankruptcy proceedings remained and summary judgment was not appropriate.
The holding of this decision is important because it sets forth clear guidelines on how §363 sales should work in
cases involving potential successor liability under CERCLA. [FN4] Moreover, the court apparently rejected the
position, taken by some environmental creditors, that §363 sales cannot strip away environmental liability.
Where to Hear CERCLA Claims
In re Chateaugay Corp., 193 B.R. 669 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) serves as an excellent example of the vast amount of
litigation that can arise in CERCLA litigation. The brief procedural facts of the case are as follows.
In July 1986, LTV and its subsidiaries, including Chateaugay, ftIed for reorganization under chapter 11. The
bar date for the filing of claims in the LTV bankruptcy cases was November 30, 1987. None of the parties to the
present action filed timely claims against LTV.
In June 1990, the EPA brought suit against 24 named defendants for clean-up costs related to the Metcoa toxic
waste site. After various attempts at settlement and significant discovery, the defendants in 1995 ftied a third
complaint against 228 additional parties, including LTV, for CERCLA clean-up costs. The defendants later
amended their claim to seek a declaratory judgment that LTV's bankruptcy did not bar the CERCLA claims.
LTV did not answer the CERCLA suit but returned to the New York bankruptcy court, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the claims had been discharged in the LTV bankruptcy and for a permanent injunction against the
parties proceeding against LTV in the CERCLA suit in New York. The defendants then moved under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(d) [FN5] for withdrawal of the reference from the bankruptcy court to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
Initially, the district court noted that mandatory withdrawal of the reference under 28 U.S.C. §157(d) was not
required because the question of whether the parties' CERCLA claims had been discharged in LTV's bankruptcy
did not require the interpretation of the substantive provisions of CERCLA, but only of the Bankruptcy Code.
See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Revere Copper & Brass Inc., 172 B.R. 192
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
The district court further held that discretionary withdrawal was not appropriate because the consideration of
the CERCLA claims was a "core" matter under 28 U.S.C. §157(d) and all other factors weighed in favor of
denying the motion to withdraw. The court noted, with some humor, that both sides had engaged in forum
shopping by their respective filings, but held that in the interests of justice the issue of whether the CERCLA
claims were barred should be decided by LTV's bankruptcy court. The district court did not state that in the
event that LTV lost its declaratory judgment motion, LTV had agreed to have its liability under CERCLA
decided in the original CERCLA action.
This most recent Chateaugay opinion is a complete and easily readable review of the question of withdrawal of
the references and the problems that will *47 likely be encountered in this murky procedural backwater of
bankruptcy law. This case clearly stands for the proposition that the bankruptcy court is the preferred forum for.
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determining whether and when an environmental claim arose, and what impact the bankruptcy proceedings had
on those claims.
Conclusion
The three cases discussed above illustrate the continued importance of environmental issues in chapter 11 cases.
While some commentators have noted that the underlying policies of the Bankruptcy Code have recently been
"losing" to the environmental ideas of CERCLA and similar legislation, these cases, along with other recent
decisions [FN6] show that the Bankruptcy Code has not been rendered totally subservient to CERCLA as of the
time of this writing. This column will keep you advised on the progress of this struggle.
[FNl]. The 7th Circuit based its decision on its holding in yet another decision in this case, Matter of Chicago,
Milwaukee, S1. Paul & Pacific R. ("Chicago Iff), 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992), where it held that a claim arose
for purposes of ,bankruptcy. ff[W]hen a potential CERCLA claimant can tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known
release of a hazardous substance which the potential claimant knows will lead to CERCLA [claims], and when
this potential claimant has, in fact conducted tests with regard to the contamination problem... " Id at 202. See
also In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993).
[FN2]. Although not stated, apparently New Clark did not purchase the Dump with the other "Old Clark" assets.
[FN3]. The court noted, however, that there was a serious split of authority on the question of successor liability.
See, e.g., Anspec Co. Inc. v. Johnson Controls, 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991) (state law determines successor
liability); U.S. v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F. 2d 478 ·(8th Cir. 1992) (CERCLA mandates successor
liability); Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Services v. Total Waste Management Corp., 817 F.Supp. 225
(N.D.N.H. 1993) (successor liability without knowledge of environmental violations).
[FN4]. It is important to note that this case did not directly address the issue of whether 11 U.S.C. §363 could
permit a sale of contaminated real estate, free and clear of claims for CERCLA liability based on the purchaser's
ownership of the contaminated property.
[FN5]. The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this. section,
on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion
of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires
consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting
interstate commerce. 28 U.S.C. §157(d).
[FN6]. See In re McCrory, 188 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) discussed in Vol. XV, No.3 ABI Journal 8
(April 1996).
END OF DOCUMENT
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*18 NORPAK V. EAGLE-PICHER INDUSTRIES: REWRITING OR SUMMARIZING HEMINGWAY
TRANSPORT?
C.R. Bowles
Copyright © 1998 by the American Bankruptcy Institute; C.R. Bowles
The ftinterface ft between the Bankruptcy Code and various state and federal environmental laws can best be
analogized to the Titantic's now infamous meeting with an iceberg several decades ago. The problem facing
bankruptcy attorneys in this area has been determining which set of laws represents the Titantic and which set
represents the iceberg. Recently, the Sixth Circuit had occasion to address this issue in the case of Norpak v.
Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. (In re Eagle-Picher), 131 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. J997), in the context of determining
Eagle-Picher's objection to the claim of Norpak Corp. under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §502(e)(I)(B).
Section 502(e)(I)(B) provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he court shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is liable with the
debtor on or has secured, the claim of a creditor, to the extent that-- ...
(B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent as of the. time of allowance or disallowance of
such claim for reimbursement or contribution...
11 U.S.C. §502(e)(I)(B).
In numerous cases, both chapter 11 debtors-ill-possession (DIP) and chapter 7 trustees have used this provision
to defeat claims of parties who are seeking contribution or indemnification from the debtor for future
environmental liabilities. See, generally, In re New York Trap Rock Corp., 153 B.R. 648 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993). See,. also, In re Charter Company, 862 F. 2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1989). This use of §502(e)(I)(B) has
generated a great deal of case law and scholarly commentary [FNI] concerning how this section should be
applied.
Courts generally have held that in order for a claim to be disallowed under §502(e)(1)(B), the debtor must be
able to establish the following three elements: (1) the claim is for reimbursement or contribution; (2) the claim is
asserted by an entity co-liable with the debtor on a primary creditor's claim; and (3) the claim is contingent as of
the time of disallowance. [FN2] In re Dant & Russell Inc., 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991). However, courts often
have refused to apply the literal language of this section, holding that this provision is not intended to "immunize
debtors from contingent liability, but instead protects debtors from multiple liability on contingent debts." In re
Allegheny Int'l Inc., 126 B.R. 919, 923 (W.O. Pa. 1991). See, also, In re Hemingway Transport Inc., 993 F. 2d
915, 924 (1st Cir. 1993):
The onerous CERCLA remediation process may take years to complete, leaving PRPs [potentially responsible
parties] holding the bag; that is, holding unallowable contingent claims for contribution or reimbursement against
the chapter 7 estate, claims typically totaling millions of dollars. In such circumstances, §502(e)(I)(B) may
operate to preclude innocent PRPs from recovering CERCLA response costs from a chapter 7 estate even though
the estate clearly is responsible for all or part of the environmental contamination. If the EPA opts to refrain
from participating in any distribution from the chapter 7 estate, as it may do simply by not filing a proof of
claim... Thus, sometimes the fundamental policy embodied in Bankruptcy Code §502(e)(1)(B) may promote an
expeditious administration of the chapter 7 estate, see In re American Continental Corp., 119 B.R. 216, 217
(Bankr. D.Ariz.1990), at the expense of a fundamental CERCLA policy: the equitable allocation of
environmental clean-up costs among all responsible parties. [FN3]
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The facts underlying Norpak's claim were typical of many environmental cases. In 1956, Vincent Corica
purchased property from the debtor that it had used as a plant for the production of pulverized lead used in the
production of lead- based paint ("Property"). Norpak is a company owned by Corica, and Norpak and another
Corica entity currently own the Property. Not surprisingly, the debtor ~ has been identified as a PRP that may be
liable for environmental clean-up costs under both state and federal environmental laws. In order to protect any
claims that it may have against the debtor, Norpak timely filed a proof of claim, for reimbursement of future
environmental costs that Norpak may incur during the debtor's chapter 11 proceeding. No other environmental
proofs of claim involving the Property, including claims of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state
_____~!!~iE~_~~~~L9f~£_~~!~!_~~~~ JJ~_~4_~g~~~!_ !hf?_ ~_~~!~~ __~~fQ~_~J!1~ ~~pt~~!!Q!!~_( Jhe!>ar date for. ~he filing of claims.
The debtor objected to the allowance of Norpak's claim under §502(e)(I)(B).
In a brief opinion for In re Eagle-Picher Industries Inc., 177 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995), the
bankruptcy court sustained the debtor's objection to Norpak's claim based in large part on an earlier decision, In
re Eagle- Picher Industries Inc., 144 B.R. 765 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992), which disallowed environmental claims
for future clean-up costs under §502(e)(I)(B). The earlier Eagle-Picher decision relied upon the district court's
analysis from In re Hemingway Transport Inc., 126 B.R. 656 (D. Mass. 1991), concerning the allowability of
future environmental claims under §502(1)(e)(B). The district court in Hemingway was, however, ultimately
reversed on this issue by the First Circuit. Apparently none of the parties in the Norpak litigation discussed the
First Circuit's Hemingway decision, as it is neither addressed by the bankruptcy court in its decision nor by the
Sixth Circuit in its opinion. The district court affirmed the *38 bankruptcy court's decision without a separate,
published opinion.
In its appeal, Norpak challenged the bankruptcy court's decision on two grounds: (1) that the debtor is not
"coliable" with Norpak for the clean-up costs associated with the Property; and (2) that Norpak's claim is not for
"reimbursement or contribution" for purposes of §502(1)(e)(B).
Unlike the First Circuit in Hemingway, [FN4] the Sixth Circuit took a fairly simple approach to the question of
whether the debtor was "co-liable" with Norpak for the future environmental clean-up expenses. The Sixth
Circuit held that the issue of "co-liability" turned upon whether the governmental agencies, which could press
environmental claims against Norpak and the debtor, still had claims against the debtor. After noting that neither
the EPA nor state authorities had filed timely proofs of claim in this case, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to
the bankruptcy court to determine whether these creditors could still file "late" claims in the debtor·s bankruptcy
proceeding under the "excusable neglect" doctrine of Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Associates
Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), or otherwise assert a claim against the debtor. [FN5] The court held
that if neither the EPA nor the state still had viable claims against the debtor, then Norpakts claim should not be
disallowed under §502(e)(I)(B), as the debtor and Norpak would not be co-liable on these claims.
The Sixth Circuit rejected Norpak's argument that its claim against the debtor was not for reimbursement or
contribution. The court held that the technical label, which could be applied to Norpak's claim, would not
determine the applicability of §502(e)(I)(B). [FN6]
While the majority opinion in Norpak is an important clarification of the application of §502(1)(e)(B) to future
environmental claims, it is the concurrence by Chief Judge Boyce Martin that makes this opinion valuable.
Writing separately to emphasize 'the underlying holding of Norpak, Judge Martin stated:
The majority opinion requires the disallowance of contingent claims against debtors when the debtor and
claimant are potentially co-liable to a third party. Debtors could, however, argue that if that third party does
actually bring a claim against the, debtor, the majority opinion still allows the debtor to raise its bankruptcy as a
defense. This is, in fact, what Eagle- Picher concedes it plans to do if the EPA or the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection and Energy bring a claim against it. In doing so, Eagle-Picher is clearly relying on the
hope that Norpak's claims will be disallowed, its bankruptcy defense will be accepted, and it will be able to walk
away from the mess it made without bearing any responsibility for it. This cannot be allowed. To read this case
as allowing such a scenario contravenes Congress's clear intention in passing CERCLA. By passing CERCLA,
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Congress intended to respond efficiently and expeditiously to toxic spills, and to hold those parties responsible
for the release of environmental toxins liable for the costs of the clean-up. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v.
Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2nd Cir. 1992). Interpreting Pioneer Investment Services or the majority's
opinion as allowing polluters to circumvent CERCLA's goals would be tantamount to turning a blind eye to clear
Congressional mandate. Such flagrant disregard for legislative intent should not be tolerated.
131 F. 3d 1191 [emphasis in original text].
In conclusion, Norpak represents an important decision in the area of environmental/bankruptcy law. The Sixth
Circuit's emphatic rejection of the possibility that debtors can escape environmental liability through a
_._~~~~Q4t~~.~9~ __ Qf. g_()Y~~~J!t~!t_.4J:t.l~~iQ~ <!!!Q_._§~Q~J)1~){~}_!§ __~__~J.~~~!!!~H~~!tQl1 th~~Jhegoals of environmental.
clean-up laws are being given higher deference than the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. While DIPs and trustees
may be able to find some solace in the fact that agreements with environmental agencies as to liability may allow
the use of §502(1)(e)(B) to disallow PRP claims, it is only a small lifeboat for the passengers on the good ship
Bankruptcy (a/k/a Titantic).
[FNl]. Note, Bankruptcy versus Environmental Liability: Discharging Future CERCLA Liability in Chapter 11,
14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1999 (1993); Ames, Kilpatrick, Salerno & Coston, Hemingway Revisted, 14 ABI J. 8 (No.
4 May 1995); Bowles & McAnUlty, The Latest Hemingway Novel: The Old Toxic Waste Pit and The Wetlands,
12 ABI J. 31 (No.7 Sept. 1993).
[FN2]. Although it has apparently never been addressed, it would appear that in cases involving highly
contaminated property, such as a former lead processing plant, a PRP could argue that the claim was merely
unliquidated as to its amount and not contingent as to liability, where the debtor and not the PRP, either
generated or improperly disposed of the toxic waste.
[FN3]. For a detailed discussion of the Hemingway decision, see the article cited in footnote 1.
[FN4]. See 993 F. 2d at 925-934, where the First Circuit performs an intricate analysis of §502(1)(e)(B), holding
that claims for future clean-up costs could not be disallowed unless either the governmental agencies responsible
for the enforcement of environmental law had properly filed their own claims or a "surrogate claim" had been
filed under §501(b) of the Code.
[FN5]. During the appeal of this case, the debtor and the EPA entered into a consent agreement that may have
given the EPA a claim against the debtor concerning this property.
[FN6]. 131 F.3d at 1190-1191 ("If Norpak and Eagle-Picher are co-liable, then it is irrelevant that Norpak can
also concoct an alternative theory on which to premise its claim against Eagle-Picher such as diminution of value
of the property due to Eagle-Picher's contamination of that property. ")
END OF DOCUMENT
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Faithful readers of this column are well aware that the conflict between the "fresh start" policies of the
Bankruptcy Code and the comprehensive liability policies of state and federal environmental laws has been raging
for a long period of time. While this war has not lasted as long as the "Hundred Years War, n it has gone on long
enough for more than one battle to be fought over the same ground.
This article discusses three recent cases that revisit two earlier "Toxins- Are-Us" articles: Ames & Bowles,
"The When and Where of Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy," 15 ABI Journal 8 (August 1996) and Bowles,
"Norpak v. Eagle- Picher Industries: Rewriting or Summarizing Hemingway Transport?", 17 ABI Journal 18
(May 1998).
Back to the Future (Chapters X and 11)
The question of when an environmental claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy law has bedeviled federal
courts for a number of years, given the difficult nature of detecting environmental contamination, and the fact
that a significant number of potentially responsible parties (PRPs), which otherwise might be held liable for
clean-up costs, filed bankruptcy before either a particular toxic waste site was uncovered or the clean-up laws
were enacted. See, generally, In re Jensen, 995 F. 2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993). One of the most unusual issues is
whether the "fmal decrees" entered in Bankruptcy Act reorganizations or the orders of confirmation entered in
Bankruptcy Code cases discharge environmental claims that arise under laws enacted after the bankruptcy cases
themselves were filed. See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 78 F.3d 385 (7th Cir. 1996);
Matter of Penn Central Transport Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir. 1991).
Recently, two decisions from federal courts in New York, In re The Duplan Corp., 229 B.R. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), aff'g, 209 B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) and In re Manville Forest Products Corp., 225 B.R. 862
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998), addressed this issue. In Duplan, the issue was whether a fmal decree in a chapter X
Bankruptcy Act case discharged claims brought by PRPs under CERCLA. On August 31, 1976, Duplan filed in
the Southern District of New York a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act that was ultimately converted to a
chapter X case. In June 1981, the debtor's chapter X plan was confirmed, approximately one year after
CERCLA was enacted. In 1983 a fmal decree, closing the bankruptcy case and discharging the debtor from its
prepetition liabilities was entered. The final decree also enjoined all parties from attempting to collect their pre-
petition obligations from the reorganized debtor.
As in all environmental/bankruptcy cases, the story does not end there. In 1989, various property owners in the
. Virgin Islands commenced a lawsuit for the cleanup of a contaminated aquifer. Chemicals from one of the
debtor's Virgin Island plants caused part of the contamination of the aquifer. Ultimately, [FNl] some of the
defendants (the primary distributees of the reorganized debtor's assets, hereinafter "defendants") in this lawsuit
filed an action in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern pistrict of New York to enjoin parties asserting
statutory CERCLA claims C'CERCLA creditors"), from proceeding, as those claims had been discharged by the
fmal decree issued in the debtor's chapter X.bankruptcy. The sole bankruptcy issue before the court was whether
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
D· 27
18-MAY AMBKRIJ 10
(Cite as: IS-MAY Am. Bankr. lost. J. 10, *10)
these CERCLA claims arose before the filing of the debtor's chapter X petition.
Page 45
The defendants argued that under United States v. LTV Corp., 994 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) the claims arose at
the time the contaminants were released as part of the operation of the debtor's plant, and that therefore the
CERCLA creditors' claims arose pre-petition and were discharged by the fmal decree. The CERCLA creditors
argued that their claims did not arise until CERCLA was enacted, several years after the debtor's bankruptcy
filing, and were not covered by the chapter X discharge under the holdings of LTV Steel Co. Inc. v. Shalala, 53
F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995) (involving claims under the Coal Act of 1993) and Matter of Penn Central Transp. Co.,
944 F. 2d 164 (3rd Cir. 1991) (involving CERCLA claims). After wading through these arguments, the
bankruptcy court agreed with the position of the CERCLA creditors and held that under Penn Central and
Sllalala, "the claims at issue here did not come into existence until CERCLA's enactment in 1980, after the filing
of Duplan's petition and after the last day to file claims against the estate." In re Duplan Corp., 209 B.R. at
332-333.
On appeal, the district court affrrmed the bankruptcy court, holding:
'[W]here there is no legal relationship defmed at the time of petition,' that is, where the statute imposing the
liability has not been enacted, 'it would be impossible to fmd even the remotest tfright to payment. ttl Id. at 497
(quoting [In re Chateaugay Corp.,] 154 B.R. at 419). Yet a "right to payment," as the court pointed out, is
necessary to a bankruptcy claim. There is nothing in [Shalala] that indicates that its principle should not be
applied in the environmental context. In its opinion, the [Shalala] court was plainly aware of [LTV Corp.] since
it cited that case...And the [ [ [Shalala] court relied, in part, on Matter of Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d
164 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906, 112 S.Ct. 1262, 117 L.Ed.2d 491 (1992), itself a case involving
CERCLA.
The importance of Duplan is that it establishes that the Penn Central line of authority, which holds that pre-
CERCLA bankruptcy cases do not discharge claims for statutory contribution under CERCLA even if the
pollution that gave rise to the CERCLA claims occurred prior to the filing of the debtor's petition, applies in the
Second Circuit. Given that many, if not a majority, of the large pre-Code reorganizations were filed in the
Second Circuit, and that old hazardous waste is still being discovered, this otherwise "quaint" Bankruptcy Act
decision should have an important impact in the environmental-bankruptcy area.
*42 The second New York case, In re Manville Forest Products Corp. (MFPC), sets forth an unusual but
important limitation on the Penn Central-Duplan line of authority. In MFPC, the reorganized debtor filed an
adversary proceeding against the Olin Corp. to prevent Olin from pursuing certain environmental claims against
the reorganized debtor. The basic facts surrounding this case are as follows. In 1966, Olin incorporated a wholly
owned subsidiary ("Sub"), by transferring its forest product assets to it and receiving in return, among other
considerations, a broadly worded indemnification agreement concerning liability related to any assets that Olin
transferred to the Sub. This indemnification agreement was a good idea, as one of the assets transferred was a
piece of contaminated real property (Plant 94). Olin obtained a similar indemnity agreement when it "spun-off"
the Sub into a publicly owned company in 1974. Five years later, the Sub merged with JM Capital to become
Manville Forest Products Corp.
In 1982, Manville flied its now-famous chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, and ultimately obtained confirmation of
its plan of reorganization in 1984. Olin was an active participant in Manville's bankruptcy, as it filed a $7.5
million proof of claim based upon its claim for a pro rata share of tax liability related the Sub's spin-off. Olin
never filed a claim related to the indemnity agreements. In 1996, the state of Louisiana made demands on both
the reorganized debtor and Olin for remediation on the Plant 94 site. Olin sought indemnification under
indemnity agreements it had with Manville, which triggered the bankruptcy court litigation.
In MFPC, Olin argued that since the Louisiana environmental protection statutes, which gave rise to its
indemnity claims, were not enacted until after Manville filed its bankruptcy petition, Olin's contractual indemnity
claims survived Manville's bankruptcy discharge, citing Shalala, Penn Central and Duplan. However, the MFPC
court rejected this position based upon the nature of Olin's claim. Unlike the creditors in Shalala, Penn Central
and Duplan, whose claims were posted upon a set of laws enacted post-petition, Olin's contractual indenmity
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claim is based upon a pre-petition legal relationship between the debtor and Olin, the indemnity agreements.
Further, Olin was an active participant in the Manville bankruptcy, and at least had the chance [FN2] "to file a
proof of claim and estimate its indemnity claim under § 502(c) of the Code." 225 B.R. at 868. Based upon the
pre-petition contractual relationship between the parties, the MFPC court held that Olin's contractual indemnity
claim was discharged by confirmation of the debtor· s plan.
The MFPC decision represents the most detailed analysis of when (and how) a claim arises for purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code in environmental liability cases. While this case seems, on the surface, to be at odds with
Duplan, upon further examination, it is a logical extension of the pre- petition/post-petition theory behind the
Duplan-Penn Central line of case. The one great unanswered question of MFPC is what effect the discharge of
Olin· s contract may have on any statutory contribution/indemnification claim Olin might have against the
reorganized debtor under Louisiana law. If such rights exist under Louisiana law, the MFPC court must decide
between two odd situations; it must either ·1) determine that Olin has a post-petition claim against the reorganized
debtor based upon the Duplan-Penn Central line of cases, when it has found a nearly identical contractual claim
to be discharged by the confirmation of the Manville chapter 11 plan; or 2) rule that, because of the pre-petition
relationship between Olin and Manville, any indemnity claim that Olin may have otherwise had against the
reorganized debtor was discharged by the confirmation of Manville's chapter 11 plan, even though in absence of
Olin's careful drafting of the indemnity agreements, Olin's statutory indemnity claim would not have been
discharged under the Duplan-Penn Central line of authority. I leave this conundrum and the city of New York to
this column's faithful readers, and travel to Cincinnati to update the proceedings in the continuing dispute
between Norpak Corp. and Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. (EPI).
The Eagle Has Landed (and Taken Off Again)
When last we left the Norpak dispute, the Sixth Circuit had reversed the u.S. District Court's decision
affirming the bankruptcy court's disallowance of Norpak's environmental contribution claims, [FN3] and had
remanded the case back to the bankruptcy court on the issue of whether EPI was co-liable with Norpak on the
environmental claims of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy (NJDEPE) and the
EPA. Norpak v. Eagle- Picher Industries Inc., 131 F.3d 1185, 1191 (6th Cir. 1997). Based on the language of
this opinion, especially the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, this author stated:
In conclusion, Norpak represents an important decision in the area of environmental/bankruptcy law. The
Sixth Circuit's emphatic rejection of the possibility that debtors can escape environmental liability through a
combination of governmental inaction and §502(e)(I)(B) is a clear indication that the goals of environmental
clean-up laws are being given higher deference than the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. While DIPs and trustees
may be able to fmd some solace in the fact that agreements with environmental agencies as to liability may allow
the use of §502(e)(I)(B) to disallow PRP claims, it is only a small lifeboat for the passengers on the good ship
Bankruptcy (a/k/a Titanic). [FN4]
In light of the bankruptcy court's decision on remand, §502(1)(e)(B) may be a much larger lifeboat for debtors
than I originally predicted. [FN5]
On remand, the bankruptcy court, in an unpublished decision, In re Eagle- Picher Industries Inc., Case No.
1-91-00100 (Slip Ope Oct. 14, 1998) ("Eagle-Picher1t ), again disallowed Norpak's claim. Addressing the issue
remanded to it by the Sixth Circuit, Eagle-Picher confronted the issue of whether EPI was co-liable with Norpak
as to the EPA and NJDEPE claims. Norpak argued that it was the only party liable to both the EPA and the
NJDEPE because neither creditor had filed a claim in the EPI bankruptcy proceedings. Based upon this sole
liability, Norpak concluded that its environmental reimbursement/contribution claims could not be disallowed
under *43 § 502(e)(I)(B). [FN6] EPI argued that it had entered into a settlement agreement with the EPA in
1996, which permitted the EPA to pursue its environmental claims arising from the Norpak/EPI contaminated
property, even though it had not filed a proof of claim iti EPI's. chapter 11 case. Based on this agreement, the
bankruptcy court found EPI had joint liability with Norpak, and that therefore Norpak's claim should be
disallowed under §502(e)(I)(B).
Norpak had followed a different path in resolving its environmental problems in 1994 when it entered into an
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agreement with the NJDEPE to remediate the site at issue. The bankruptcy court's opinion does not address the
issue of whether EPI has any liability to NJDEPE. The bankruptcy court does, however, consider Norpak's
argument concerning its NJDEPE liability, but rejects its contention that it impacts the issue of EPI's joint
liability on these environmental claims. This case has been appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
Sixth Circuit.
The significance of the Eagle-Picher decision is that it allows debtors facing environmental liabilities additional
leeway in addressing those particularly trouble-some claims. While it is no longer possible under Norpak v.
Eagle-Picher Industries Inc., 131 F.3d 1185, 1191 (6th Cir. 1997) and In re Hemingway Transport Inc., 993
F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993), for debtors to raise a bankruptcy defense of discharge against governmental entities
holding environmental claims, while at the same time disallowing claims for contribution by other PRPs arising
from the same set of facts, it may be possible for a debtor to make a deal with the governmental entities (thereby
creating joint liability) and to disallow the PRPs contribution claims under §502(e)(I)(B). After all, who are
environmental officials more likely to pursue: a fmancially troubled debtor in bankruptcy, or a solvent entity
sitting in the unprotected world of normal commerce? Only time will tell if this could be a viable strategy. Stay
tuned to this column for further developments on this case.
[FNl]. This article omits any discussion of the twisted path this litigation took through the Virgin Island Federal
District and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal to ultimately reach the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York, as such procedural riddles are beyond the scope of this piece.
[FN2]. One might ask whether this is a distinction without a difference, Le., how could you estimate a claim
under an indemnity agreement for damages arising from the possible passage of future laws?
[FN3]. See Bowles, "Norpak v. Eagle-Picher Industries: Rewriting or Summarizing Hemingway Transport?," 17
ABI Journal 18 (May 1998).
[FN4]. Id.
[FN5]. As this case is on appeal to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit, I am constrained, as an
employee of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky, from making any comment about
the current status of this matter, and shall. limit my comments to an overview of the bankruptcy court's decision
on remand. I have further chosen not to review any pleadings filed by either Norpak or EPI in this appeal.
[FN6]. See In re Dant & Russell Inc., 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991), where the court stated:
Section 502(e)(I)(B) provides that "the court shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an
entity that is liable with the debtor on...the claim of a creditor, to the extent that. ..such claim.. .is contingent as
of the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim. If 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(I)(B). The section is not intended to
"immunize debtors from contingent liability, but instead protects debtors from multiple liability on contingent
debts. If In re Allegheny Int'l Inc., 126 B.R. 919, 923 (W.D. Pa. 1991). In order for a claim to be disallowed
under §502(e)(I)(B), therefore, the debtor must be able to show the following three elements: (1) the claim is for
reimbursement or contribution; (2) the claim is asserted by an entity co-liable with the debtor on a primary
creditor's claim; and (3) the claim is contingent as of the time of disallowance.
END OF DOCUMENT
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"" 0 not throwaway your old law journal articles and treatises concerning the Bankruptcy Act and
early Bankruptcy Code just yet, loyal readers, as this month's Toxins-Are-Us column will
" """ address issues relating to the discharge of environmental claims in two Bankruptcy Act cases,
as well as the early Code case of In re Manville Forest Products Corp. This column will also
provide you with an update of an earlier Toxins-Are-Us column ttA Tale of Two Cities: Recent
Decisions as to When a CERCLA Claim Arises and How an Environmental Claim May be Disallowed
Under §502(e)(I)(B),tt published in the May 1999 issue of the ABIJournal.
Back to the Future Part II-Duplan and Manville Forest Products
On May 15, 2000, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals entered its decision in the case of.li.1....r.e....l2ull.l?1l:1.
Cor]2., 212 .F.3d 144 (2d Cir._2000). Although the procedural history of the environmental litigation at
issue in this case is torturous and complex, the underlying substantive facts are fairly straightforward.
On Aug. 31, 1976, Duplan filed a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act that was ultimately converted to
a chapter X case. A bar date for the filing of claims was established as July 10, 1979. On Dec. 11, 1980,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) became
effective. In June 1981, the debtor's chapter X plan was confirmed. In 1983, a final decree closing the
bankruptcy case and providing for a general discharge of Duplan's liabilities was entered. However,
Duplan remained liable for administrative expenses that arose during its chapter X proceedings. The
final decree also enjoined all parties from attempting to collect "claims" they had against the pre-petitton
debtor and the reorganized debtor.
In 1989, various property owners in the Virgin Islands commenced a lawsuit for the cleanup of a
contaminated aquifer. Chemicals from one of the debtor's Virgin Island plants caused part of the
. contamination ofthe aquifer. Ultimately, some of the defendants (the primary distributes of the
reorganized debtor's assets, hereinafter "defendants") in this lawsuit filed an action in the u.s. District.
Court for the Southern District of New York to enjoin the parties (CERCLA creditors) asserting
common law and statutory CERCLA and RCRA claims (collectively, uenvironmental claimsn) from
proceeding against the defendants because the environmental claims had been discharged by the final
decree issued in Duplan's chapter X bankruptcy. This matter was referred to the bankruptcy court.
The bankruptcy court found that the final decree entered in the Duplan chapter X case discharged only
claims that arose prior to the filing of the petition, and that the environmental claims asserted against the
defendants arose at the earliest on ~ec. 11, 1980, some four years after Duplan initially filed its
bankruptcy. Therefore, the environmental claims did not constitute a pre-petition claim and were not
discharged by the final decree. The bankruptcy court also held that the CERCLA creditor's common-law
and RCRA claims were not discharged by the final decree or its accompanying permanent injunction.
See In t~_.f)JJP-lq!1 ..Corp., 209 B.R. 3241Bankr~-!D~N~_Y~l22I).The defendants appealed and the
bankruptcy court's order was affirmed by the district court.ltl...te....Dup.I{1.n...C(?rp~.1 .....2.29...B..~.R~ ....6.02.,...6..1. ...1.
(S_!D.~.N.~.Y~_ ..1_9.2.2)..
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In its decision, the Second Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the earliest date the
CERCLA claims arose for bankruptcy purposes was Dec. 11, 1980, the date when CERCLA became
effective. 1 The Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision of L.r~.SJe.e.l...CQ.~ ..__Y~....Sb(J.lqlq~ .....5.3.....F.!.3.d_.4.78....(2.d...C.ir~.
1.2.9.5) (Chateaugay II), and held that claims arising out of statutes that create a "new and unique
obligation arising out of previous conduct" arise, for purposes of bankruptcy law, at the earliest on their
effective date and not when the actual conduct, which may provide the basis of claim, originally
occurred. See 2.1..2.. E.~_3..d.J~t.. ...l.5.?.
However, the Second Circuit rejected both the bankruptcy and district courts' interpretation of the extent
of discharge provided by the Duplan final decree. Unlike the lower courts, the Second Circuit found that
this discharge of indebtedness set forth in the final decree entered in the Duplan case "terminated all of
the debtor's debts and liabilities except as provided for in the final decree or in the plan." [ll. at 153__ The
Second Circuit held that the Duplan chapter X plan's limitation of claims to obligations arising pre-
petition did not limit the scope of the Duplan chapter X final decree and discharge. In making this
decision, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its long-standing case law that discharges in chapter X cases
must be given a broad construction with respect to claims and creditors in order to dispose of all
liabilities of the debtor in reorganization. SeeMq.ttc.r o.f.Stgl~Ii.f1g ..:liQ.!llg~I._C()l:l2.!., 5.7.9._.F.~.2g '2.06., '2.1..2..{2d.~
.Cir.!_....1..2.1.8). Therefore, the mere fact that the CERCLA claims did not arise pre-petition did not
automatically prevent them from being discharged by the final decree entered in the Duplan chapter X
case.
However, the Second Circuit did find that the lower courts correctly determined that the final decree and
chapter X plan specifically excepted, from the scope of the discharge and permanent injunction, all
administrative claims that arose during the chapter X case and that Duplan was still liable for any
administrative claims from its chapter X case. The Second Circuit held that since the CERCLA claims
arose post-petition, they constituted administrative claims for purposes of both the Bankruptcy Act and
the Bankruptcy Code. See, generally, ..U'-lit(id..~$t(Jl?~Y ...Y!._...L_:rl(..CQrp~.J .._._244._F..~_2g ....9.91....(2.d.~.....Cir.~ ....1..99.1.J
(Chateaugay I).
The Second Circuit did reverse the lower courts' rulings concerning the RCRA claims, asserted by the
CERCLA creditors. The Second Circuit held that the CERCLA creditors were barred from bringing the
RCRA claims as a matter of law_ 212 ]~.3d at 155-156. The court also remanded this case to the
bankruptcy court for a factual review of whether certain common-law claims related to the
contamination had been discharged by the debtor's chapter X bankruptcy proceeding. Id~_JJ.t.J..5.6_:..l.5.7.
The court ruled that an environmental claim under the Bankruptcy Code arises when there has been a
release or threatened release of hazardous substances, that release has caused injury in the form of
contamination and the contamination is capable ofdetection. See, generally, _re.x.q(;(l...I(J.(;!...J?~ ....SqlJ(Ic..r.sL..J..8.2
B_~.R.! ..._2.3.7,._2.5..1....-<Bf.IDkr.~ .._S..!.l).!_N.~.Y.~ .._.1..92.5_).
The Second Circuit's Duplan decision is important for two core reasons: (1) it gives clear guidance as to
when CERCLA claims and common-law environmental claims arise for purposes of both the
Bankruptcy Act and Code, and (2) its holding that the scope of a discharge in a chapter X Bankruptcy
Act case may include claims that had not arisen pre-petition in that case, and could breathe new life into
some specific environmental lawsuits. The circuit's ruling may make it possible to discharge some
CERCLA claims in certain chapter X cases depending on the discharge language of the fmal decree
relating to administrative claims. While it is unlikely that the drafters of these chapter X plans could
have ever envisioned that the administrative claims portion of these plans could be used to bring large
environmental claims against the reorganized debtors, the exact wording of these provisions will be
important in future environmentallitigation.
Shortly before Duplan was decided, the Second Circuit resolved the appeal of a second case discussed in
http://www.abiworld.orglabidata... D· 32 10/20/2003
Old Bankruptcy Cases Never Dit... Page 3 of5
the "Tale of Two Cities" article: ..lt1....rg.._Mql1.yill~ ....E(lrg~~~l. ..£r()JJll.~.t.~~ ...CQrp.~.J_...2J12....E3d....1..2.5....(2~.~.._.Cir~ ....'2Q.Q.Q).
The facts underlying the Manville decision show how even the best legal drafting can turn out to be a
disadvantage. In early 1967, Olin Corp. transferred its forest-products division to an entity known as
Olinkraft Inc. (Sub). As part of this transaction, Sub granted Olin a broadly worded indemnification
agreement concerning liability related to any asset that Olin transferred to Sub. These assets included a
piece of real estate known as Plant 94, which was contaminated by a variety of toxic substances. In May
1974, Sub became an independent public company but reaffirmed its broad indemnification agreement
with Olin. In January 1979, Sub merged into JM Capital, a subsidiary of the Johns-Manville Corp., and
subsequently changed its name to Manville·Forest Products Corp. (MFPC).
In 1982, MFPC filed its chapter 11 petition along with other Johns-Manville entities. The claims bar
date in the MFPC chapter 11 was set for Dec. 29, 1983. Olin filed a proof of claim for certain taxes that
it was owed by MFPC, but did not file a proof of claim under any of the indemnification agreements it
had with Sub and that had been assumed by MFPC.
On March 26, 1984, MFPC's reorganization plan was confirmed. The order of confrrmation provided
that MFPC was discharged from any and all unsecured debts that arose prior to the confirmation of the
plan. Approximately three months after MFPC's chapter 11 was confirmed, the state of Louisiana
enacted the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act (LEQA), which proved a comprehensive plan for the
remediation of environmental contamination. As with most state environmental acts, it imposed liability
for environmental cleanup costs on current and former owners of polluted property.
In May 1996, the state of Louisiana sent demand letters to Olin to pay the cleanup costs for Plant 94.
Olin demanded indemnification from MFPC (n/k/a Riverwood International Corp.) for the costs, and the
matter was ultimately brought before the MFPC bankruptcy court.
The bankruptcy court found that Olin's claim for indemnification against MFPC for the Plant 94
contamination arose not under the LEQA, but under its pre-petition indemnification agreements.
Therefore, the bankruptcy court rejected Olin's argument that its claim was a post-petition claim arising
upon the enactment of the LEQA and found that the order of confirmation in the MFPC chapter 11 case
barred Olin's claim against MFPC. See, generally, In...r.e:....lttiq.l1J!.illg....EQrg.st....P1~_QdJJ.(;f.$. ...(;Qrp~_L ..2.2.5.....B.~.R.! ....8.6.2
(Bankf. S.D.N.Y. 1998). Olin appealed the bankruptcy court's decision, which was affirmed by the
district court on April 23, 1999, and Olin pursued its appeal to the Second Circuit.
In Manville, the Second Circuit held that there were two requirements for a party to have a valid pre-
petition claim under the Bankruptcy Code. First, a claimant must possess a right to payment. Second,
that right to payment must have arisen prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. ZQ.2....F_~3.d ..at._.l.2_8. See,
also, .Cba.t.eJl..ugqJt..IL.....5.3....F.!.3Jl...a.t....49.7.. In discussing the nature of Olin's claim, the court found that, under
contract law, a right to payment arises under a written indemnification contract at the time the
indemnification agreement is executed. 1(l..J~lt.12.2.. The Second Circuit found that the indemnification
agreement in favor of Olin was so broad that it encompassed all types of future liability, including
possible environmental liability arising from statues that might be enacted in the future. 'Ill The court
rejected Olin's argument that its liability should not be deemed to arise until the statute which gave it
liability~ the LEQA, was enacted into law, stating:
Olin's liability here is triggered by LEQA, but it flows from the indemnification agreements,
which allocate risk from a category of anticipated losses without reference or limitation to
particular causes of action and particular statutes. In short, Olin brought a contract cause of
action based upon a pre-petition contract, not a statutory claim for indemnification under a
statute enacted after confirmation.
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The Manville case highlights a rather strange trap that parties could fall into when wording claims for
reimbursement for environmental liabilities in cases involving long-discharged debtors. Basing claims
on contractual indemnity provisions in the non-bankruptcy world is generally a better method of seeking
indemnification than proceeding under the complex indemnity and contribution requirements ofCERLA
and other state and environmental laws. However, as is clearly highlighted by the Second Circuit in its
Manville decision, reliance on certain and well-drafted contractual indemnity provisions may destroy
any chance for a creditor to assert a claim against a former debtor as the indemnification provisions
could be deemed to be pre-petition claims, while statutory causes of action arising from CERLA will be
deemed to be post-petition claims that survive the discharge.
The Rock Island Line Was a Mighty Dirty Road
The fmal case in our review of older bankruptcy proceedings is the :!Yfq}'.t.qg_(~QrJ2!.....v~ ....liq.v..iS!Jlf
111.le.rJ1IJtif.'-.1j'<;11...Tr(J.11$j~r ....G~QIP!J ....= ..E!.3.d...=.,....2.Q.QQ._.W.!.L.~ .....8.2.3.4.5.2_..(7Jll._Ci.r~_ ...JlIIle....2.7,....2_QQQ). In 1975, the
Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. filed for reorganization under §77 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Approximately five years later, in 1980, Rock Island was allowed to abandon its railroad operations.
Four years after the abandonment of its railroad operations, Rock Island successfully confrrmed a plan
and emerged from bankruptcy as the Chicago Pacific Corp. In January 1989, Chicago Pacific Corp.
merged with Maytag Corp.
One of the assets the Chicago Pacific Corp. had when its bankruptcy proceeding ended was a railyard in
Rock Island, Ill. This railyard was sold after the completion of the Rock Island bankruptcy to Hartland
Rail Corp., which leased it to another entity. In 1993, it was determined that petroleum was leaking from
the railyard into a tributary of the Mississippi River. Two property owners adjacent to the railyard sued
Hartland and operators of the railyard under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) in the Central District
of Illinois, demanding contribution for cleanup costs (OPA lawsuit). All parties to the OPA lawsuit filed
claims against Maytag, as a third party defendant seeking contribution under Illinois and federal law for
the costs of the cleanup of the railyard site.
In response to the OPA lawsuit, Maytag moved in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, where the Rock Island bankruptcy had been administered, to enjoin the prosecution of the OPA
lawsuit. The Northern District of Illinois granted Maytag's request for an injunction, and the other
parties to the OPA lawsuit appealed.
In considering the appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed two primary issues. First, Maytag argued that
the request for contribution for the cleanup costs relating to pollutants placed in the ground before the
1984 sale of the railyard was a claim that was barred by the injunction issued when the Rock Island
/ bankruptcy was closed. The 7th Circuit declined to address the injunction issue, remanding the case to
the district court for a review of the terms of the Bankruptcy Act injunction, which arose in the Rock
Island bankruptcy case.
The second argument raised by Maytag in support of the injunction was that, under general corporate
law, it was not liable for Rock Island's debts because Rock Island was "liquidated" under its §77
Bankruptcy Act proceeding rather than reorganized. The district court accepted this argument as the
basis for its injunction. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting that while a true liquidation
could shield a subsequent purchaser of a debtor's assets from liability, in this particular case, no
liquidation occurred. The Seventh Circuit rejected the district courts' finding that Rock Island liquidated
its operations, and instead found that Rock Island ultimately reorganized its business affairs as the
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Chicago Pacific Corp., and therefore could be held liable for any Rock Island debts that were not
discharged under the terms of its bankruptcy.
The Rock Island case once again highlights the importance ofthe precise terms ofold Bankruptcy Act
case injunctions and discharges as they relate to environmental claims. In this case, the important issue
was whether the debtor liquidated or reorganized in its §77 Bankruptcy Act proceedings. Reviewing the
same plans, the district court found that the Rock Island bankruptcy was a liquidation, due primarily to
the fact that the debtor abandoned its railroad operations, including its operation of the railyard in
question. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the plan and it found that since the debtor emerged from
bankruptcy as the Chicago Pacific Corp., its bankruptcy was a reorganization as opposed to a
liquidation. This article will keep you updated on the fate of the Maytag litigation should it return to the
Seventh Circuit in the future. .
Conclusion
An ancient saying goes that those who do not understand history are doomed to repeat it. This statement
rings especially true in the toxic tort area of bankruptcy proceedings. It is impossible to imagine that the
bankruptcy attorneys who worked on the railroad reorganizations and in chapter X and chapter XI
proceedings more than 20 and 30 years ago would ever consider that the way they drafted a particular
discharge order or resulting injunction would impact the liability of a successor corporation for causes of
action that had not yet even been discussed by Congress, much less enacted into law. It therefore
appears that scholarship relating to the Bankruptcy Act is not yet dead but, so long as toxic waste pits
continue to be discovered, will necessarily continue, much to the chagrin of a host of environmental
lawyers and federal judges' law clerks.
Footnotes
1 The Second Circuit specifically noted that for purposes of this case, it was assuming that the CERCLA
claims arose on the date that CERCLA became effective. The court specifically stated that "nothing in
this opinion precludes a finding that the CERCLA claims actually arose after the date of enactment and
after the close of the Duplan bankruptcy proceeding." .2J..?...F.._J..d...at....l.5.5. at N.1o. RetYffi.JQ...art.icle
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(20)(A) The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an
offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility,
title or control ofwhich was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency,
abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such tenn
does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility,
holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
(B) In the case of a hazardous substance which has been accepted for transportation by a
common or contract carrier and except as provided in section 9607(a)(3) or (4) of this title, (i) the
term "owner or operator" shall mean such common carrier or other bona fide for hire carrier
acting as an independent contractor during such transportation, (ii) the shipper of such hazardous
substance shall not be considered to have caused or contributed to any release during such
transportation which resulted solely from circumstances or conditions beyond his control.
(C) In the case of a hazardous substance which has been delivered by a common or contract
carrier to a disposal or treatment facility and except as provided in section 9607(a)(3) or (4) of
this title, (i) the term "owner or operator" shall not include such common or contract carrier, and
(ii) such common or contract carrier shall not be considered to have caused or contributed to any
release at such disposal or treatment facility resulting from circumstances or conditions beyond
its control.
(D) The tenn "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local government which
acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment,
or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its
function as
sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local
government which has caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance from the facility, and such a State or local government shall be subject to the
provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title.
(E) Exclusion of lenders not participants in management
(i) Indicia ofownership to protect security
The tenn "owner or operator" does not include a person that is a lender that, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect the
security interest of the person in the vessel or facility.
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(ii) Foreclosure
The tenn "owner or operator" does not include a person that is a lender that did not participate in
management of a vessel or facility prior to foreclosure, notwithstanding that the person--
(I) forecloses on the vessel or facility; and
(II) after foreclosure, sells, re-Ieases (in the case of a lease finance transaction), or liquidates the
vessel or facility, maintains business activities, winds up operations, undertakes a response action
under section 9607(d)(l) of this title or under the direction of an on-scene coordinator appointed
under the National Contingency Plan, with respect to the vessel or facility, or takes any other
measure to preserve, protect, or prepare the vessel or facility prior to sale or disposition,
if the person seeks to sell, re-lease (in the case ofa lease finance transaction), or otherwise divest
the person of the vessel or facility at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable time, on
commercially reasonable tenns, taking into account market conditions and legal and regulatory
requirements.
(F) Participation in management
For purposes of subparagraph (E)--
(i) the term "participate in management"--
(I) means actually participating in the management or operational affairs of a vessel or facility;
and
(II) does not include merely having the capacity to influence, or the
unexercised right to control, vessel or facility operations;
(ii) a person that is a lender and that holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security
interest in a vessel or facility shall be considered to participate. in management only if, while the
borrower is still in possession of the vessel or facility encumbered by the security interest, the
person--
(I) exercises decisio~akingcontrol over the environmental compliance related to the vessel or
facility, such that the person has undertaken responsibility for the hazardous substance handling
or disposal practices related to the vessel or facility; or
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(IT) exercises control at a level comparable to that of a manager of the vessel or facility, such that
the person has assumed or manifested responsibility--
(aa) for the overall management of the vessel or facility encompassing day-to- day
decisionmaking with respect to environmental compliance; or
(bb) over all or substantially all of the operational functions (as distinguished from financial or
administrative functions) of the vessel or facility other than the function of environmental
compliance;
(iii) the tenn "participate in management" does not include performing an act or failing to act
prior to the time at which a security interest is created in a vessel or facility; and
(iv) the tenn "participate in management" does not include--
(I) holding a security interest or abandoning or releasing a security interest;
(IT) including in the tenns of an extension of credit, or in a contract or security agreement relating
to the extension, a covenant, warranty, or other term or condition that relates to environmental
compliance;
(III) monitoring or enforcing the terms and conditions of the extension of credit or security
interest;
(N) monitoring or undertaking 1 or more inspections ofthe vessel or facility;
(V) requiring a response action or other lawful means of addressing the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance in connection with the vessel or facility prior to, during, or on
the expiration of the tenn of the extension ofcredit;
(VI) providing financial or other advice or counseling in an effort to mitigate, prevent, or cure
default or diminution in the value of the vessel or facility;
(VIT) restructuring, renegotiating, or otherwise agreeing to alter the tenns and conditions of the
extension of credit or security interest, exercising forbearance;
(VIII) exercising other remedies that may be available under applicable law for the breach of a
tenn or condition of the extension of credit or security agreement; or
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(IX) conducting a response action under section 9607(d) of this title or under the direction of an
on-scene coordinator appointed under the National Contingency Plan,
if the actions do not rise to the level of participating in management (within the meaning of
clauses (i) and (ii».
(G) Other terms
As used in this chapter:
(i) Extension of credit
The term "extension of credit" includes a lease finance transaction--
(1) in which the lessor does not initially select the leased vessel or facility and does not during the
lease term control the daily operations or maintenance of the vessel or facility; or
(II) that confonns with regulations issued by the appropriate Federal banking agency or the
appropriate State bank supervisor (as those terms are defined in section 1813 of Title 12 [FN2] or
with regulations issued by the National Credit Union Administration Board, as appropriate.
(ii) Financial or administrative function
The term "financial or administrative function" includes a function such as that of a credit
manager, accounts payable officer, accounts receivable officer, personnel manager, comptroller,
or chief financial officer, or a similar function.
(iii) Foreclosure; foreclose
The terms uforeclosure" and "foreclose" mean, respectively, acquiring, and to acquire, a vessel or
facility through--
(I)(aa) purchase at sale under a judgment or decree, power of sale, or nonjudicial foreclosure sale;
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(bb) a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or similar conveyance from a trustee; or
(cc) repossession,
if the vessel or facility was security for an extension of credit previously contracted;
(II) conveyance pursuant to an extension of credit previously contracted, including the
termination ofa lease agreement; or
(ill) any other formal or informal manner by which the person acquires, for subsequent
disposition, title to or possession of a vessel or facility in order to protect the security interest of
the person.
(iv) Lender
The tenn "lender" means--
(n an insured depository institution (as defined in section 1813 ofTitle 12);
(II) an insured credit union (as defined in section 1752 ofTitle 12);
(ill) a bank or association chartered under the Farm Credit Act of 1971 (12 U.S.C. 2001 et seq.);
(IV) a leasing or trust company that is an affiliate of an insured depository institution;
(V) any person (including a successor or assignee of any such person) that makes a bona fide
extension ofcredit to or takes or acquires a security interest from a nonaffiliated person;
(VI) the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or any other entity that in a bona fide manner
buys or sells loans or interests in loans;
(VII) a person that insures or guarantees against a default in the repayment of
an extension of credit, or acts as a surety with respect to an extension of credit, to a nonaffiliated
person; and
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(VIII) a person that provides title insurance and that acquires a vessel or facility as a result of
assignment or conveyance in the course of underwriting claims and claims settlement.
(v) Operational function
The term "operational function" includes a function such as that of a facility or plant manager,
operations manager, chiefoperating officer, or chief executive officer.
(vi) Security interest
The term "security interest" includes a right under a mortgage, deed of trust, assignment,
judgment lien, pledge, security agreement, factoring agreement, or lease and any other right
accruing to a person to secure the repayment ofmoney, the performance of a duty, or any other
obligation by a nonaffiliated person.
42 USCA s 9601
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Weakening the Clean Air Act
Presentation by Nat Mund
Sierra Club
Background on the Sierra Club
The Sierra Club is a non-profit membership
organization dedicated to preserving, protecting, and
enjoying the planet. Started by John Muir over 100
years ago, Sierra Club has a long history of working
to educate the public and our political leaders on
environmental policy.
We have more than 700,000 members across the
country, in every state.
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Clean Air Act:
30 Years of Success
Health Impacts of Air Pollution
NOx:
A critical component of ozone, linked to a broad variety
of respiratory conditions, particularly asthma.
SOx:
Closely associated with fine particle pollution, linked to
cardio-respiratory illnesses and premature mortalities.
Mercury:
A potent neurological toxin, associated with
developmental damage in fetuses and children. Impacts
are seen in adults at high enough levels.
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Thirty years ofprogress
• EPA 2002 Air Quality Trends Report
demonstrates reductions in six major
pollutants since 1970
- Pollution decreased while GDP increased
- Greater than 95% reduction in lead
- Reductions in NOx, SOx, fine particles
- Still struggling to reduce ground level ozone
Thirty years ofprogress
• National Ambient Air Quality Standards
- 1 hour ozone standard (1990)
- 8 hour ozone standard (1997)
- fine particle standard
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Thirty years ofprogress
• New Source Review
- Requires existing sources of pollution to install
modern pollution control technology when making
a change that increases pollution.
- EPA report back to VP Cheney's Energy Task
force more than a 4 million tons reduced 1997-
2001.
- Environmental Integrity Project compiled data from
of enforcement settlements since 2000
demonstrate pollution reductions of about a million
tonsl year when fully implemented.
Thirty years ofprogress
• Interstate pollution
- "Section 126" of the Clean Air Act allows states to
petition EPA to reduce pollution from upwind
states.
- In 1998, EPA issued a "SIP call" in response to NE
state 126 petitions. The SIP call reduces
summertime NOx by a tremendous amount,
providing benefits locally and through
"transported" pollution reductions.
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Thirty years ofprogress
• Future measures
- Tier II automobile standards
- Diesel rules
- Proposed non-road diesel rules
- Proposed 8 hour standard implementation
rule
- Utility MACT
Clear Skies:
Undermining the
Existing Clean Air Act
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Brief History
• Originally announced in concept form in
February, 2002
• Introduced as legislation in July, 2002, and
again in early 2003
• President Bush mentioned Clear Skies
prominently in the State of the Union address
• Since then, several Congressional hearings,
and rumors about its appearance on various
legislative proposals
Existing Clean Air Act gets
greater reductions
• EPA presentation to EEl 9/01
- Demonstrated that existing Clean Air Act
programs would get greater reductions than
Clear Skies proposal (Attachment A)
• EPA Hg presentation 12/01
- Further demonstrated that substantial
reductions in mercury emissions would be
achieved under existing law (Available upon
request)
E-G
Ways that Clear Skies Weakens
Clean Air Act
• Pollution trading- an inappropriate solution for public
health concerns
Puts into place a national "cap and trade" system,
allowing power plants to buy and sell the right to pollute
Expands a program focused on acid rain reduction (a
chronic and cumulative concern) to programs focused on
public health protection.
Includes, for the first time, the trading of a toxic air
pollutant (mercury)
Ways that Clear Skies Weakens
Clean Air Act
• Delays implementation of 8 hour ozone standard in
many areas
For communities that "attain" the 1 hour ozone standard,
but fail to meet the 8 hour standard, Clear Skies delays
implementation until 2015.
Study after study has linked this type ofpollution to
health concerns.
E-7
Ways that Clear Skies Weakens
Clean Air Act
• Repeals utility MACT, leaving communities exposed
to mercury air pollution
Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, EPA must control
toxic air pollution sector by sector, through the "MACT"
process.
MACT requires each facility in a sector to adopt pollution
control technology to reduce air toxics.
EPA must produce a proposal for a utility MACT by
December, 2003, and finalize it by December, 2004, with
compliance by 2008.
Clear Skies repeals this requirement, r~placing it with a cap
and trade system that isn't fully implemented until 2018.
Ways that Clear Skies Weakens
Clean Air Act
• Repeals New Source Review and haze requirements
(BART) for Covered Units
Replaces existing programs designed to prevent local air
pollution degradation and haze pollution with a static
performance measure.
•Delays Section 126 petitions, and places additional
hurdles to granting them
Prevents ~PA from acting on Section 126 petitions until 2009,
and from implementing a. petition until 2011.
Places a new cost-effectiveness hurdle in place.
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Concerns about EPA
demonstrations
• EPA has produced a model that
demonstrates these concerns, reflecting
some disturbing assumptions about the
existing Act- the "Rip van Winkle"
enforcement scenario
• Only 3 counties do better under EPA's
analysis of Clear Skies than during their
"base case" for 8 hour ozone
AtlKhmcntA
COMPARISON OF REQUIREMENTS UNDER
BUSINESS-AS-USUAL AND THE STRAW PROPOSAL
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Different Regions of the Country Rely on
Different Fuel Mixes to Generate Electricity.
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Snapshot of Selected CAA Requirements
NSR Permits for new sources & modifications that increase emissions
Serious 8-hr Ozone
NAAQS attainment
Date
Note: Dotted lines indicat•• rang. of possibl. dat...
I Further action on ozone would be considered bMed
on the 2007 .......,.,t.
2 The SIP-.ubmitt. and lItt.nment dat.... keyed off
the dete of designation; for exempte, if PM or ozone ••
designated In 2004, the first an.oment date Is 2009
EPA is required to updllt. the new source performanc.
stand.ct. (NSPS) for boilers and turbln.. fNery 8 ye..
In developing the Ilme11ne of current eM requirements, It
WM nec"'8rY for EPA to m•• lIUUmptions IIbout
rulemaklngs th. hllY. not been completed or, In some
case, not even ••rted. EPA's rulemaklngs wiI be
condueted through the usu. ~and-c:omment
proe.... and the conclusions mllYv~ from then
8SSOOlptions.
:~~~~~c:.--T-----------~~;~~;::-~Ei:~~~RT
New Fine PM NMOS latest attainment Second Regional
Implementation Plans date for Fine Pt...1 Haze SIPs due
! NAAQS~
Regional Haze SIPs due
Final
Utilily
MACT
Proposed
Utility
MACT
Designate Areas
for Fine PM NMOS
Designate 1-hrSevere Marg- 8-hr Asses..o:; Moderate
areas for Area inaI 8-hr Ozone Effectiveness 8-hr
8-hr Ozone Attainment Ozone Attain- of Regional Ozone
NAAQS Date NAAQS ment Ozone NA.<\QS
Attain- Demon- Strat€i}ies Attainment
ment stration Date
Date SIPs due Possible
~Cl---~~il~;'
NOx
SIPs
Due
Mercury
Determination
Phase II
Acid Rain
Compliance
Interstate Transport Rule to Address
S021 NOx Emissions for Fine PM
NAAQS and Regional Hi-"!a=z=e'-- ~
IAcid Rain, PM2.S' Haze, Taxies I
Ozone I
1-hrSerious
Area Attainment
Date
OTC
NOx
Trading
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EPA Analysis of Clear Skies
• Fine particle and ozone non-attainment counties
decline more than 90% by 2020, while the few
remaining areas would be very close to the standards
• Very low increase in natural gas usage
• Coal use stable or increases in all major regions:
./ West - 2020 coal production equals 2000 production
./ Interior - 2020 coal production almost doubles 2000
production
../ Appalachia - 2020 coal production equals 2000
production
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State nsi ,__ rati ns
• Reduces patchwork of different programs and
confusion / competition issues for regulated sources
• Federal program addresses transported emissions
and minimizes interstate conflicts
• Federal program takes pressure off state programs,
enforcement and costs
• Significantly lowers the number of areas failing
federal air quality standards
• Low-cost option for electric consumers (industry,
small businesses & households)
• Flexibility allows local and state needs to be
considered (e.g., fuel choices, jobs and tax base)
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CI(.~~ar Ski~_·-.~:s vs@ lean Air Planning Act
(EEl Modeling)
• Clear Skies cost is $15-30 Bless ($1999, NPV
2004-2020)
• In 2020, Clear Skies costs $2-4 Bless
• In 2020, Clear Skies has negligible impact on
use of coal and natural gas to generate
electricity
• In 2020, Clean Air Planning Act could reduce
coal use by about 25% and increase natural
gas use about 25%
n)gnosis?
• Schedule influenced by Senate Subcommittee
mark-up, energy and transportation bills, and
confirmation of new EPA Administrator
• House Energy & Commerce could mark up bill,
but will not move absent Senate action
• Passage of Clear Skies is Administration's top
environmental priority
• 2004 Presidential politics loom large
• Clear Skies' objectives could be implemented
in large measure via regulatory programs...
E - 21
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Climate Chan Litigati n (2)
• Six federal district court cases:
~ EPA's August 28 decision moots one case and has
caused voluntary dismissal of another
./ Three NEPA cases and one Clean Air Act case remain
• The main battleground over regulation of CO2 and
other greenhouse gases shifts to the D.C. Circuit's
consideration of EPA's August 28 decision:
~ Several states, cities and environmental groups have
challenged EPA decision
./ Several states and Industry groups will seek to
intervene in support of government
,/ Other intervenors and amici likely
Summary
• A multi-emission approach provides the most promising
future for national and state economies, fuel diversity,
the environment, and electricity generation
• Legislation should address S02' NOx and Hg emissions,
and reduce duplication and inefficiency of the CAA
• At this time, the correct approach to greenhouse gas
reductions is a combination of voluntary efforts to
reduce, avoid and sequester emissions, combined with
R&D on future electric generation technologies
• Alternative multi-emission and/or mandatory climate
bills have little chance of success
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Clear Skies:
A Better Way to Clean the Air
Presentation to
UKiCLE 19TH Annual Environmental Law
Sam Napolitano
Acting Director, US EPA Clean Air Markets Division
November 14, 2003
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Millions of People Live in Areas that Do Not Attain the
8- Hour Ozone and Fine PM Standards (Monitoring Data)
Regional Emissions Contribute Significantly to Local
Nonattainment Problems
Cine CleveDetMiIw Indy
5
o : ,
MInn-st.Paul St.Louis Chi
Urban v. Regional Contribution to PM
Concentrations
(Annual Average, ug/m3)
25····················································· - .
30·····-------------------,
15....,..---
10
• regional contribution • urban contribution
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Power Plants Are Significant Contributors to Public
Health and Environmental Challenges
Sulfur Dioxide Nitrogen Oxides
Electric Power (63%)
* Other stationary combustion includes residential and commercial sources.
Mercury
Electric Power (37%)
• Electric power
• Other stationary
combustion *
m Industrial Processing
• Transportation
mMiscellaneous
Power Plants Face a Complex Set of Requirements under
the Current Clean Air Act (CAA)
NSR Permits for new sources & modifications that increase emissions
Serious 8-hr Ozone
NAAQS attainment
Date
EPA Ie required to updllte th. new sourc. performance
stendwde (NSPS) for boiler. end turbl".. ~ery 8 ye••
Note: Dotted lin.. lnetic•• a rang. of pouible d....
1 Furthw -=tIon on ozone would be COMidered b..ed
on the 2007 ...-.ment.
2 Th. SIP-aubmlttlll .w IIttllinment dm.. •• k.yed off
the d•• d dee!gnllllon; for .X8mple. If PM or ozone ••
deelgn.ed In 2004. the first IIttllinment date Ie 2009
In developing the t1rnel1n. d CWTent CM requiremen",
It w. nec....ry for EPA to milk...sumptlons IIbout
rulemllldnga th. h..... not been completed or, In some
case, not even ablrted. EPA'. rulemaklnga wi. be
conducted through the uau81 notlce-end-comment
proc.... end the conclusions may v-v from these
..umptlons.
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BART Sources sources under the
Trading Program
Latest attainment Second Regional
date for Fine PM Haze SIPs due
NAAQS2
Compliance
with utility
MACT
New Fine PM NMQS
Implementation Plans
!
Regional Haze SIPs due
Designate 1-hr Severe Marg- 8-hr Assess Moderate
areas for Area Inal 8-hr Ozone Effectiveness 8-hr
8-hr Ozone Attainment Ozone Attain- of Regional Ozone
NAAQS Date NAAQS ment Ozone NAAQS
NO. Attain- De~on- Strategies Attainment
SIP ment stratlOn [ Date
call Date SIPs due Possible
;£-r ~b-~~I~
M ~ 00 10
NO.
SIPs
Due
OTC
NO.
Trading
Mercury Proposed Final
Detemlination Utility Utility
MACT MACT
Phase II Designate Areas
Acid Rain for Fine PM NAAQS
Compliance
Interstate Transport Rule to Address
SOz/ NOx Emissions for Fine PM
NAAQS and Regional Haze
~d Rain, PM2.S, Haze,TO~
lozone I
1-hrSerious
Area Attainment
Date
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Building on Lessons Learned:
Reductions in the Acid Rain Program
Monitored Reductions in Wet Sulfate Deposition under the Acid Rain Program
1989-1991 1999-2001
Building on Lessons Learned:
Costs Lower than Expected
Projected Costs at Full Implementation of the Acid Rain Program
8:, ...,.,-----.--,..,.,.,...-,.,,..,.,.,...-,.,----.--,..,.,.,...-,.,----.------.------------------.------,..,.,.,...-,.,----.--,..,.,.,...-,.,,..,.,.,...-,.,-------------------- ---"'l
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,e:$,~j:n).a~es'··:',t
e:l1a;ctrtferlt:
Estim'.tes:4
y~a'.:later
Estima.fes:,8:
:y~a,.:later
EEl Edisoo Electric Institute
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
GAO General Accounting Office
RFF Resources for the Future
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Amending the CAA, Clear Skies Sets a Firm, Clear
Timeline for Emissions Reductions
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Considering the Benefits of Clear Skies: Sulfur Dioxide
Example
S02 Emissions in the Base Case and with Added Controls under Existing
Act, Clear Skies Caps, and Clear Skies Response
• ••••••••••• ~ •••••••• ~ •.•.•.~ ~ io ••.•• ii.·';';·';~~.•
Cle~r .Skie.s.Caps
12 Base Case Emissions11 ~...~ .
10 ------
9
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7
6
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4
3
2
1
0..-------.---------.------..-------.-
c~
~
EPA is measuring benefits from the Base Case to the Clear Skies Reduction line. This is a
standard way to measure changes that the Agency used in 1996 for the Clean Air Power Initiative
and in 1999 in the Air Quality Dialog Process, and other major rulemakings under the CAA.
Some of the Major Issues Faced...
• Practical Aspects of Implementation
- Time to Construct Pollution Controls
- Labor and Materials Needed for Pollution Control Construction
- Financing of Equipment
- Effect of Program on Power Grid Reliability
• Increases in Energy Prices
• Energy Diversity
• Changes in Coal Mining Production
• Uncertainty of Pollution Control Reductions
• Large Benefits from Air Emissions Reductions
• Differences in the "Benefits" Gained from Each Pollutant
• Providing "Proper" Incentives
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Power Sector Emissions Reduced Significantly with
Clear Skies Plus Existing Control Programs
AIuka&~i.,.notlncludeclinEPA·.modelof..,..,.,..con.-tedtot"'~1
U.S. Mdr1c:llygnd.
Not.: ElUting c:onlrol progrema In IPM Indude lltle N, NOx SIP Cen, NSR settlements, end stetHlpedllc~ In CT, MA, MO, NC, NH, lX, end WL "does not Indude mercury MACT In 2007, Imp.nenletlon of lhe NAAQS or ""y oIher
pot.ntlll'lUlnrwguletloNtolrnplemenlthec...... C nAlrAcl.
Projected S02 Emissions from Power Plants with the Base
Case and Clear Skies in 2020
Projected 802 emissions from Power Plants
WIth the Base Case and Clear Skies (2020) In.oootonl
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Clear Skies with Other Air Programs Substantially Improves
Fine Particle Attainment over the Next Two Decades
129 Nonattalnment Counties
• There are 129 counties nationwide (114
counties in the East) that are currently
estimated to exceed the annual fine particle
standard of 15 IJ/m3•
• 65 million people (43 million people in the
East) currently live In counties that would
not meet the standard.
Most counties would be brought into attainment
with the PM2•5 standard by 2020:
• Clear Skies and existing control programs
will bring 111 counties (hom~ to
approximately 32 million people) into
attainment with the fine particle standard
(compared to current conditions).
IliiiillilI11Iililll1'=ii.IJi.I;III.Bll.l;il_rlli;lilliliiiiiiiiiil:;li!!I:i;i!!!
18 Nonattalnment Counties
Not••: Based on 1999-2001 data of counties with monitors that have three years of complete data. Additional federal and state programs must bring all counties into
attainment by 2016 at the latest. The methodology used to predict nonattainment status in the West is different than that used for the East.
Clear Skies with Other Air Programs Substantially
Improves Ozone Attainment over the Next Two Decades
27 Nonattalnment Counties
290 Nonattalnment Counties
• There are 290 counties nationwide (268 counties In
the East) currently estimated to exceed the 8-hour
ozone standard.
• 111 million people (87 million people In the
East) currently live In counties with projected
ozone concentrations greater than the 8-hour
ozone standard of 85 ppb.
Most counties would be brought Into attainment with
the ozone standard by 2020 :
• Clear Skies and existing control programs
(primarily the NOx SIP Call and vehicle rules,
Including the proposed non-road rule) will bring
283 counties (home to approximately 77 million
people) Into attainment with the 8-hour ozone
standard (compared to current conditions).
Notes: Based on 1999-2001 data of counties with monitors that have three years of complete data. Additional federal and state programs must bring all counties into
attainment between 2007 and 2021. The methodology used to predict nonattainment status in the West is different than that used for the East.
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Benefits Begin Immediately under Clear Skies
• The power sector will immediately lower 802 emissions to bank allowances for the
future. Leads to preventing 1000s of premature deaths before 2010.
• In 2008, added pollution controls lower NOx and indirectly reduce Hg levels through
new NOx and existing 802 pollution controls providing co-benefits.
• The first phase of 802 and Hg controls start in 2010. EPA estimates annual benefits of
$ 55 billion. There are also many "unvalued" benefits.
Premature mortality
(Alternative estimate)
7,900
(4,700)
Clear Skies Delivers Increasing Environmental
and Public Health Benefits
By 2020...
• Reduced fine particle and ozone exposure would result in $110
billion in annual public health benefits, including:
- 14,100 fewer premature deaths;
- 8,800 fewer cases of chronic bronchitis;
- 23,000 fewer non-fatal heart attacks;and
- 30,000 fewer hospitalizations and ER visits
• An alternative estimate projects 8,400 fewer premature deaths and
annual health benefits of $21 billion.
• Visibility would be significantly improved in parks and forests
- $3 billion in annual visibility benefits for southern and western parks alone by 2020
• Reductions in sulfur, nitrogen, and mercury deposition would
improve the health of lakes, streams, and estuaries
- Virtual elimination of chronically acidic lakes in the Northeast
• Additional human health and environmental benefits cannot
currently be monetized (e.g., mercury risk reduction)
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Other Unquantified Benefits Include...
Blues and (;ret\.Hs Show Areas of Significant Improvement by 2020.
Emissions Reductions Come from Further Controls
on Coal-Fired Capacity
In 2020 with Clear Skies, 81 % of all coal-fired capacity is
projected to have one or more of the following: selective
catalytic reduction (SCR) for NOx, flue gas desulfization
(scrubbers) for S02' and/or activated carbon injection (ACI)
for mercury. Of this capacity, 34% is due to Clear Skies.
There will be about 300 GW of coal-fired units in 2020.
Graphics show cumulative capacity with existing controls,
controls projected to be retrofitted under the NOx SIP call,
NSR settlements and state enacted programs, CAA Title IV,
and controls projected to be retrofitted with Clear Skies.
PrOj.<t.d Cqal-Fh'.d C.p.C:I~wltbScat
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29 -.- -- - .
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Projected Annual Costs of the Clear Skies Act
o·
Total annual costs of the Clear
Skies Act are projected to be
$6.3 billion ($1999) in 2020.
The net present value (NPV) of
the difference in costs between
Clear Skies and the EPA Base
Case is $52.5 billion ($1999) for
the period between 2005 and
2025.
• ·4+----------
i
.=1D>3+'---------__
Note: Cost projections a-e based on modeling using IPM and are based on best available engineering estimates. These projections show the costs to PO\Y8f" generators over
and above the costs they will incur to meet statutory and regulatory requirements that are already in effect. The projections do not include costs associated with the purchase
of allowances from the auction. Nor do the projections consider future technological changes that could lower compliance costs or electric demand response that would lower
costs through reduced power generation. In the absence of Oear Skies legislation. there are existing statutory provisions that will. in the future. require EPA and states to
impose additional requirements (and thus additional costs) on power generators between now and 2020 (e.g., states will be required to meet the PM2.5 and ozone NMOS).
When compared to existing Oean Ajr Ad requirements, Oear Skies may actually result in cost savings because a cap-and-trade approach is more effICient than existing
regulatory programs. When the Acid Rain Program was implemented using a C8j>and-trade program. compliance costs to achieve the mandated reductions were
signiflC8nUy lower than predicted as sources took advantage of the f1exibHity provided by a cap and trade program.
Note: EPA's net present value calculation is based on annual costs from IPM and CCNer the years 2005-2025. see chapter 7, table 7.1 of the IPM documentation for more
information on the discount rates used for various plant types. (www.epa.gov/airmarketslepa-ipmlindex.html#documentation).
Impact on Electricity Prices and Fuel Prices
• Retail electricity prices are expected to gradually decline from today's levels but then rise over time
with Clear Skies. (Prices are expected to drop initially due to the increase of excess generation
capacity; in 2010 prices would begin to increase due to new capacity requirements, which lead to
higher capital costs and greater natural gas use, and higher retail prices passed onto consumers.)
• Clear Skies will have a small effect on national electricity, coal, and natural gas prices.
• The impact on coal-fired capacity is small.
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Note: Retail prices from 2000 are from AE02003. Prices for the period 2005 and after were cala.dated using the Retail Electricity Price Model (see
Section G for a description of the Model).
The 0031 price represents an average mlnemouth price across all twelve grades of coal in the model mined in 39 supply regions. The natural gas price
is the Henry Hub price. Fuel prices for 2005 to 2020 are EPA's projections from IPM.
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Projected Generation Mix in 2010 & 2020
Projected Generation Mix In 2010 Projected Generation Mix In 2020
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! 3,000 3,000
Ba_ Cue In 2010 Clear Skies In 2010 Ba_ Cue In 2020 Clur Ski.. In 2020
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Note: Projeetlona are from EPA'. modeling using IPM. The base ca.. in IPM includes Title IV, the NOx SIP Call, NSR settlements, and stat.apecific caps in CT, MA, MO, NC, NH, TX,
and WI. The ·other" category Include. generation from sotar, wind, geothermlll, biom_, landfill g_, and fuel cells.
Coal Production for Electricity Generation in 1990 and
2000 and Projected Production with Clear Skies in 2020
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Impact of Changes in IPM Modeling Assumptions
• EPA has explored the impact of changing assumptions in the model to:
- AEO 2003 natural gas prices
- AEO 2003 electricity growth
- Mercury emission modification factors (EMFs) used by EIA
• To measure the pure impact of the assumptions, as opposed to the
safety valve effect, a Clear Skies Case without the safety valve was used
in IPM modeling of power grid behavior and emissions. With the safety
valve modeled, the impacts would be smaller than those shown. (The
sensitivity analysis did not extend to air quality and benefits analysis.)
• The assumptions used in the sensitivities for natural gas prices,
electricity growth and mercury removal efficiencies were those used by
EIA in its 2003 modeling.
Effects of Assumptions for Natural Gas Prices, Electricity
Growth, and Emission Modification Factors (EMFs)
pfQJ.ct.d AnnuaiCoeu(SJ.tI.) U.l", EPA.nd EtA
A.e.... ,'lo".f.ol' GrAJw.tl'l,Gn,.ltd. "e·rcury EM,:a
• Projected annual costs decline
or remain about the same when
the model is run with EIA's
natural gas assumptions,
electricity growth assumptions,
and/or EMFs. Assumptions
lead to building much cleaner
new coal-fired capacity that
leads to lower overall cost.
• Annual costs increase less than
100/0 by 2020.
• Coal-fired generation increases.
• Allowance prices are relatively
close, except for mercury.
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In Summary: Four Key Benefits of Clear Skies
Clear Skies would provide dramatic benefits for public health, starting
immediately upon passage
- When fully implemented, Clear Skies would prolong thousands of lives each year,
providing billions of dollars in economic benefits, and would save tens of millions of
dollars in health care from reduced hospitalizations and ER visits alone
Clear Skies would make great strides to help the environment
Clear Skies would improve visibility in national parks and wilderness areas; reduce
nitrogen loads to the Chesapeake Bay and other waters; help lakes, streams, & forests
recover from acid rain damage; and reduce mercury in the environment.
Clear Skies would improve the Clean Air Act by simplifying requirements for
industry and reducing burdens on states.
Clear Skies would retain the health-based ambient air quality standards (NAAOS) under
the Clean Air Act while strengthening a proven, mandatory market-based approach and
reducing reliance on complex, less efficient requirements.
Clear Skies would maintain energy diversity and would only have a small
effect on national electricity, coal, and natural gas prices.
- Clear Skies would deliver certainty and efficiency, achieving environmental protection
while supporting economic growth.
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Comparison of Proposed Multi-Pollutant
Control Levels: Nitrogen Oxides
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Notes on EPA's Analysis Using a Base Case of
Existing Control Programs
The information presented in this analysis reflects EPA's modeling of the Clear Skies Act of
2003. EPA has updated this information to reflect modifications:
• Revisions to the Existing Control Programs to reflect newly promulgated rules at the
state and federal level since the initial analysis was undertaken.
- The 2003 analysis reaffirms previous analytical results
• Benefits of Clear Skies substantially outweigh the costs,
• Resulting economic impacts of the program are reasonable given the air quality,
health and environmental improvements that are gained.
This analysis compares the new program (Clear Skies) to a Base Case (Existing Control
Programs), which is typical when calculating costs and benefits of Agency rulemakings.
- The Existing Control Programs reflects implementation of current control programs only
• Does not include yet-to-be developed regulations such as those to implement the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
- The EPA 2003 Existing Control Programs for power sector modeling indudes:
• Title IV, the NOx SIP Call, NSR settlements, and state-specific caps in Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin, all
finalized before March 2003.
- The EPA 2003 Base Case for air quality modeling includes:
• Federal and state control programs in the EPA 2003 IPM Existing Control Programs,
as well as the Tier II, Heavy Duty Diesel, and Non-Road Diesel rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Any discussion of "real estate -issues for the environmental lawyer" typically
should include a discussion of the management of contingent environmental liability associated
with the sale, ownership, operation and leasing of real property. In that context, sellers, buyers,
owners, operators and tenants must consider a variety of legal and practical aspects of applicable
environmental laws, as well as consider the full tier of programs on the federal, state and local
level that may impact liability associated with real estate.
A primary environmental concern associated with real estate continues to be the
federal superfund law, or CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. This statute imposes liability on
certain categories of persons based, in some instances, simply on their status in relation to the
real property at issue. For example, CERCLA provides for strict liability (meaning without
regard to fault) and joint and several liability (meaning one person can be held responsible for
the entire cleanup cost regardless of their proportionate contribution to the problem) for certain
current owners and operators of contaminated property, as well as certain past owners and
operators, and those who arranged for the disposal or transportation of hazardous substances to
the property at issue. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1). CERCLA, however, is just one of many
federal, state and local programs meriting consideration and, even focusing on CERCLA alone,
parties must realize that CERCLA primarily deals only with "hazardous substances," a term
expressly defined not to include petroleum. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14). Moreover, while recent
amendments to CERCLA seek to provide additional protections against liability, they also have
the potential to impose new burdens on owners/operators of real property interests.
An outline of various environmental laws that may impact real estate is attached
as Appendix A to this paper. Rather than explore all such laws in depth, this paper will examine
F - 1
selected real estate issues for the environmental lawyer and provide an update of applicable law,
beginning with brownfields.
BROWNFIELDS, ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE AND
THE NEW BONA FIDE PROSPECTIVE PURCHASE
"Brownfields" are defined as "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or
reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (39).
The U.S. Conference of Mayors estimates that there are more than 450,000
brownfield sites nationwide. Such sites not only may detract aesthetically from our
communities, but they also may pose health and environmental risks, impact a community's tax
base, and even contribute to urban sprawl. And although such properties may present attractive
opportunities for redevelopment and reuse, parties interested in acquiring and/or developing such
property naturally are concerned with environmental contamination and associated risks. These
risks include uncertainties concerning the nature and extent of contamination and any associated
remediation costs, as well as possible property value impairment, third party claims and future
land use or operational restrictions. Often these risks can tum a potential inner city
redevelopment project away toward greener "urban sprawl" pastures.
Even where sophisticated private parties may be willing to take a reasonable risk
in a brownfields project, often lenders and other interested stakeholders may be unwilling to
participate due to the uncertainty of environmental risks. As a result, some states have tried to
-encourage redevelopment by implementing voluntary cleanup programs, but liability concerns
remain. "Despite protection from State liability as an incentive to invest in these types of sites,
testimony before the committee confirmed that the fear of incurring federal liability sometimes
drives developers and lenders toward open spaces." S. Rep. No. 107-2, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., p.
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3. Congress thus amended CERCLA in an effort to address such concerns and further encourage
brownfields redevelopment.
Congress Changes the Federal Law
On January 11, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Small Business Liability
Relief and BroWnfields Revitalization Act (the, "Act"), amending CERCLA. The Act, among
other things:
• creates a brownfields grant program and authorizes new funding for
brownfields redevelopment;
• seeks to clarify the scope of "all appropriate inquiry" under the innocent
purchaser defense;
• creates a new bona fide prospective purchaser defense, and
• codifies EPA policy regarding other liability protections.
1. Brownfields Revitalization Funding
The Act authorizes EPA to establish a brownfields grant program and authorizes
funding to identify, investigate, assess and clean up properties that are abandoned or under
utilized. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (k). However, the definition of "brownfield site" excludes from the
grant program a number of types of properties or cleanup sites, and "federal brownfields
expenditures are appropriately limited to sites where, due to the threat of real or perceived
contamination, no reuse is likely and no federally directed or funded cleanup is underway or
imminent." S. Rep. No. 107-2 at 5. Also important to note, entities eligible to receive grants
under the new program include only state and local governments, quasi-governmental and
clearance authorities, regional counsels, state-chartered redevelopment agencies, and Indian
tribes. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (k).
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2. New Innocent Purchaser Considerations
CERCLA provides an affirmative defense for "innocent purchasers" of real
property who, prior to the date ofpurchase, did not know and had no reason to 'know of a release
or threatened release of a hazardous substance on the property. To establish the defense, the
purchaser must demonstrate that it took "all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and
uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35) (B). The Act amends this section of CERCLA in an
effort to clarify its scope and better define its application.
First, the Act clarifies the scope of the defense by inserting between "deeds or
other instruments" the terms "easements, leases." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35) (A).
Second, the Act provides that the "all appropriate inquiry" standard will be
satisfied by conducting an environmental site assessment that meets specific standards to be
promulgated by EPA within two years. 1 In the interim, the following defines "all appropriate
inquiry:"
For commercial property purchased before May 31, 1997, the court shall consider
(1) any specialized knowledge or experience; (2) the relationship of the purchase
price to the value of the property if not contaminated; (3) commonly known or
reasonably ascertainable information about the property; (4) obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of contamination; and (5) the ability of the purchaser
to detect contamination by appropriate inspection.
EPA has initiated a nego iated rulemaking proceeding to develop regulations to address the
"all appropriate inquiry" stan ard.
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For property purchased on or after May 31, 1997, and until EPA promulgates due
diligence standards, appropriate inquiry is satisfied by following the procedures of
the American Society for Testing and Materials, including an assessment in
accordance with E 1527-97, Standa~d Practice for Environmental Site
Assessments: Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Process.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35) (B) (iv) (I) - (II).
Third, the Act adds new obligations that a prospective purchaser must comply
with after acquiring property in order to preserve its status as an innocent purchaser. These
obligations include:
• cooperate, assist, and provide access to persons that are authorized to
conduct response actions at the property;
• comply with any land use restrictions in connection with the response
action at the property; and
• do not impede the effectiveness or integrity of any institutional controls
employed at the property.
Finally, after acquiring the property the purchaser must also adhere to another
requirement - exercise "appropriate care" with respect to hazardous. substances found at the
property. Such "appropriate care" includes taking reasonable steps to stop any continuing
release, prevent any threatened future release, and prevent or limit human, environmental or
natural resource exposure to any previously released hazardous substance. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(35)(B)(i)(II).
3. New Bona fide Perspective Purchaser Defense
A principle drawback of the CERCLA innocent purchaser defense has been the
inherent "catch 22" of the defense itself, whereby a prospective purchaser who diligently
undertakes "all appropriate inquiry" may in fact discover contamination, thus precluding
application of the defense because an innocent purchaser must establish that it had "no reason to
know" that the property was contaminated. This quandary is particularly troublesome for efforts
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to encourage redevelopment of brownfields SInce the existence of contamination IS often
confinned in due diligence.
In an effort to eliminate this potential barrier to redevelopment ofbrownfields, the
Act creates a new bona fide prospective purchaser defense. Under this defense, property owners
or tenants who knowingly acquire or lease contaminated property after January 11, 2002 can
still avoid CERCLA liability if they can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that:
• the disposal of hazardous substances occurred before acquisition of the
property;
• as a prospective purchaser they conducted "all appropriate inquiry," and
complied with any applicable release reporting requirements;
• as an owner/operator, after acquiring the property they took "appropriate
care" in relation to contamination discovered;
• as an owner/operator, after acquiring the property they cooperate, assist,
and provide access to persons authorized to conduct response actions;
comply with any land use restrictions and institutional controls; and
comply with any EPA requests for infonnation; and
• as an owner/operator, they are not otherwise a potentially responsible
party or affiliated with any other potentially responsible party through any
direct or indirect familial relationship, any contractual or corporate
relationship, or as a result of a reorganization of a business entity that was
a potentially responsible party.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (40).
4. Windfall Lien
Although a bona fide prospective purchaser may be protected from CERCLA's
strict liability, the Act nevertheless creates a "windfall lien" in favor of the government on
property owned by the bona fide prospective purchaser. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (r). This lien is
intended to prevent a bona fide prospective purchaser from reaping a windfall due to any
increase in property value as a result of federal government cleanup efforts. Thus, if the federal
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government incurs response costs at the property, the Act allows a federal windfall lien in an
amount not to exceed the increase in the fair market value of the property due to the
government's cleanup efforts. Id. at (r) (4).
5. Contiguous Property Owners
The Act also codifies the contiguous property defense previously published as
policy in EPA's "Final Policy Toward Owners of Property with Contaminated Aquifers." See 60
F. Reg. 34790 (July 3, 1995). Under the 1995 policy, EPA agreed not to target enforcement
action against an owner ofproperty when groundwater beneath their property had been impacted
from contamination that migrated onto or under their property from an adjoining parcel. This
defense applied only where the owner did not contribute to the release of the hazardous
substances, was not in a contractual relationship with the person responsible for the release, and
where no alternative basis for imposing CERCLA liability on the owner existed. The
amendments under the Act reiterate these conditions, but also imposes new conditions to satisfy
the defense, such as requirements to abate a release, and requirements to cooperate - - a
requirement that may result in restrictions to or interference with land use.
Pursuant to this defense, EPA may issue assurances that no enforcement action
will be initiated or may enter into settlements that would insulate a person meeting the
requirements of the defense from a cost recovery or contribution action under CERCLA. See 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (q) (3). While this defense may relieve the innocent land owner from
requirements to conduct groundwater investigations or install groundwater remediation systems
(except in accordance with the 1995 policy), and may relieve such parties from undertaking full-
scale response actions, it nevertheless still requires that they take reasonable steps in response to
the contamination. Id. at (q) (1) (A) (iii).
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Brownfields In Kentucky
Kentucky has two (2) statutory voluntary cleanup programs that offer certain
protections against environmental liability in order to encourage and facilitate redevelopment of
property in the Commonwealth impacted by real or perceived environmental contamination.
Kentucky's original brownfields statute offers such protections to public entities only, while the
more recent "Voluntary Environmental Remediation Act" seeks to open the brownfields program
to private participants as well.
1. Public Entities
In 1996, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted legislation "to encourage
economic development by allowing the issuance of a No Further Remediation Letter to a public
entity for a site when the remediation plan has been successfully completed." See KRS 224.01-
450. The issuance of a no further remediation letter acts as a release from further responsibilities
and "shall he considered prima facie evidence that the site does not constitute a threat to human
health and the environment and does not require additional remediation...." KRS 224.01-465(1).
In order to obtain a no further remediation letter, a public entity must submit an
application to the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
("Cabinet") that contains, among other things, an environmental site assessment sufficient to
characterize the extent of any contamination at the site, and a proposed remediation plan for the
site consistent with the proposed reuse of the site. With regard to the latter, Kentucky's cleanup
statutes expressly recognize that risk-based remediation and risk management tools, such as
engineering and institutional controls, may be employed where appropriate as an alternative to
more costly traditional cleanups such as removal and off-site disposal of contamination. See
KRS 224.01-400 (18).
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If the Cabinet approves the no further remediation letter application, the public
entity must undertake or cause to be undertaken all actions pursuant to the remediation plan
before the Cabinet will issue the no further remediation letter. See KRS 224.01-460. Moreover,
once issued, the Cabinet may void the release from liability if 1) the site is not managed in
compliance with the statute or the approved remediation plan; or 2) the Cabinet determines that
any facts upon which the remediation plan was based were either unknown at the time the release
was issued, or were known but not disclosed, or were false. See KRS 224.01-465 (4).
Although Kentucky's brownfields statute requires that a "public entity" submit
the no further remediation letter application, the statute provides that any release from liability
runs in favor of any mortgagee, trustee, transferee or successor in interest of the public entity, as
well as any financial institution that, after the issuance of the letter, acquires ownership,
operation, management or control of the property. KRS 224.01-465(3).
2. Private Parties
Recognizing the limits of the original brownfields program, in 2001 the Kentucky
General Assembly enacted Kentucky's Voluntary Environmental Remediation Act, also known
as "VERA". Similar to the public entity statute, this program is "intended to establish an
efficient and predictable process, within the context of KRS 224.01-400 and 224.01-405, to
promote voluntary cleanup and redevelopment of properties suspected of environmental
contamination." KRS 224.01-510. Under VERA, any person may apply to enter certain
property into the program by submitting a Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program
("VERP") application and a nonrefundable application fee. Certain properties, such as NPL sites,
TSD facilities, property at which an environmental emergency exists, and property subject to
enforcement or certain closure/corrective action requirements, are ineligible for the program.
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After receipt and acceptance of an application, the applicant and the Cabinet shall
enter into an agreed order setting forth mutual responsibilities with respect to the project,
including requirements for site characterization and corrective action as well as a remediation
compliance schedule. See KRS 224.01 514-518. Upon successful completion of the corrective
action plan and submittal of a completion report, the Cabinet shall issue to the applicant a
covenant not to sue. KRS 224.01-526. The covenant not to sue, however, does not apply to a
number of enumerated items under the statute, including criminal liability, petroleum storage
tanks, natural resources damages, unknown conditions, anq claims based on changes in
standards, among others. See KRS 224.01 526 (7).
Pursuant to VERA, the Kentucky General Assembly also required the Cabinet,
within one year of its effective date (June 21, 2001), to promulgate regulations establishing
standards for Kentucky's general cleanup statute and defining tiered remediation management
options that account for current and proposed land use, zoning, and the nature and extent of
contamination. The current standards contained in the EPA's Region IX Preliminary
Remediation Goals are established as screening levels (not cleanup standards) to be used by the
Cabinet. See KRS 223.01-530.
In response to VERA's mandate, the Cabinet submitted proposed regulations to
the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission on June 28, 2002. That regulatory package
included "Kentucky Risk Assessment Guidance" and sought to detail requirements for site
characterization plans, site characterization reports, corrective action options, and other aspects
of site closure. The regulatory package resulted in significant public comment and opposition,
and as a result the proposed regulations were withdrawn on January 14, 2003.
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UNIFORM ENVIRONMENTAL COVENANTS ACT
The recent amendments to CERCLA and the statutory and regulatory activity
regarding brownfields in Kentucky emphasizes the evolving trend toward risk management of
environmentally impacted property where some measure of contamination is left in place. In
such situations, determining what type of clean-up or risk management is appropriate based upon
the reasonably anticipated future land use is critically important to understanding and using
appropriate engineering and/or institutional controls at a site. For example, a portion of the
property may be paved or otherwise capped to manage risks associated with soil contamination
left in place, while a slurry wall or groundwater treatment system may be implemented in order
to manage risks associated with groundwater contamination. Such engineering controls may
require routine periodic inspection or operation and maintenance attention, and may include
various site restrictions and affirmative obligations applicable to the sites and occupants. Such
institutional controls may also include access agreements for remediation and/or monitoring
activities by PRPs.
Recent efforts have sought to codify the use and application of institutional
controls at sites where contamination may be managed in place. For example, ASTM
International (fka The American Society for Testing and Materials), has issued a guidance
document entitled "Standard Guide for Use of Activity and Use Limitations, Including
Institutional and Engineering Controls" E2091-00, in an effort to provide guidance concerning
the correlation of institutional controls and risk based corrective action. In this context, The
ASTM guide defines institutional controls as follows:
Legal or physical restrictions or limitations on the use of, or access
to, a site or facility to eliminate or minimize potential exposures to
chemicals of concern, or to prevent activities that could interfere
with the effectiveness of a response action, to ensure maintenance
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of a condition of 'acceptable risk' or 'no significant risk' to human
health and the environment.
See ASTM Standard E2091-00, Section 3.1.2. Such "institutional controls" may include
proprietary controls (i.e., traditional property law), state and local government controls (i.e.,
zoning, water/well use advisories), statutory enforcement tools (i.e., consent decrees and other
agency orders or permits), informational devices (i.e., deed notice or restriction), as well as
access controls.
In an apparent attempt to address the perceived need for further codification, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") recently
promulgated the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act, ("UECA") a model environmental
covenant law that could be adopted by all fifty states. The NCCUSL approved the final UECA
at its I 12th Ann~alMeeting on August 6, 2003.
The UECA defines the nature and rights attendant to an environmental covenant
in this context, and sets forth uniform provisions that an environmental covenant "must" contain.
The UECA also suggests "other information, restrictions, and requirements" that the covenant
"may" contain.
The UECA also addresses the validity of the environmental covenant, seeking to
eliminate many of the common law impediments that may undermine confidence in such
instituti<;>nal controls. The Act additionally addresses notice and recording requirements, as well
as duration, amendment, and enforcement of an environmental covenant.
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APPENDIX A
REAL ESTATE & ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
I. The Law
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") - 42 U.S.C. § 9601 eta seq.
1. strict, joint and several liability
2. scope ofPRPs
[a]
[b]
[c]
[d]
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 1876 (1998) (corporate
affiliates and piercing the corporate veil)
Carter-Jones Lumber v. Dixie Distributing Company, 166 F. 3d
840 (6th Cir. 1999) (shareholder and "arranger" liability)
mc Manufacturing Company v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15140 (6th Cir. 1999) (successor liability)
Kelley v. Tiscomia, 104 F. 3d 361 (6th Cir. 1996) (lender safe
harbor)
3. innocent landowner defense
[a] "all appropriate inquiry"
[b] due care requirements
[c] United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F. 3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000)
(inheritance/bequest)
[d] Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3556 (W.D. Ky.1997) (failure to disclose upon sale can
void defense)
4. EPA enforcement policies under CERCLA
[a] contaminated aquifers - 60 Fed. Reg. 34790 (July 3, 1995)
[b] prospective purchaser agreements - 65 Fed. Reg. 1381 (Jan. 10,
2000)
[c] lender liability - 62 Fed. Reg. 36424 (July 7, 1997)
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B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")- 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et. seq.
1. waste management and permitting requirements
2. citizens suits enjoining "imminent and substantial endangerment"
[a] "against any person ... contributing to ..."
3. underground storage tanks ("USTs")
[a] lender safe harbor - 40 CFR § 280.200
C. Clean Water Act - 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq.
1. prohibits the discharge ofpollutants ...
[a] KPDES permit
2. storm water permitting requirements
[a] Phase II storm water regulations - 64 Fed. Reg. 68721 (Dec. 8,
1999)
3. Section 404 dredge and fill permits
[a] recent modification of NWPs - 65 Fed. Reg. 12818 (March 9,
2000)
D. Clean Air Act - 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq.
1. permit and compliance status
2. operational flexibility
3. PSD/non-attainment areas
4. MACT
E. OSHA
1. asbestos containing material
2. disclosure, management and abatement requirements
F. Endangered Species Act
1. prohibition against "taking" endangered species
2. potential impact on development
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G. Comparable State and Local Laws/Regulations
1. KRS 224.01-400
2. KRS 224.01-530
3. Local water district WHPA plans
4. Local wastewater discharge regulations
5. Metro APCD
II. Environmental Due Diligence
A. Buyer's Concerns
1. innocent purchaser defense
2. identify environmental conditions, impacts and use restrictions
[a] avoid liability for pre-existing conditions
[b] ensure operational flexibility
B. Seller's Concerns
1. no contingent residual liability
2. protection from future action/conditions
3. confidentiality/disclosure issues
C. Practical Considerations For Both Parties
1. establish factual baseline
2. reliability of infonnation
3. right to rely on report
4. sufficient infonnation to support business decision/risk allocation
D. Assessing the Assessment
1. transactional screen
2. EPA comfort letters - 62 Fed. Reg. 4624 (Jan. 30,1997)
[a] "purely infonnational only"
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3. Phase I ESA - ASTM E 1527
[a] sufficiency of "all appropriate inquiry"
[b] BCW Assoc. v. Occidental Chern. Corp., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
(E.D.Pa. 1988) (court held that buyer should have investigated
further based on suspicion)
4. compliance audit
5. Phase II investigation and beyond
E. Additional Considerations
1. site access
[a] KC 1986 Limited Partnership v. Reade Manufacturing, 33 F. Supp.
2d 1143 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (claims against consultant as PRP under
CERCLA); KC 1986 Limited Partnership v. Reade Manufacturing,
33 F. Supp. 2d 820 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (claims against prospective
purchaser as PRP under CERCLA)
2. reporting obligations
[a] professional engineers - 201 KAR 18:140(1)
3. referral sources
[a] Lippy v. Society National Bank, 651 N.E. 2d 1364 (Ohio 1995)
4. risk based corrective action
[a] engineering controls
[b] institutional controls
III. Contractual Risk Allocation
A. Identifying Risks
[a] representations/warranties
[b] due diligence
2. Allocating Risk
[a] representations/warranties
[b] indemnity
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[c] escrow
[d] carve out
[e] lease
[f] Insurance
[g] statutory protections
3. Contract Language
[a] definitions
[b] exceptions/schedules
[c] environmental standards/presumptions
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What You Should Know About Environmental Due
Diligence
Becoming an Informed Consumer of Phase I Environmental Site Assessments
Susan C. Bush, PG
Third Rock Consultants, LLC
Abstract
A Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (ESA) is commonly performed on a
parcel of commercial real estate to allow the purchaser to satisfy one of the
requirements to qualify for the innocent landowner defense to CERCLA
liability; and to avoid the acquisition of expensive environmental liabilities.
While there are a variety of different protocols available, E 1527-00 Standard
Practice for Environmental Site Assessment: Phase I Environmental Site
Assessment Process set by the American Society for Testing & Materials (ASTM)
is the most commonly used method today. Users of Phase I ESA's lulled by the
apparent security of a unit price and a widely accepted generic procedure
subject themselves to significant risk if the Phase I ESA does not account for
the complexity of the historical use and the future planned use of the property.
To keep cost reasonable, the standard Phase I ESA is limited in scope, and
therefore, the environmental professional must draw conclusions based on
limited data. This paper will discuss the limitations of a Phase I ESA and will
provide guidance for selecting the appropriate environmental professional.
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INTRODUCTION
Purchasing or leasing property includes the risk of acquiring liability for environmental
conditions caused by previous owners. Many times the cost of addressing these
environmental problems can become a significan~ expense, or in some cases, exceed
the value of the property. The most common protocol for evaluating a property is
E1527-00 Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessment: Phase I Environmental
Site Assessment Process set by the American Society for Testing & Materials (ASTM).
The purpose of this standard is to define good commercial and customary practice for
conducting an environmental site assessment (ESA) on commercial property with
respect to contaminants within the scope of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and· Liability Act (CERCLA) and petroleum products. The
objectives of this standard are 1) to memorialize in writing good commercial and
customary practices for ESAs, 2) to facilitate high quality, standardized ESAs, 3) to
ensure the standard of appropriate inquiry is practical and reasonable, and 4) to
clarify an industry standard for appropriate inquiry in an effort to gUide the legal
interpretation of CERCLA's innocent landowner defense. A properly conducted Phase I
ESA can provide the user with a good general indication of the past and existing
conditions on a property that could indicate the presence of recognized
environmental conditions. A person should be able to decide based on the
information prOVided in a Phase I ESA whether to proceed with a project or
investigate further.
LIMITATIONS OF A PHASE I ESA
While most people dealing in real estate transactions are familiar with ASTM E 1527
standard practice for performing Phase I ESA's, few have actually read the standard
and understand its limitations. One of the objectives in developing the standard was
to ensure that the standard for appropriate inquiry was reasonable and practical. The
ATSM standard was developed to achieve a balance between the competing goals of
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limiting the cost and time demands of performing and environmental assessment and
the reduction of uncertainty regarding unknown conditions on the property. By its
nature, the standard Phase I ESA is limited in scope. It is the responsibility of the user
to understand the scope of the standard and to ensure that the scope of Phase I ESA
services is sufficient to satisfy the needs of their specific project.
The ASTM E 1527-Phase I ESA does not address any requirements of state or local laws
or any federal laws other than the appropriate inquiry provisions of CERCLA's
innocent landowner defense. The standard cautions users that federal, state and
local laws may impose environmental assessment obligations that are beyond the
scope of the ASTM standard practice. The practice goes on to state "Users should
also be aware that there are likely to be other legal obligations with regard to
hazardous substances or petroleum products discovered on a property that are not
addressed in this practice and may pose risks of civil and/or criminal sanctions for
non-compliance. "
A Phase I ESA is not an environmental audit. An environmental audit is the
investigative process to determine whether or not an existing facility is in compliance
with applicable environmental laws and regulations. A Phase I ESA is not as rigorous
or exhaustive as an environmental audit. A Phase I ESA may include the results of a
prior environmental audit, or an environmental audit can include an environmental
assessment based on the requirements of the project. It is important to understand
this distinction when real estate transactions involve facilities subject to
environmental laws and regulations.
The ASTM Standard does not require the environmental professional to check title
records for Environmental Liens or Activity and Land Use Restrictions. It is the
responsibility of the user to hire a title professional to review these records and
report the findings to the environmental professional. This is an increasingly
important point to remember as institutional controls and engineered controlled
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corrective action. options become more popular forms of addressing contaminated
properties.
Most state Brownfield programs allow the land use restrictions and engineered
controls to address contaminated properties. Engineered controls for contaminated
sites such as caps require routine inspection and maintenance in perpetuity. These
duties a~e generally the responsibility of the property owner. .Brownfield programs
also allow land use and activity restrictions to address contaminated property. These
programs typically employ tiered clean-up levels that are dependant upon the land
use. Higher levels of contamination may be allowed to remain on an industrial
property, and therefore, land use controls such as deed restrictions are used to
ensure that the property is not converted to an inappropriate land use such as
residential. In addition, there may be activity restrictions placed on portions of a
contaminated property, such as prohibiting any type of surface disturbance in an area
of contamination that has been capped.
The availability of record information on property is highly variable between sources.
The ASTM Standard does not require the environmental professional to identify,
obtain, and review every possib~e record that may exist for a property. The ASTM
Standard specifies what information must be reviewed from standard sources, and
requires the environmental professional to only review those records that are
reasonably ascertainable from those sources. The ASTM Standard defines reasonably
ascertainable as 1) information that is publicly available, 2) information that can be
obtained from its source within reasonable time and expense' constraints, and 3)
information that is practically reviewable. The phrase reasonable time and expense
in the ASTM Standard means that the information can be obtained in 20 days from the
date of the request and at a nominal charge that is intended to cover the source's
cost of retrieving and duplicating the information. Information is considered
practically reviewable if it can be reviewed for information relative to the property
without the need for extraordinary analysis of irrelevant data.
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There are other environmental considerations that the user of a Phase I ESA may wish
to address that are not covered under the current ASTM Standard. These
environmental considerations are commonly referred to as non-scope considerations.
While these non-scope considerations are not necessarily related to environmental
contamination, they can still represent a significant financial liability and delay and
limit future development plans for a property. Non-scope considerations include but
are not limited to:
• Asbestos Containing Materials
• Radon
• Lead-Based Paint
• Lead in Drinking Water
• Wetlands
• Regulatory Compliance
• Cultural and Historic Resources
• Industrial Hygiene
• Health and Safety
• Ecological Resources
• Endangered Species
• Indoor Air Quality
• High Voltage Power Lines
Whether or not it is appropriate to include any of the non-scope considerations into a
Phase I ESA is entirely dependant upon the specific needs of the project, the nature
of the property being assessed, and the level of risk the prospective purchaser is
comfortable assuming. The user should consult with the environmental professional
and then determine what scope of services is appropriate for the particular project.
The following table is intended to assist in selecting some non-scope considerations
that may be appropriate for inclusion in a Phase I ESA based on the type of property
and future use.
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Wetlands, Endangered Species, Cultural 8:
Historic Resources, Ecological Resources
Asbestos Survey, Lead-Based Paint
Asbestos Survey, Lead-Based Paint, Radon, High
Voltage Power Lines
Asbestos Survey, Lead-Based Paint
SELECTING AN ENV'IRONMENTAL PROFESSIONAL
Commonly lenders require a Phase I ESA when arranging a property loan, just as they
do a title search. Because Phase I ESA's have become a familiar part of the loan
routine, many prospective purchasers view them as a pre-defined, unit-priced
commodity. A Phase I ESA should be viewed as a professional service and not as a
commodity. The first thing to remember is to hire a professional.
In the past few years, the market has become saturated with providers of Phase I
ESA's. This has resulted in a price-driven market where high volume and minimal
effort on the part of the Phase I ESA provider has dominated. The expertise and
qualifications of individuals performing Phase I ESA services is highly variable. Their
training can range from a three-day course to a degreed professional with over
20 years of experience. Since many users of Phase I ESA services consider it a
commodity, where the only difference in the service is price, it is not uncommon for
users to "shop around," and the only question they ask the environmental professional
they are considering hiring is "how much"? The result can be a Phase I ESA that is
inexpensive when invoiced, but financially disastrous when recognized environmental
conditions are overlooked resulting in environmental litigation later.
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Although there is a recognized standard for performing Phase I ESA's, the quality and
scope of Phase I ESA's produced varies widely. This is due to the fact that the ASTM
Standard allows a great deal of flexibility in performing the Phase I ESA and leaves
many decisions to the judgment of the environmental professional. The ASTM
Standard states that an environmental professional, which is defined as a person
possessing sufficient training and experience necessary to conduct a site
reconnaissance, interviews and other activities in accordance with the ASTM
Standard, must perform the Phase I ESA. The environmental professional must also be
capable of evaluating the information generated by the Phase I ESA and rendering
opinions and conclusions regarding the presence of recognized environmental
conditions on the property.
Although some states have prescribed minimum qualifications for performing a Phase I
ESA, most states, including Kentucky have not. An ESA requires interdisciplinary skills
and it is therefore difficult to prescribe a narrow set of qualifications. ASTM
Standard E 1527 offers several good criteria for evaluating the technical competence
of an environmental professional. A person contemplating hiring an environmental
professional to complete a Phase I ESA would be well advised to consider some of the
points below.
1. Formal education of the individual,
2. Any environmental site assessment training in the classroom or field,
3. Length of time the individual has been conducting Phase I ESAs,
4. Experience of the individual in performing the scope of services required for
the type of property being evaluated,
5. Familiarity of the individual with the current Practice E 1527, (This practice
has undergone several revisions since it's initial development)
6. Sample reports prepared by the individual, and
7. References who have used the individual's services.
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If a firm employs the environmental professional, some additional criteria that can
assist you in your evaluation of the firm include:
1. Quality assurance/quality control procedures used in the review of the Phase I
ESA conducted by individuals employed by the firm.
2. The firm's internal risk management program to manage the risk associated
with the conduct of Phase I ESAs.
3. The firm's standard terms and conditions, including any limitations to liability.
4. The firm's errors and omissions professional liability insurance policy including
the amount of coverage, limits, deductibles, and exclusions.
Many environmental professionals providing Phase I ESA services advertise the fact
that they do not perform Phase II or Phase III services. They view this as a positive
point because there is no impetus for them to identify recognized environmental
conditions on a property simply to generate additional work through a Phase II
investigation. While many users may view this as a positive factor when selecting an
environmental professional, there is also a down side. If recognized environmental
conditions are identified as a result of a Phase I ESA, the user will have to hire
another firm or individual to provide Phase II services should they wish to continue
with the evaluation of the property. The firm or individual performing the Phase II
service will have to spend additional time becoming familiar with the property and
the results of the Phase I ESA adding cost and time delays to the project. Performing
Phase II investigations provides valuable experience in the conduct of a Phase I ESA.
Persons experienced conducting Phase II investigations have a better understanding of
contaminant release mechanisms, contaminants migration pathways, and where they
are commonly found. This experience will allow them to identify potential
recognized environmental conditions on a property more readily than someone lacking
this experience. It is ultimately up to the Phase I ESA user to decide which of these
factors are most important in achieving the goals of the project.
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The bottom line is that the user is the one ultimately responsible for making an
appropriate selection when hiring an environmental professional. Select your
environmental professional on qualifications first, then negotiate the price afterward.
USERS RESPONSIBILITIES
ASTM Standard E 1527 also includes responsibilities of the user in assisting with the
identification of recognized environmental conditions on a property. If the user has
any specialized knowledge of the property that is germane to recognized
environmental conditions, the user is required to communicate this information to the
environmental professional. This information should be provided prior to the
performance of the site reconn"aissance performed by the environmental professional.
In addition, if the user is aware that the purchase price of the property is significantly
less than that of comparable properties, it is incumbent upon the user to ascertain
the reason for the price differential.
The user should provide the environmental professional with the reason why the user
wants to have a Phase I ESA performed on a property. If this information is not
provided, the ASTM Standard allows the environmental professional to assume it is to
qualify for the innocent landowner defense to CERCLA liability and state such in the
report. Another reason for performing a Phase I ESA may be to identify environmental
conditions that could adversely impact the planned future use of the property. If this
is the case, the environmental professional and user may need to modify the scope of
services of the Phase I ESA to appropriately evaluate the property in light of its
intended future use.
The user and the environmental professional should work jointly to define the
appropriate scope of a Phase I ESA.Each Phase I may differ based on the complexity
of the property being evaluated, the future intended use of the property, and the
level of risk that the user is willing to assume.
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One of the most important things to remember is to begin the Phase I ESA as early in
the process as possible. Too often the Phase I ESA is a last minute consideration just
before the scheduled closing date. Waiting to the last minute does not afford the
environmental professional adequate time to thoroughly review existing
documentation on the property and to consider the unique aspects of the project.
Few governmental agencies can locate records for the property, duplicate them, and
forward them to the environmental professional in less than a week. Tight time
constraints placed on the environmental professional may result in important
information not being evaluated. In addition, if recognized environmental conditions
are identified as a result of the Phase I ESA, the user doesn't have ample time to
conduct further evaluation of the property. These types of delays just prior to a
scheduled closing can kill the real estate transaction. Performing a Phase I ESA
should not be a lengthy project, but allowing 30 days is a reasonable and prudent
time frame. More time may be necessary to complete a complex Phase I ESA such as
those performed on properties with a long industrial history.
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I. LOADING THE GATE-FILING OF PETITION AND TIME FOR FILING
A. Petitions from an adverse final determination must be filed within thirty days of
receipt of final decision \ or actual notice
KRS 224.40-410(2) and 401 KAR 100:010 § 13
Suggestion-In your petition or entry of appearance include your e-mail address
along with regular mail address and phone number.
B. Timely filing is jurisdictional -
Jenny Wiley Health Care Center. v Com. Ky.
828 S.W.2d 657 (1992)
Fox v. House
Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet. AOF-22371-042 (1995). ( The case of the errant word processor).
YOU CAN USE THE FAX. 502-564-4973 (follow with a hard copy)
400 KAR 1:090 § 4.
C. What constitutes actual notice \ newspaper advertisements.
1. In permit construction cases, deadline in newspaper may extend the filing
period for someone who has received a letter notifying him or her of the
Cabinet's decision to issue a construction permit.
SORE v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
DWM-21955-042 (Prehearing Conference Report 1995)
2. Surface mining anomaly
Some decisions characterized as being final aren't really fmal at all.
Appolo Fuels, Inc v Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet, PDH-22738-042 (Rendered 1996)
Citizen complaint letters \ referral for investigation
D. Surface Mining Cases ( A special note).
Kentec v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
2002-CA-001239-MR Slip opinion - July 25,2003
Pending Motion for Discretionary Review - Prepayment provision of
405 KAR 7:092 § 3 struck down. Case is not yet final.
E. Filing upon receipt of an NOV - Should you file?
1. Cabinet's position \ Not a final determination. Final determination is
made when violation is abated and agency conference with violator has
taken place.
2. Position taken by some in the environmental community.
Filing has the effect of resolving issues quickly.
3. But premature filing may have the effect of delaying settlement of the
case within the agency. On the other hand, Cabinet has sometimes
waited almost five years to file an Administrative Complaint.
F. When to Intervene and status of Intervenors when principal parties are trying to
settle. 401 KAR 100:010 § 11.
G. Naming of a Third Party Defendant.
Can't be done without Cabinet consent.
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I. Petitions initiated by client \ Unauthorized practice of law issues.
Petitions will be accepted with a warning letter.
If retained after petition has been filed you need to promptly file entry of
appearance and amended petition.
II. THEY'RE OFF-FIRST PREHEARING CONFERENCE
Contrary to the wording of 224.10-420 (1), a formal hearing is NEVER scheduled in
the Administrative Summons. There will ALWAYS be at least one prehearing
conference.
A. Time for filing of amended petition.
1. Without leave prior to filing of Answer
2. Thereafter, at anytime with leave of Hearing Officer so long' as it does
not have the effect of delaying the case or causing prejudice to the
Respondent.
3. Preferred practice - File a complete Amended Petition. Not an
addendum.
·4. Multiple Amended Petitions can be dangerous to your case and
exasperating to the Hearing Officer.
B. Acquainting the Hearing officer with the issues \ detailed vs. cursory petitions
C. Scheduling of formal \ status conference
1. Please bring your calendar
2. Consult with client prior to conference as to his schedule and whether he
is willing to mediate.
D. Keeping the hearing officer in the loop \ Failing to appear
1. Don't settle the case and then forget to tell the Hearing Officer.
2. Show cause procedures.
III. THE FIRST TURN- REFERRAL TO MEDIATION -
A. An overview of 400 KAR 7:090 § 7
B. Tips for an effective mediation conference
1. Don't agree to mediation simply because you think it may please the
Hearing Officer. You are making a commitment to explore settlement of
case in good faith.
2. Avoid the temptation of viewing mediation as an opportunity to conduct
discovery.
3. Have a representative with full authority to settle present at conference
or make sure you have clear authority to settle.
4. File complete answers to forms submitted in mediation packet. Your
opponents and hearing officer will not see them. This is definitely not
the time to be coy.
5. Mediation is NOT arbitration - don't try the case.
6. In private sessions with mediator be candid as to your expectations and
what you can reasonably expect from the process.
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7. Don't expect to win everything. Remember the goal in mediation is to
create as much as possible a win-win situation. It is not a "I win \ you
lose" process.
IV. DOWN THE BACK STRETCH-DISCOVERY ISSUES
A. Overview of 400 KAR 1:040
B. Tips for more effective discovery practice
1. Response to Interrogatories must be filed in Office of Administrative
Hearings.
2. Timing for the filing of depositions
We have limited storage room and overworked administrative assistants
Don't file depositions until you have to. See 400 KAR 1:090 § 15. Must
be filed if it is being quoted or referred to in any motion or is referred to
during the formal hearing.
NOTE: Just because it is filed, it is not in the Formal Administrative
Hearing record until you move for its admission as an exhibit. It is
permissible to use the transcript that is in the file, if pre-filed before the
hearing.
3. Motions to compel \ Waiving of time limits for Responses to Motion to
Compel. \ Filing of proposed order. 400 KAR 1:040 § 10.
See also Motion practice under 400 KAR 7:090 § 9.
a. When to set-
Generally Thursday mornings are reserved for arguments
concerning motions. Discussion of Hearing Officer's calendar.
b. Requirement of certificate of good faith effort to resolve
But, it is not good practice to set out in motion copies of the
correspondence concerning the issue.
4. Making your motion understandable
Utilization of bullets \ brevity is NOT a bad thing.
5. Making the call to your opponent before the motion conference.
Now that you have your opponent's attention - give him \ her a call.
6. If you resolve the issues, it is quite all right to cancel the motion hearing.
But keep the Hearing Officer in the loop and file motion to withdraw
motion to compel along with agreement.
7. Filing of electronic copy of motion and order
In this instance, filing of a proposed order would be helpful.
v. AT THE TURN-FINAL PREHEARING CONFERENCE \ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION \ MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
A. Motion for Continuance - Construction of 400 KAR 1:090 § 11.
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When is "good cause" an absolute requirement. As a general rule, if the motion'
is opposed or a continuance has been previously granted, hearing officer will
want to make a finding of good cause. In additi0n, we have an informal policy
that a case needs to be disposed of (or at least heard) within one year of filing.
B. Motion practice pertaining to Motions for Summary Disposition
1. Overview of 401 KAR 100:010 § 3(4) and 400 KAR 1:090 § 9
Steelvest applies to administrative hearings.
2. The pesky "accompanied by an order rule." See § 9(9) ,and (10).
Does it really apply to Motions for Summary Dispo~ition. Not
really, but get permission first.
3. Practical Elements of Summary Disposition
a. Statement of facts \ Putting yourself in the Hearing
Officers head \ Necessity of his making a record. This is
not the place to be making an argument.
b. Alternative - Joint stipulation of facts
c. Affidavits and depositions
Don't be chintzy with the extracts- give the hearing
officer some context for referenced material.
d. Brevity is king. Be kind to the Hearing Officer
e. Attaching authorities.
Hearing officer can readily access statutes, SW Reporters
and regulations. Anything else, you need to supply a
copy. DO NOT USE SPIRAL BINDERS.
f. Submit an electronic version of Motion. (optional).
C. The Final Prehearing Memorandum
1. Must be filed - Failure to file or filing of incomplete prehearing
memorandum can have a disastrous effect on your case. Rebuttal
evidence and witnesses do not have to be listed.
2. If done properly can be an excellent resource for the Hearing Officer and
for yourself.
3. Use it as a tool for organizing your case.
4. Don't overlook the issues to be decided and the necessity of outlining the
elements of the regulation that has to be proven.
5. First opportunity to address issue of penalty and factors supporting your
case concerning amount of penalty.
D. Organization of documents \ Pre-hearing agreements
1. Meeting with the opposition. \ best opportunity to settle.
2. Joint exhibits in complex cases \ Use of file folders
3. Joint stipulations
4. Waiving of foundation requirements
5. The looming problem of digital photographs and electronic documents.
VI. THE FINAL STRETCH-FORMAL HEARING
A. The case in chief.
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1. Its an administrative hearing \ not a jury trial \ Rules of admission are
more flexible
BUT don't bury the hearing officer in exhibits.
2. Educating the Hearing Officer \ KISS
3. Issues about hearsay \ limited use of objections \ Scintilla rule
4. Dual witnesses \ Calling witnesses out of order
5. Document .management
In making copies don't forget the Hearing Officer
If you anticipate marking up an· exhibit, make an extra one that will not
be marked.
B. Penalties (enforcement cases). I
1. NREPC v. Maggard, DWM-19198-038 (1994)
(penalties factors in general - derived from EPA standards)
2. NREPC v. Cumberland Wood and Chair, DOW-18965-042 (1998)
Individual liability for corporate owners is a possibility in limited
situations where direct control or responsibility for a hazardous waste
facility is shown.
3. Specific points to keep in mind.
a. Documentation of extent of environmental harm
b. Documentation of remedial costs.
c. Emergency response costs are not penalties
d. Penalty issues probably need to be addressed during discovery as
well.
f. Other Maggard factors.
4. Making a recommendation of penalty to the Hearing Officer. Yes you
are going to win, but it doesn't hurt to have a Plan B.
5 How many days to access - usually when observed, but there are
exceptions. (Continuing environmental harm - damaged stream
situations).
VII. COMING DOWN TO THE WIRE- POST HEARING ISSUES
A. Identification of issues \ make the hearing officer tell you what he is thinking
B. Writing the post hearing brief
Filing of Findings of fact \ your chance to be a hearing officer. See comments in
Section V B above. Filing of electronic documents is strongly encouraged.
VIII. CALLING ON THE STEWARDS\ FILING OF EXCEPTIONS
A. Timing for exceptions
1. Must be. FILED (not mailed) within 14 days of receipt in Chapter 224
cases. Within 14 days of service. KRS 224.10-440. KRS
350.0301requires exceptions to be filed says within 14 days of service.
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Response can filed within 21 days of service. A DRAFT
SECRETARY'S ORDER MUST BE FILED with the Exceptions.
2. Three day mail rule is NOT applicable.
3. The oddity of not being a1?le to response in Chapter 224 cases. (but some
do anyway)
B. What needs to be included in exceptions \ the issue of preservation.
Discussion of Philpot and Swatzell below.
1. Philpot v. Tourism Development Cabinet
2001 CA-000347 MR
2002 WL 538467
Chapter 13 B does not require the I filing of exceptions to preserve issue
for circuit court review.
Oral arguments were held on 5/15/03. Clerk said the case is still "out to
court. "
2002-SC-000374 / 2001-CA-000347 / 00~CI-00928
2. Swatzell v. Com, KY. 962 S.W.2d 866 (1998)
Failure to file exceptions constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
3. It would be prudent to file exceptions.
C. Procedure by which exceptions are reviewed.
IX. NO ROSES FOR YOU \ APPEALS
1. Appeals must be filed in the Franklin Circuit Court on Chapter 224
actions.
2. Chapter 350 cases involving an enforcement action, bond forfeiture, or
penalty assessments can be filed in either the court where the mine site is located
OR in the Franklin Circuit Court. KRS 350.032 \KRS 350.0301. All other
appeals from a final order (mainly permitting actions) MUST be filed in the
Franklin Circuit Court.
3. Certification of record.
Contact Jane Wingate when you need to have a record certified for
Circuit Court review. Please note: All exhibits are sent to Circuit court.
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FILED
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY ,;UC 2 11995
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRO~~~~~~~~~it~:zCABINET OFf~CE O~ ~Or.1JN!~TMT.I~H~~G~
PERMIT NO. 836-0025
Increments # 15 & 20
UTICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
PETITIONER,
. Vs. -HEARING OFFICER'S REPoRT
AMl2
RECOMMENDED SEcRETARY'S oRDER
NATURAL RESOURCES AND-
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET,
IN RE: BRASHEA COAL COMPANY, INC.
**** ****
RESPONDENT.
I. INTRoDUe1-'IoN
THIS REPORT AND PROPOSED ORDER pertains to a Motion to Dismiss filed by
the Cabinet on July 17, 1995. In its -Motion, the Cabinet seeks to dismiss a Petition fued by
Utica Mutual Insurance Co, hereinafter referred to as Utica Mutual, which was seeking a
review of the Cabinet's determination to administratively forfeit, pursuant to 405 KAR 10:050,
the performance bonds associated with a surface disturbance and reclamation permit, Permit
No. 097-0050, issued to Brashea Coal Company. As its justification fo~ the dismissal, the
Cabinet noted that the Petitioner had acknowledged that its Request for Administrative Hearing
had not been filed within thirty (30) of its receipt of the Cabinet's Determination to Forfeit
Bond. It should be noted that the Petition was accompanied by a request that the Petition be
accepted as timely filed due to the efforts of counsel to substantially comply with the
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requirements of 405 KAR 7:090 §9. Accompanying the Motion was an Affidavit executed
under oath by the Hon. Tom Roma, the contents of which have not been disputed by the
Cabillet. In the Motion and Affidavit, counsel stated that the request had been initially mailed
well before the deadline for filing, but due to an error in printing of the envelope, the Petition
was returned by the U. S. Postal Office as being undeliverable due to insufficiency of address.
Thereafter the Petition was promptly mailed to this Office but was received after the expiration
of the deadline for a timely filing of the Petition.
A Prehearing Conference on this matter was held on August 9, 1995. Appearing for
Utica Mutual was the Hon. Tom Roma; the Hon Greg Higgins appeared for Brad Smock, who
is the attorney representing the Cabinet. At that time, the Hearing Officer entertained oral
arguments on the record as to both the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for an Enlargement of
Time in which to File Petition, which for purposes of this Report is being treated as a response
to the Cabinet's Motion. In· essence, counsel for the Petitioner argues that the Petition should
be accepted because he had substantially complied with the Cabinet's regulations by initially
mailing the Petition prior to the last day for a timely filing of the Petition.
II. FINDINGS of FAcT AND coNcLuSIoNS of LAW
Based on the foregoing Pleadings and ~otions and taking into consideration the record
as a whole, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
1. The Petitioner, Utica Mutual Insurance Co, is a surety company authorized to
do business ·in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and is the issuer of Surety Bond Su 44953 and
Su 44958 which a~e the performa.nce bonds issued to the Cabinet guaranteeing the complete
performance of reclamation work and achievement of post nlining land use on Permit No. 836-
0026, Increments 15 and 20 respectively.
2. On May 10, 1995, the Cabinet issued a Determination of Bond Forfeiture with
respect to Su 44953 and cited as justification for the forfeiture" the Permittee's violation of the
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Cabinet's Regulations pertaining to off-permit disturbance and liability insurance. On that
same day, the Cabinet also issued a Determination of Bond Forfeiture with respect to Su
44958, and stated as its justification the failure of the Pennittee to abide 1)y the Cabinet's
regulations pertaining to off-permit disturbance, backfilling and grading, and maintenance of
liability insurance.
3. On June 13, 1995, Tom Roma, counsel for Utica Mutual prepared and signed
the Petition for Administrative Hearing and also prepared a letter addressed to Ms. Jane
Wingate, Chief Clerk, Office of Administrative Hearings requesting her to file the Petition and
to issue a summons.
4. On that same date, Mr. Roma's secretary prepared envelopes for mailing of the
Petition. Although Mr. Roma' s "secretary typed the full address for Jane Wingate which
included the city, ~tate, and zip code onto her·word processor for preparation in printing the
envelope, the printer deleted the last line of the address.
5. Mr. Roma' s secretary apparently did not detect the printing error at the time she
affIXed postage to the envelope and mailed it.
6. On June 20, 1995, the envelope containing the original Petition was returned
due to an insuffici~nt address. A true and correct copy of the envelope, as returned, is
attached to Mr. Roma's affidavit as Exhibit "B It •
. .
7. A Petition was actually received on June 22, 1995, and was filed in the Office of
Administrative Hearings. A Summons and Order Setting Prehearing Conference was issued
by this Office on Juile 26, 1995.
8. In the Motion to Accept Late Filing, it was admitted by Mr. Roma that the
Petition was not filed within thirty days of receipt of the Determinations of Bond Forfeiture.
9. The Cabinet has filed a Motion to Dismiss and relying on the provisions of 405
KAR 7:092 Section 9 has requested that "the Petition be dismissed.
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10. 405 KAR 7:092· Section 9 provides that any person adversely affected by a
determination of the Cabinet may file with the Office of Administrative Hearings a petition for
a reView of that determination. According to the regulation such petitions:
ttshall be filed within thirty (30) days after the petitioner
has had actual notice of the determination complained of, or
could reasonably have had notice. Failure ·to timely file a
petition for review shall constitute a waiver of an administrative
bearing and the petition shall be dismissed.. (Emphasis added)
11. Counsel for the.Petitioner seeks to avoid the consequences of this provision by
arguing that he was in substantial compliance with the regulations and had timely mailed the
Petition. The Petitioner also asserts that but for the unfortunate hiccup of his printer, the
petition would have been timely received. No supporting authority, however, is offered for
the acceptance of the late filing.
12. The terms of the regulation are mandatory and allow no latitude for a late filing.
It has also been the consistent position of this Office and the Secretary that the timely fuing of
Petitions, when it is mandatory that they be fued within a particular period of time, is
jurisdictional. When such petitions are filed late or out of time, the Hearing Officer cannot
consider them. See Valley Watch, Inc., v. N.R.E.P.C,. File No. DWM-22232-042.
13. The appellate courts have also addressed this issue and have similarly
determined that the timely ·filing of a petition in accordance with anadministrative agency's
procedural regulations is mandatory and jurisdictional. In a case very similar to this one, the
Cabinet for Human Resources (CHR) had a regulation requiring any person issued a violation
to file a request for an administrative hearing within twenty days of receipt of the written
1 The authority for this regulation is derived from KRS 350.0301 (1) which allows any person adversely
affected by a Cabinet determination to petition for an administrative hearing provided that such petitions are rtied
within thirty days of actual notice or within thirty days of the date that the Petitioner could reasonably be expected
to have notice.
notice of the violation. See 900 KAR 2:020. The Petition was mailed by the Petitioner and
received one day past the last day for timely filing. Notwithstanding the arguments that the
petit~er had made a good faith effort to timely file and that the court should extend its
substantial compliance rationale as expressed in Ready v. Jamison, Ky., 765 S.W. 2d 479
(1986), the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected these arguments and affIrmed the dismissal of
the petition. See Jenny Wiley Health Care Center v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human
Resources, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 657 (1992).2
14. In so holding the· Court noted that the rationale expressed in the Jamison
decision was only applicable to procedural errors occurring after the timely and proper filing
of a notice of appeal. In the case under consideration, the Court analogized the timely filing
of a Petition for Administrative Hearing to that of a Notice of Appeal. In order to trigger the
reviewing tribunal t s jurisdiction, the applicant has a mandatory duty to strictly comply with
the procedural requisites for invoking the agency jurisdiction. See Jenny Wiley v. Com, supra
at 660-661. The Court also -expressly rejected the argument that a timely mailing was the
functional equivalent -of a timely filing. The Court noted that to allow a timely mailing to
substitute for timely filing would in effect be a judicial rewriting of the regulation, a drafting
exercise it declined to perform. In accordance with this case is the recent decision of Fox v.
House, 42. K.L.S. 13, dis. rev. pend. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that the mailing
of notice of appeal by overnight express which arrived late was not substantial compliance and
could not excuse the dismissal of the appeal.
15. Although there are few certainties in this life, one of them is that a failure to
strictly adhere to the filing requirements of a regulation, statute or court rule will be
universally fatal to the belated action. In this case, a malfunction of a computerized printer
has regrettably resulted in the Petition being filed out of time. Neither substantial compliance
2 To add insult to injury, the last day for filing fell on a Sunday when the State office was closed" The
Court declined to construe· KRS 446.030 (1)(a) to allow the petitioner to have his request construed as being
timely filed as of first available day the office was open. -
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nor excusable neglect can confer jurisdiction over this action when the jurisdiction over this
matter has expired as an operation of law.. Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer has no
choice but to conclude that he must recommend to the Secretary that he fmd that the Petitioner
has waived its right to an appeal and that the Petition be dismissed.
III. REcoMMENDATIoN
The Hearing Officer respectfully recommends to the Secretary that he sign the
attached Order fmding that the Petitioner has waived its right to an Administrative Hearing
and that the Petition which was not filed in conformity with 405 KAR 7:092 Section 9 be
dismissed ..
So RECOMMENDED this thec:>l/.".. day of 4V<:$vsr , 1995 ..
AMES L. DICKINSON
HEARING OFFiCER
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
35-36 Fountain Place
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
(502) 564-7312
RIGHT To FILE EXCEPTIONS AND REPLIES
Pursuant to KRS 350.0301, any party may file Exceptions to this Report and Recommendation within
fourteen days of service of this Report. Any party may submit a written response to the Exceptions within
twenty-one (21) days of service of the Report and Recommended Order. Thereafter, the matter shall stand
submitted to Secretary, who shall consider the Report, any Exceptions and Responses, and the
Recommended Order and decide the case.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true "and accurate copy of the foregoing HEARING OFFICER'S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER was, on this ~/Sr day of AV6~s-r
1995},mailed by frrst-class mail, postage prepaid to:
Hon. Thomas E. Roma, Jr.
Parker & 0'Connell
1540 Providian Center
400 West Market Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Utica Mutual Insurance Co.
180 Gevesee Street
New Hartford, NY 13413
and hand delivered to:
Hon. S. Bradford Smock
Office of Legal Services
Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet
Fifth Floor, Capital Plaza Tower"
Frankfort, KY 40601
~d«&~~
DO~T COORDINA'f()
Distribution:
James L. Dickinson, Hearing Officer
Division of Field Services
Prestonsburg Regional Office
LTS
NCJ
e:\docs\aof\22371.006
jld 08\17\95 (ND) .
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COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
FILE NO~ AOF-22371-042
PERMIT NO. 836-0025
Increments # 15 & 20
UTICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
PETITIONER,
vs. SEcRETARY'S ORDER
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET,
IN RE: BRASHEA COAL COMPANY, INC.
*********
RESPONDENT.
The Hearing Officer, James L. Dickinson, having submitted a Report and
Recommended Order, recommending the dismissal of the above-styled action and the Secretary
having considered the Report, any exceptions and replies, and being otherwise sufficiently
advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows,
1. The Hearing Officer Report, dated A(.h~t/:5'7 ~ / , 1995, is
HEREBY ADOPTED AND INCORPORATED herein as if set forth verbatim.
2. The Petitioner has WAIVED its right to an Administrative Hearing by failing to
timely., file a Petition contesting the detennination of bond forfeiture.
3. The above styled action is D!SMISSED with prejudice.
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4. This is a FINAL and appealable Order.
SO ORDERED this the __ day of , 199_
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
.ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD,
SECRETARY
APPEAL RIGHTS
Pursuant to KRS 350.032, any person aggrieved by a Final Order of the Secretary may obtain a review of the
Order by filing in the Circuit Court of county within which the mine (surface mining permit) is located or in the
Franklin Circuit Court a Petition for Review. Such Petition must be filed within thirty (30) days of the entry of this
Order. A copy of the Petition must be served upon the Cabinet.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing SECRETARY'S ORDER
was'"on this __. day of , 199_, mailed by fIrst-class mail, postage
prepaid to:
Hon. Thomas E. Roma, Jr.
Parker & 0'Connell
1540 Providian Center
400 West Market Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Utica Mutual Insurance Co.
180 Gevesee Street
New Hartford, NY 13413
Brashea Coal Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 5
Manton, KY 41648
and hand delivered to:
Hon. S. Bradford Smock
Office of Legal Services
Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet
Fifth Floor, Capital Plaza Tower
Frankfort, KY 40601
DOCKET COORDINATOR
Distribution:
James L. Dickinson, Hearing Officer
Division of Field Services (Bond Forfeiture Section)
Division of Field Services
Prestonsburg Regional Office
NCJ
BF/Order File
LTS
JK
-. e: \docs\aot\22371.007
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET JtJL \, ) '996
FILE NO. PDH-22738-042\PDH-22739-042 ~' DFFtrOF ADMINISTRATIVE Hf.ARJNGS
PERMIT NOS. 807-5137\807-5104 . .
APPOLO FUELS, INC.,
PETITIONER,
vs. ORDER of THE SECRETARY
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET,
**********
RESPONDENT.
THIS MATTER being before the Secretary upon the issuance of a Report and
Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer, James L. Dickinson, and the Secretary having
considered the Report and Recommended Order, and any Exceptions and Responses thereto,
and being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
I. The Hearing Officer's Report filed in the Record on f'r\ ~ ~}~3 "
1996, is ADOPTED AS THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OJLAW in this
matter and is incorporated herein by reference and made a part hereof, as if set forth verbatim.
2. The Respondent's Motions to Dismiss the Petitions filed by Appolo Fuels, Inc.
are GRANTED and the Petitions are DISMISSED without prejudice.
3. This is a FINAL AND APPEALABLE ORDER.
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SO ORDERED this J\5'\hday Of __C)~~~--¥-O-------'1996.
ES E. BICKFO
ECRETARY
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
APPEAL RIGHTS
In accordance with the provisions of KRS 350.0305 and KRS 350.032, any person or party aggrieved by a
Final Order of the Secretary resulting from a hearing may obtain a review of the Final Order by filing in
Circuit Court a Petition for Review. Such Petition must be ftled within thirty (30) days after the entry or
rendition of the Final Order, and a copy of the Petition must be served upon the Cabinet.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing SECRETARY'S ORDER
was, on this ~d.ay of ~, 1996, mailed., postage prepaid, to:
HON JAMES R GOLDEN
DENHAM GOLDEN & NAGLE
PO BOX 398
MIDDLESBORO KY 40965
APPOLO FUELS, INC.
P.O. BOX 1727
MIDDLESBORO, KY 40965
and hand delivered to:
Hon. Ronald P. Mills
Office of Legal Services
Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet
Fifth Floof, Capital Plaza Tower
Frankfort, KY ~0601
elm &nt~
DOCKET COORDINATOR
Distribution:
James L. ~ickinson, Hearing Officer
Division of Permits
Middlesboro Regional Office
NCJ
WestLaw
BAF\Order File
LTSr, e.-\ c\ Se.r 0\C€~
J~
e: \docs\pdh\22739.010
"
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filED
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
NATURAL RESOURCES AND MAY 23, 1996.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
FILE NO. PDH-22738-042\PDH-22739-042 OfIAg Of ADMOOSJRAIJVf Hf.AR1H8S
PERMIT NOS. 807-5137\807-5104
APPOLO FUELS, INC.,
PETITIONER,
VS. HEARING OFFICER t S REPoRT
AND
RECOMMENDED SECRETARY'S ORDER
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET,
* * * * * * * * * *
RESPONDENT.
THIS CONSOLIDATED REPORT AND RECOMMENDED SECRETARY'S
ORDER stems from consideration of Respondent's Motions to Dismiss two Petitions for
Administrative Review. In,.the Petitions, Appolo Fuels, Inc., hereinafter "Appolo" challenged
two determinations (one for each permit) of the Division of Permits, Department of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement stating that Appolo in accordance with 405 KAR
18:010, Section 6, must provide a plan for protection against a sudden release of water. In its
Motions to Dismiss, the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, hereinafter
"Cabinet," argued that the one of the Petitions had not been timely filed; alternatively, the
Cabinet urged the dismissal of both Petitions because they were an attempt to review a
determination of the Cabinet that was not yet final.
Oral arguments on this matter were conducted at Prehearing Conference held on
February 8, 1996. At that time, the Hearing Officer announced that the Cabinet's contentions
concerning the reviewability of the Cabinet's determinations were well taken and that
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accordingly, he would recommend to the Secretary that Appolo's Petitions be dismissed
without prejudice. This Report and Recommended Order sets forth the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of~Law supporting this recommendation.
I. FINDINGS of FAcT
Based upon a consideration of the Appolo '.s Petitions for Review and the attachments
made thereto, the Cabinet's Motions to Dismiss and a consideration of the Record as a whole,
the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact:
1. Appolo is a corporate entity authorized to transact business in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and is the holder of Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation
Operations Pennit, Nos. 807-5137 and 807-5104. As issued by the Division of Permits, the
Permits authorized the performance of underground mining with surface effects. Permit No.
807-5137 was issued on December 4, 1992; Permit No. 807-5104 was issued on March 16,
1988 and renewed in October of 1993.
2. The Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet is a duly
authorized agency of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and is empowered under the provisions
of KRS Chapter 350 and the regulations promulgated thereto to issue Surface Coal Mining and
Reclamation Operations Permits and is also authorized, among other things, to conduct mid-
term reviews in accordance with 405 KAR 8:010, Section 19.
3. On December 12, 199~, the Department for Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement amended 405 KAR 18:010 by adding new Section 6. This new provision created
a standard requiring underground coal mines to provide a buffer zone of unmined coal. The
purpose of this regulations was to protect against a sudden release of accumulated ~waters from
the underground mine. This regulation was an implementation of Reclamation Advisory
Memorandum (RAM) No. 114, as issued by the Department on May 3, 1994.
4. On May 15, 1995, the Division of Pennits informed Appolo that it would be
conducting a mid-term review on both Permits in accordance with 405 KAR 18:010~ Section
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19. Subsequently, on September 29, 1995, the Division issued a letter to Appolo ordering
Appolo to submit certain modifications to Pennit No. 807-5137 including the following:
Item 12.2: The permittee must provide a plan for protection
against a sudden release of water accumulated in underground
workings to the land surface in accordance with 405 KAR
18:010, Section 6, as amended on December 12, 1994. The plan
must include the calculation of the width of the unmined barrier
of coal and show it's (sic) location on the MRP [Mine
Reclamation Plan] Map. (Brackets supplied)
5. An identical detennination was made by the Cabinet with respect to Permit No.
807-5104 on November 14, 1995. As to both determinations, the Cabinet noted that the
Permittee was to file with the Cabinet Mid-Term Review Modifications within seventy-five
days of the date of the letter. According to the Division of Permits, failure to do so could
result in enforcement action by the Division of Field Services. Neither of these letters,
however, indicated that Appolo could request an Administrative Hearing.
6. With respect to the determination letter of September 29, 1995, Appolo directed
a letter to the Division of Permits on October 23, 1995, requesting the Division to provide
findings supporting the Order for Modification. On October 30, 1995, the Division of Permits
responded to Appolo by noting that the letter of September 29, 1995, constituted the Cabinet's
findings. The letter also indicated that these findings were subject to administrative and
judicial review pursuant to 405 KAR 7:092, Section 8.
7. Appolo 's Petition requesting a review of this determination was filed within
thirty days of receipt of the Cabinet's October 30, 1995 letter. Appolo's request for a review
of the Cabinet's November 14, 1995 letter was also filed within thirty days of receipt.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Hearing officer makes the following
Conclusions of Law for consideration by the Secretary:
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8. In its Petitions, Appolo argues that the Cabinet's determinations should be
rescinded on the grounds that the letters did not contain any findings as to why permit
modifications to accommodate the requirements of 405 KAR 18:010, Section 6 were
necessary. This argument is premised on Appolots contention that under 405 KAR 8:010,
Section 19, the Cabinet cannot order that the permit be revised or modified without first
entering fmdings supporting its Order. Appolo also argues that the Cabinet's review process
is arbitrary and capricious in that the Cabinet was not requiring other permittees, whose
permits had already been through the mid-term review process, to modify their permits.
Finally, Appolo contends that 405 KAR 18:010, Section 6 violates KRS 13A.130, which
prohibits the promulgation of legislation more stringent than the federal regulations governing
the surface mining program. It is not disputed that the Federal Surface Mining Program does
not have a provision comparable to this regulation.
9. The Cabinet responded to these assertions by first arguing that one of Petitions
had not been. timely filed. As to both Petitions, the Cabinet further argues that
notwithstanding the language in the October 30th letter which stated that the determination
could be reviewed by this Office, the letters ordering modification of the permits were not the
type of determinations from which Appolo could seek administrative review.
10. At this point, it should be observed that Appolo also sought Temporary Relief
under 405 KAR 7:092, Section 12, on these determinations in AppoLo FueLs Inc., v.
N.R.E.P. C., File Nos. TRH-22738-037 and TRH-22739-037. In that action, the Hearing
Officer considered arguments similar to the ones now being raised by the Cabinet and
concluded that the Cabinet's argument concerning AppoIo's failure to timely file a Petition was
without merit. According to t~e Temporary Relief Hearing Officer, the company acted
reasonably when it promptly requested an elaboration of the Division's order requiring Appolo
to modify its ~ermit and thereafter filed its request within the regulatory time period. This
Hearing Officer agrees with that decision. As noted, Appolo filed its Petition within thirty
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days of being informed by the Division that the September 29, 1995 letter was in fact a finding
and arguably subject to review. Under these facts, Appolo timely filed its Petition.
11. The only question left to be resolved then is whether the Division of Permits
made a determination of sufficient finality concerning the provisions of 405 KAR 18:010
Section 6, that it can be effectively reviewed by this Office for recommendation to the
Secretary. The starting point for this inquiry lies with the nature of the mid-term review and
the provisions of 405 KAR 8:010, Section 6.
12. Under the provisions of 405 KAR 8:010 Section 19, the Cabinet is to conduct a
review of any permit that has been issued. Such reviews are to be conducted at midterm of the
permit or every five years, whichever is more frequent. Once the review is completed, the
Cabinet is authorized to issue an order requiring revision or modification of the pennit as may
be needed to ensure that the pennit remains in compliance with the regulatory program.
Under 405 KAR 8:010, Section 19(4), these determinations are subject to administrative
review upon the filing o( a Petition for Review in accordance with 405 KAR 7:092 Section 8.
13. As noted, the Cabinet directed Appolo to submit a plan for protection against
the sudden release of water from the underground workings of both permits. This requirement
had first been suggested in RAM No. 114, where the Department notified the regulated
community in 1994 that due to a rash of "blowouts" of large volumes of water from
abandoned underground workings, it was strongly recommending that underground mines
institute the practice of leaving a coal barrier that would be equal to fifty feet in width plus an
additional distance equivalent to the maximum hydrostatic head that c'ould be reasonably
expected to build up on the outcrop barrier. These provisions became the heart of the new
regulation. As will be discussed. below, however, the regulation, itself was not quite as
stringent as the RAM, nor was this formula cast in stone.
14. The central focus of AppoIo's arguments with respect to the Cabinet's "order"
that it should set forth a water protection plan is its contention that the Cabinet made this
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request without having first made any findings. 1 Ironically, it is precisely this argument which
calls into question whether there is any substantive issue to be reviewed at this time.
15. Under 405 KAR 8:010, Section 19, the Cabinet is mandated to review permits
to ensure their continued compliance with the regulatory program. Aft~r the issuance of these
permits, 405 KAR 18:010 Section 6 became effective, and thus, it became incumbent upon the
Division of Permits during the mid-term review process to remind Apollo that it would have to
submit a plan indicating how it intended to comply with this new regulation. That the
regulation could be retroactively applied in this instance, see KRS 350.230, cannot be
disputed; nor can it be seriously disputed from the Cabinet's perspective that Appolo would be
required to comply with those provisions.
16. 405 KAR 18:010, Section 6 states in pertinent part:
(1) Except where surface openings are approved in the
pennit, an unmined barrier of coal shall be left where the
underground workings dip toward and approach the land surface.
the cabinet shall~ this requirement if it determines that the
proposed operation meets all other applicable requirements of
405 KAR Chapters 7-24 and KRS Chapter 350 and also meets
. either paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection:
(a) The applicant has demonstrated In the pennit
application to the satisfaction of the cabinet, based upon the
geologic and hydrologic conditions in the pennit area, that
accumulation of water in the underground workings cannot
reasonably be expected to occur; or
(b) Adequate measures to prevent accumulation of water
in the underground workings have been included in the permit
As previously d~scussed, Appolo argued that the review process itself was arbitrary and capricious in
that it only ordered some but not all of the Permittees to start the process of modifying their permits. As a general
rule, arguments relying on an allegation of selective enforcement are not well received. Appolo also argued that
this regulation was invalid because it was allegedly more stringent than the federal regulatory program. Questions
of stringency and validity of regulations are within the province of the judicial branch and are not subject to being
reviewed by this Hearing Officer. See Cannonsburg EnvironmentaL Associates, LTD v. NREPC, DWM-20748-042
(1995) See also NREPC v. R.H. Minerals of Western Kentucky, File No. APD-11593--043 (1995) where the
Secretary in reversing a Hearing Officer1 s decision stated that "stringency" issues are not for the Hearing Officer
to decide. In any event, given the fact that the Cabinet's determinations are not reviewable, these issues have
been rendered moot and will not considered.
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application and have been approved by the cabinet. (Emphasis
added)
17. The outcrop barrier provisions are somewhat different from most of the
Cabinet's regulations in that they afford a number of options to the permittee as to how the
objectives of the regulation are to be met. In addition, the regulation was specifically crafted
in such a way as to deal with the question of how permittees, who had finished mining in a
given area prior to the enunciation of the new provisions, were to retroactively comply with
the regulation. Contrary to Appolo t s concerns that it would be faced with an impossible
condition, the regulation is quite clear that there are several alternatives to the requirement of
maintaining a barrier of coal in conformity with the fonnula set forth in the regulation. It
should also be noted that in addition to these alternatives, the regulation specifically provides
that in the event a barrier is detennined to be needed, the Cabinet on a case-by-case· basis
could approve a barrier less than the required minimum. In short, there is nothing absolute in
this regulation. It is also clear that a fmal determination as to the nature of the plan is
dependent upon the information submitted by the permittee.
18. Given this interpretation of the regulation, it is evident that Appolo
misunderstood the import of the Cabinet's mid-term review letters. It is also clear, however,
that some confusion could have been avoided if the Cabinet had pointed out in its letters that
while a plan would be needed, the plan could consist of an assertion, supported by relevant
data, that the p~rmittee would be eligible for a waiver of the barrier requirement or that some
amount of unmined coal less than the minimum width would be sufficient. As the Cabinet
notes, this letter was not drafted by an" attorney, and thus it is understandable that there may
have been some confusion as to what was being requested. 2
2 The Division of Permits seemingly signaled its own opinion that this determination was not yet ready for
an administrative review ~ when it omitted the language usually found in such letters stating that the Modification
Order was subject to administrative review under 405 KAR 18:010, Section 19(4). Unfortunately the Division
compounded the confusion when, after being pressed for a clarification of its September 29th letter, it stated in its
letter of October 30 that the determination~ subject to review. In contrasty the November 14,1995 letter, which
dealt with the remaining permit and was virtually identical to the September 29th letter, again made no mention of
the administrative review process.
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194 In any event, it is clear, notwithstanding the literal text of the letter itself, that a
reviewable determination had not yet been made. 3 In reality, the Cabinet was not ordering
Appolo to do anything, other than to start the process of accommodating itself to this new
regulation. Thus, at this stage of the mid-tenn review process, the Cabinet did not need to
make any factual findings. The only relevant legal finding that at this juncture had been made
was that a new. regulation had been promulgated, and Appolo would have to demonstrate its
entitlement to a waiver or demonstrate that its Permit was already in confonnity with the
outcrop barrier provisions. Appolot s argument that the Cabinet did not have any facts upon
which to make a decision serves only to reinforces this point.
20. In the final analysis the question is one of whither what remedy? In its Petition,
Appolo requests that the pennitting letter be rescinded and that the matter be remanded to the
Division of Permits so that it can make specific findings. In suggesting this remedy, Appolo
ignores the fact that the information needed by the Division of Permits to make any kind of
reviewable determination rests exclusively within the Appolot s domain. Whether the Hearing
Officer agrees with Appolo' s request and issues a report recommending to the Secretary that
this matter be remanded or whether the Hearing Officer agrees with the Cabinet and issues a
report recomm~nding that the matter be dismissed, the result in either case will be exactly the
same: Appolo will be obliged to submit information to the Division of Permits. Posited this
way, there is no question that the September 29 and November 14 determinations are not
reviewable.
21. In agreement with this conclusion is the recent Order of the Secretary in Willig
v. N.R.E.P.C. et ai., File No. DOW-22769-37 (Order issued April 23, 1996,) which discussed
in the context of a different iss~e the question of finality and the purpose underlying an
administrative review of Cabinet permitting determinations. In that case, the Hearing Officer
who concluded that a determination made by the Division of Water was not subject to review
3 The Temporary Relief Officer also reached the conclusion that at this point in the review process there
was nothing to review. See Order Denying Temporary Relief at p. 2.
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who concluded that a determination made by the Division of Water was not subject to review
because it was not a final determination, cited to the well understood principals of finality as
enunciated in Abbott Laboratories v.Gardner,387 U.S.136, 87S.Ct. 1507, 18 L .Ed. 2d 681
(1967). In that case, as well as several others, the key question was whether the agency had
made a preliminary or final decision. If the decision was preliminary? with other action to
follow, the initial determination, absent some compelling hardship, was ordinarily not subject
to review. City of Jersey City v. Hodel, 714 F. Supp. 126 (D.N.I. 1989). The Hearing
Officer in the ,Willig case also noted that adherence to this principal served the purpose of
avoiding haVing the Secretary become enmeshed in an on-going pennitting review process.
Once a reviewable determination is made, then and only then, should this Office become
involved in the permitting decision. 4 The decision made by the Division of Permits, which in
effect was a request for more information, is such a decision and is therefore not subject to
review at this time.
22. In conclusion, although an argument can be made that the literal language of
405 KAR 8:010, Section 19 implies that a review would be available from~ determination,
this regulation, as well as its enabling legislation KRS 350.0301, conditiollS.such reviews upon
a finding that the petitioner is ttaggrieved." There is also an implied requirement, as discussed
above, that the review process would result in a final remedy, thereby avoiding a piecemeal
review of an agency's ongoing review process. In the context of this case, where it is clear
that the Cabinet's letters were in effect a request for more information, there is no substantive
basis supporting Appolo's assertion that it was aggrieved by the Division's statements. In
addition, given the fact that the Division of Permits needs additional information in order to
determine whether a coal barrier is n~eded, there is no effective remedy to be accorded to
4 It should be pointed out that in Willig, the Hearing Officer was applying the provisions of KRS 224.10-
410 which specifically provides that only certain types of final permitting decisions were subject to administrative
review. Irrespective of the precise language of the reviewing statute, the case is relevant to this Report with
regard to its analysis of the judicial doctrine of a need for fmality so that an effective remedy can be given by the
Courts.
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Appolo at this time. In short, once a determination is made as to what would be required for
the issuance of a modified permit and assuming the Petitioner is aggrieved by that
determination, it can then have the matter reviewed. by this Office.
III. REcoMMENDATIoN
In' consideration of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer respectively recommends that the
Secretary sign the attached Order granting the Cabinetts Motions to Dismiss and Dismissing
without prejudice Appolo ts Petitions for Administrative Review.
SO RECOMMENDED this ;;~ day Of_(h-=---_c..._~~c__' 1996.
RIGHT To FILE EXcEPTIONS
Pursuant to KRS 350.0301, any party may file Exceptions to this Report and Recommendation within
fourteen days of service of this Report. Any party may submit a written response to the Exceptions within
twenty-one (21) days of service of the Report and Recommended Order. Thereafter, the matter shall stand
submitted to Secretary, who shall consider the Report, any Exceptions and Responses, and the
Recommended Order and decide the case.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing HEARING 0fECER'S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED SECRETARY'S ORDER was, on this d 3 day of
lli~ ~ ,1996, mailed, postage prepaid, to:
()
HON JAMES R GOLDEN
DENHAM GOLDEN & NAGLE
PO BOX 398
MIDDLESBORO KY 40965
APPOLO FUELS, INC.
P.O. BOX 1727
MIDDLESBORO, KY 40965
and hand delivered to:
Hon. Ronald P. Mills
Office of Legal Services
Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet
Fifth Floor, Capital Plaza Tower
Frankfort, KY 40601
lstribution:
James L. Dickinson, Hearing Officer
Division of Permits
Middlesboro Regional Office
LTS
NCJ
e:\docs\pdh\22739.009
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COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
FILE NO. DWM-21955-042
SAVE OUR RURAL ENVIRONMENT, A CITIZENS ACTION
GROUP COMPRISED OF DENNIS BICKETT, ELAINE GLENN,
GENE GLENN, DELBERT GLENN, JAMES GLENN, SHELLY
GLENN, LORRAINE HAYDEN, JEROME MCCARTHY, RUTH
ANN MCCARTHY, JOANNE MOORE, STEVE MOORE AND
AMY SYNDER,
PETITIONER,
VS. PREHEARING CONFERENCE REPORT
AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS, GRANTING MOTION
TO AMEND PETITION AND SCHEDULING FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
and DAVIESS COUNTY,
RESPONDENTS.
IN RE: DRAFT PERMIT
APPLICATION NO. 030-00004 LC3 NWI
* * * * * * * * * *
This REPORT, pertains to a telephonic Prehearing Conference held on January 6, 1995, at
2:00 p.m. EST. Present for the Petitioner, Save Our Rural Environment, was the Hon. Mark
Feather. Present for the Respondent, Daviess County, were ,the Hons. Allen Holbrook, William
R. Dexter and Robert M. Kirtley. Present in person for the Respondent, Natural Resources
Environmental Protection Cabinet, hereinafter Cabinet, was the Hon. Kathryn Matheny. The
following recounts the events that transpired at that proceeding.
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This case was initiated by the filing of a Petition and Request for Administrative Hearing
by a group bearing the acronym of SORE (Save Our Rural Environment). In the initial Petition,
SORE announced that it was aggrieved by a determination made by the Division of Waste
Management that it would issue to Daviess County a permit authorizing the construction of a
contained waste disposal landfill in Daviess County. By way of summary, SORE in its original
Petition argued that the Division's determination was arbitrary and capricious in that the permit
application submitted by the Respondent, Daviess County failed to set forth an (1) adequate
explosive gas plan, (2) a satisfactory leachate collection system which would comply with the
regulatory requirements, (3) consistent representations concerning the slope of the proposed liner
and (4) adequate provisions for the testing of the leachate storage tanks. In addition to these
. allegations, SORE also argued that the plan was deficient in that the proposed site was unstable
due to the existence of mine spoil which was inadequately compacted. Finally, the Petitioner
maintained that the Cabinet failed to give sufficient consideration to the potential impact of
earthquakes. The Petition/letter was filed with the Division of Waste Management on November
14, 1994.
Daviess County reacted to this Petition by immediately filing a Motion to Dismiss. In its
Motion, the Respondent argued that the Petition had not been timely filed under the auspices of
KRS 224.10-420 in that any Petition protesting a final determination of the Cabinet must be filed
within thirty days of actual notice of the Cabinet determination or within thirty days of the date
the petitioner could have reasonably had notice. In addition to this allegatioll, Daviess County
also argued that SORE was not a person with standing to file an administrative complaint and
that in any event SORE had already been heard in this matter and was not entitled to an
administrative hearing on the matter. To a certain extent, Daviess County noted its frustration
with the Petition in that it did not know exactly who the members were of this organization.
Nevertheless based on the information that it did have, it argued that SORE was on notice as to
the decision to issue the construction permit as early as September 27, 1994 and as late as
October 11, 1994.
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Given the urgency of the matter, an initial Prehearing Conference was held on December
9, 1994.1 At that time, the Petitioners had not filed a written response to the Motion to Dismiss.
After some argument on the matter, this Deputy Hearing Officer directed the Petitioner to submit
a Motion to Amend its Petition and to file with the Office a verified Amended Petition setting
forth the names of the particular individuals of the organization who were aggrieved by the
Cabinet's determination. In addition, the Deputy Hearing Officer directed the Petitioner' to
supply information as to ~hen the various members knew of the Cabinet's decision to issue
Daviess County a construction permit for its contained landfill. A Second Prehearing
Conference was scheduled for January 6, 1995.
By the date of the Second Prehearing Conference, the Petitioner had filed a Response to
the Motion to Dismiss, a Motion to Amend Petition and a verified Amended Petition in support
of its Request for an Administrative Hearing. Of particular note is the fact that the verified
Amended Petition, as attested by counsel for SORE, set forth the names of some, if not all, of the
membership of SORE, characterized as being a citizens action group. The Amended Petition
also alleged that the various members lived close or adjacent to the proposed contained landfill
and specifically alleged that the construction permit as approved would present a danger to the
Petitioners' health and the environment in which they lived. The specifics of the alleged
deficiencies were set forth in the original Petition as filed on November 14, 1994 and have been
recounted above.
.Also on file at the date of the Prehearing Conference was an extensive Response as filed
by Daviess County. The Cabinet, which is a Co-Respondent in this matter, has not sought to
dismiss the Petition and has declined to endorse the positions taken by the opposing parties in
this matter.
1 Under the provisions of KRS 224.40-310 (6) construction cannot begin until there is a Final Order of the
Secretary. Thus, while this matter is pending, Daviess County is effectively stymied from commencing any
activities at the landfill site. This delay is of particular concern to the County in that the Henderson County
Landfill, which is the current recipient for Daviess County's solid waste, is slated to close in July 1995.
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After hearing oral arguments at the telephonic Prehearing Conference, and being
otherwise sufficiently advised, the Deputy Hearing Officer announced he would issue a Report
overruling the Motion to Dismiss, granting the Motion to Amend and accepting for the purposes
of filing the tendered Verified Amended Petition. The Parties then discussed the necessity of a
prompt formal administrative hearing and were thereafter able to agree on the dates for such a
hearing as well as other prehearing events.
Since this appears to be a case of first impression, the balance of this Report will be
devoted to the rationale supporting the Deputy Hearing Officer's decision. This Report will also
set forth the schedule of events for this proceeding. The principal parties are to be commended
for presenting well-written arguments and discussion of what is an admittedly complex issue
pertaining to the procedure for the timely filing of a Petition protesting the issuance of a
construction permit for a solid waste landfill.
A determination as to whether this Petition was timely filed revolves around two
pertinent statutes. The first, KRS 224.10-420, is the statute most frequently invoked by those
who believe they are aggrieved by a Cabinet's determination. The statute provides in pertinent
part:
Any person not previously heard in connection with the issuance of
any order or the making of any final determination arising under
this chapter by which he considers himself aggrieved may file with
the cabinet a petition....
An order or final determination includes, but is not limited to, the
issuance, denial, modification, or revocation of a permit, but does
not include the issuance of a letter identifying deficiencies in an
application for a permit, a registration or a certification or other
non final determination. This subsection does not abrogate the
right to a hearing on a draft permit afforded by KRS 224.40-310....
The right to demand a hearing pursuant to this section shall be
limited to a period of thirty days after the petitioner has had actual
notice of the order or final determination complained of, or could
reasonably have had such notice.
(Emphasis added)
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As pointed out by the Petitioner, this statute, which was most recently amended in 1992,
pertains only to final determinations and orders of the Cabinet. In addition the statute cross
references to the provisions of KRS 224.40-310 and implies that notwithstanding the lack of
finality, an administrative hearing can be conducted on the Cabinet's initial determination that a
construction permit should be issued to a particular applicant. This contention brings into play
the second key statute, KRS 224.40-310 (6), which provides as follows:
No permit to construct or expand ... shall be issued until at least
thirty days have expired following publication of the application.
The applicant for a permit shall establish the date of publication by
verified affidavit from the newspaper which publishes the
advertisement.2
This section also provides that in the event a hearing is requested, actual construction may not
commence until the Secretary renders a final order in the matter.
From the facts of this case, which are essentially undisputed, it appears the Cabinet
initially determined that the construction pennit could be issued and to that effect sent on or
about September 27, 1994, notification letters to a variety of concerned citizens as well as the
Messenger-Inquirer, the local newspaper. The letters indicated that the newspaper notice of the
decision to issue the permit would be published on September 30, 1994. Evidently, there was an
error in the first notice and consequently, a second notice, dated October 11, 1994, was sent to
Messenger-Inquirer. This Notice was published on October 13, 1994. Set forth in the body of
the Notice was the statement, in conformity with both 401 KAR 47: 140 and KRS 224.40-310,
that requests for an adjudicative hearing by any person who may be aggrieved by the decision
2 The cabinet also has in place a regulation, 401 KAR 47:140 § 11 which provides that informal hearings
and adjudicative hearings, or both, are available for the review of such determinations. Section 11 specifically
provides that requests for an adjudicative hearing must be made within thirty days of the date of publication of the
public notice of the issuance of a draft permit. The public notice, in effect, acts as a cutoff notice for the filing of
such requests in that it would be difficult for any person, save perhaps, Rip Van Winkle, to contend that he could
not reasonably be expected to have notice of the decision to issue the construction permit.
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must be filed with the Division of Waste Management by no later than November 14, 1994.3 See
Petitioner's Exhibit A. Thus, the Cabinet's own publication announced to the public, including
. the members of SORE and its counsel, that the cutoff date for the filing of a timely petition
would be November 14, 1994.
Notwithstanding the language of the Notice, Daviess County earnestly argues that the
citizen petitioners had notice of the Cabinet's decision to issue the permit much earlier than
October 13, 1994 and by its calculations the latest date for actual knowledge of the decision was
October 11, 1994. Relying on the actual knowledge language of KRS 224.10-420, Daviess
County maintains that a request for a hearing at the very latest should have been filed by
November 10, 1994. After due consideration of the statute and the purpose of the public notice
provisions, this argument must necessarily fail because in a very real sense, as will be explained
below, Daviess County is attempting to convert a shield into a sword.
It is well recognized that statutes prescribing a deadline for the initiation of an
administrative proceeding are jurisdictional in nature and a person's failure to timely invoke the
administrative process can deprive an agency of the statutory authority to consider a complaint.
Jenny Wiley Health Center v. Commonwealth, Ky., 828 S.W. 2d 657 (1992). At the same time,
the Cabinet has a compelling duty to consider all legitimate claims that may be filed, especially
in the arena of landfill applications. It would be an understatement to say the least that the siting
of a landfill is of intense concern to the body politic, especially those who may be living in the
vicinity of a proposed landfill. Generally speaking, as reflected in KRS Chapter 224 and the
Cabinet's regulations, the philosophy underlying the Cabinet's permitting decisions is to solicit a
maximum amount of public input and to allow those aggrieved by the Cabinet's determination
broad access to an administrative forum. To that end, the Cabinet's statute for the timely filing of
3 As chance would have it the thirtieth day for filing fell on Sunday, November 13, 1994, a day that the
Division offices are closed. Under KRS 400 KAR 1:030 § 4, as well as KRS 446:030, if the deadline for
performance of a certain event falls on a weekend or holiday, then the date for filing is extended to next available
date the state office is open. In this case, the person who wrote the notice correctly calculated the last day for filing
in conformity with these provisions. See Jenny Wiley Health, Care Center v. Commonwealth, Ky~ 828 S.W. 2d 657
at 658.
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a request for hearing is a very different from the usual prescription for the filing of a request for a
hearing. Under KRS 224.10-420, the time for filing is triggered by the occurrence of one or the
other of two subjective events, either from the date of actual knowledge or from the date the
determination could have been reasonably been known. Taken literally, where there is a dispute
as to the timeliness of a petition, the subjective language of the statute could require an
evidentiary hearing as to when a petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the
Cabinet's determination.
To a certain extent, the uncertainty as to the last day for filing has been mitigated by a
variety of means. As the Respondent pointed out, the regulation pertaining to public comment
on landfill applications sets forth a variety of mechanisms by which notice is given to those
persons or entities who arguably may be aggrieved by the Cabinet's determination. These
mechanisms range from the sending of letters to those individuals who have expressed an interest
in the matter to the compiling of dissemination lists of those organizations and persons known to
have a broad interest in the Cabinet's decisions. The sending of such letters has the effect of
giving actual notice to those who may have expressed a direct concern in the proceedings. Also
included in this arsenal of potential weapons for informing the public, however, is the broad
requirement that all permitting decisions be published in a local newspaper of mass circulation
for the county where the landfill is to be sited. Such notices have the effect of eliminating the
uncertainty as to when a person should have reasonably known of the Cabinet's determination.
Thus, this requirement lends some degree of certainty as to when it can be safely determined that
the deadline for filing a request has expired and the decision is no longer subject to
administrative review. In this case, such a newspaper notice was made which established
November 14, 1994 as the cutoff date.
The Respondent argues that the Petitioners are not entitled to rely on this date given in
the newspaper, but instead must file within thirty days of the date they actually knew of the
decision. This argument cannot be countenanced for the very simple reason that it implies that
each Petitioner is entitled only to actual notice. In other words, the Respondent is reading into
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the statute the requirement that a filing must be made within 30 days of the date the Petitioner
first had actual knowledge of the decision. The statute, however, is broader than the Respondent
would have it. In this case, as in other permitting determinations, there can be a range of
opportunities for the filing of a Request The window of opportunity opens with the issuance and
receipt of the letters that are directly sent to interested persons. It closes with the date given in
the newspaper notice. During that interval, which may be considerably longer than thirty days,
any person, including those who may h~ve previously had actual knowledge, are free to file a
Request for a Hearing, so long as the filing is within the deadline provided in KRS 224.40-310.
Although the Respondent may not like it, the statutes do not reqUire this Hearing Officer to
engage in a calculation as to when each and every petitioner may have received actual notice. It
is sufficient for purposes of determining whether a petition is timely to rely on the date given in
the newspaper notice, so long as it is correctly calculated. Given the circumstances of this case,
and given the fact that no further action can take place with respect to the construction of the
landfill area until the expiration of the comment period, it would be absurd to construe this
statute in such a way as to bar an interested petitioner from relying on the newspaper date, simply
because an earlier notice of the Cabinet's proposed decision may have been received. In short the
Respondent's arguments exalt form over substance and is contrary to the spirit of KRS 224.40-
310, which was designed to maximize citizen participation, not to limit it.
The Respondent's remaining arguments do not require a great deal of discussion.
Although the Respondent may be genuinely perplexed as to the exact identity of its opponent, it
knew or should have know that an organization going by the name of SORE was actively
interested in the permitting proceedings. Whatever confusion there may have been as to the
composition of SORE has now been resolved with the filing of the Amended Petition which
articulated the names of some or all of the citizen action group members and has set forth
sufficient facts to establish the fact that one or more of them may be legitimately aggrieved by
the Cabinet's determination.
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The Respondent's argument that SORE and its membership have already been heard is
equally without merit. The requirement ofKRS-224.10-420 that a "person not previously heard"
may file a petition does not bar those persons who participated in the informal hearing and
comment proceedings from seeking administrative relief in this forum. In the context of the
statute, "previously heard" means previously heard in a formal administrative hearing. Any other
interpretation would have the effect of depriving an administrative hearing to those persons most
interested in the Cabinet's determination. A result that would. to say the least, be somewhat
absurd.
Having considered the Respondent's arguments and being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows,
1. The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED; the Petitioners' Motion to Amend its
Petition is GRANTED and the verified Amended Petition is deemed to be filed as of January 6,
1995.
2. A Formal Administrative Hearing on the issues presented in the Petitioner's Petition shall
be held on Monday, March 20, through Wednesday, March 22, 1995, at 9:30 a.m. CST each
day at a location to be announced in Daviess County, Kentucky. This ·Formal Administrative
Hearing is assigned second case status. Failure to appear may result in an action adverse to the
party failing to appear.
3. In the event the Formal Administrative Hearing cannot be conducted on dates set forth in
paragraph 2, a Formal Administrative Hearing on the issues presented in the Petitioner's Petition
shall be held on Monday, April 24, through Friday, April 28, 1995, at 9:30 a.m. CDT each
day at a location to be announced in Daviess County, Kentucky. This Formal Administrative
Hearing is assigned FIRST case status. Failure to appear may result in an action adverse to the
party failing to appear.
4: On or before February 28, 1995, the parties shall complete discovery with any pleadings
requiring a response being filed at least thirty days prior to the aforementioned cutoff date.
G - 43
5. A Final Prehearing Conference shall be held on March 6, 1995, at 10:30 a.m. in the
Main Conference Room of the Office of Administrative Hearings. The purpose of the Final
Prehearing Conference will be to resolve any issues pertaining to the Formal Administrative
Hearing and to consider any motions that may be filed pursuant to item 7 of this Order. The
Parties may participate telephonically by calling 502-564-7312 at the designated time.
6. By March 6, 1995, the parties shall file with the Office and serve a Prehearing
Memorandum which shall contain the following:
(a) a succinct statement of the facts of the case and the questions of
fact and questions of law;
(b) a listing of all agreed stipulations;
(c) a listing of all exhibits the filing party intends to use at the
hearing;
(d) a listing of all witnesses the filing party intends to call at the
hearing, together with a brief summary (references to depositions
not being sufficient) of the expected testimony ofeach witness;
(e) a listing of all pending motions;
(f) a listing of all anticipated motions in limine regarding evidentiary
questions; and
(g) a brief statement of the status of settlement negotiations, if any,
not to exceed one page in length.
7. All Motions, including Motions for Summary Disposition must be filed in accordance
with 400 KAR 1:090 Section 9. Procedures pertaining to all Motions shall be in accordance
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with the aforementioned regulation. The failure by any party to comply with 400 KAR 1:090
Section 9 may result in a ruling on the motion which is adverse to such party.
SO ORDERED this _ day of , 1995.
JAMES L. DICKINSON
DEPUTY HEARING OFFICER
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
35-36 Fountain Place
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
(502) 564-7312
NOTICE
The Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet does not discriminate on the
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age or disability in employment or the
provision of services and provides, upon request, reasonable accommodation including
auxiliary aids and services necessary to afford individuals with disabilities an equal
opportunity to participate in all programs and activities. Any individual who requires
special accommodations in connection with any proceeding before the Office of
Administrative Hearings should contact Jane P. Wingate at 35-36 Fountain Place,
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 or at (502) 564-7312 (telephone) or (502) 564-4973 (telefax) at
least one week prior to the date the accommodations will be needed.
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I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing ORDER was, on this
__ day of , 1995, mailed by first-class mail, postage prepaid to and
Hon. Mark S. Feather
Brown, Todd & Heyburn
3200 Providian Center
Louisville, KY 40202-3363
Hon. Robert M. Kirtley
Daviess County Attorney
Daviess County Courthouse, Room 202
212 St. Ann Street
Owensboro, KY 42301
Hon. Allen W. Holbrook
Hon. William R. Dexter
Holbrook, Sullivan, Mountjoy et al.
P. O. Box 727
Owensboro, KY 42302-0727
and hand delivered to:
Hon. Kathryn Matheny
Department of Law
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Fifth Floor, Capital Plaza Tower
Frankfort, KY 40601
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Cumberland Wood and Chair
DWM-l8~65-042
Individual Defendants. Accordingly those violations which have been not established by a
preponderance of the evidence and were actively contested by the Individual Defendants
because of the Cabinet's allegation that they were individually liable for their commission
should be dismissed as to all Defendants.
D. Penalties
1. CWC'S Liability
244. In its Motion for Default the Cabinet has requested the maximum penalty of
twenty-five thousand dollars as authorized under KRS 224.99-010 (5) for each and everyone
of the violations cited in the Administrative Complaint. Since CWC has defaulted, the Cabinet
is entitled to a recommendation that it be granted the relief it has requested. Therefore, it is
recommended that the Secretary impose an aggregate penalty of seven hundred and fifty
thousand dollars ($750,000.00) reflecting the maximum $25,000 penalty for each of the thirty
(30) affirmed violations.
2. Individual Defendants' Liability
245. The Hearing Officer determined that the Individual Defendants should be held
liable for the violations of KRS 32:010 § 2 (failure to classify), 401 KAR 35:020 § 6 (general
inspection requirements), 401 KAR 35:030 § 2 (maintenance and operation of drums), 401
KAR 35:030 §§ 3 and 4 (related equipment and testing of equipment), 401 KAR 35:030 § 6
(maintaining required aisle space), 401 KAR 35: 180 (use and management of containers), and
401 KAR 32:030 § 5 (for failure to mark as hazardous waste and state accumulation time).
246. In considering the appropriate penalty to recommend for each violation, the
standard that this Hearing Officer has used in the past is derived in part from guidelines issued
by the EPA, as well as the Cabinet. Those include: 1) the seriousness of the violation, taking
G - 49
into account the complete context of the violation,33 2) the economic benefit (if any) resulting
from the violation, 3) the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, including the cost of
remediation, 4) the history of other violations on the site by this violator, 5) the culpability of
the violator, 6) the good· faith actions of the violator to remedy the violation, comply with the·
law or obey an order of the Cabinet, 7) such other matters as imposition of a just penalty
would require, and 8) the number of days the Cabinet shows the defendant to have violated the
law. See NREPC v. Maggard, DWM-19198-038 (Secretary's Order rendered June 1994).
247. In its Post Hearing Memorandum, the Cabinet suggested with respect to the
Individual Defendants that a penalty of five hundred dollars ($500.00) be imposed for each of
the violations associated with the Drum Violation Area. Since the Cabinet believes the
violation was in existence since August 1988, the Cabinet also suggested that a separate penalty
be imposed for each day of violation, from the date the drums were accumulated in excess of
ninety days to the date the drums were shipped off site. The Cabinet's suggested penalty
would total one hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000) for each Individual
Defendant.
248. There are substantial difficulties with this proposed assessment, not the least of
which is that the Cabinet did not consider the factors listed above, including the Defendants'
ability to pay. In addition, although it is clear that some drums had been accumulated in
excess of ninety days, the evidence did not clearly establish that the drums accumulated in
33 As noted in Maggard, infra, seriousness of the violation should take into account such factors as: a) the
susceptibility of the site to environmental harm of the type concerned in the case, b) the physical, geographic and
chronological extent of the violation, c) the. inherent danger to the environment or human health and safety posed
by a violation of the type concerned in the case, d) the substantive nature of the violation, e.g., whether it is a
reporting violation or a violation of a substantive standard of the law or regulations, and e) whether the violation
is correctable and if so, the type and extent of remedial efforts required to correct the violation, taking into
account any secondary harm to the environment which may be caused thereby.
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April 1988, were still in the Drum Violation Area ninety days later. As Pawlak testified, some
of the drums were being reused by the facility as part of the paint washing process.
249. In addition, cwe and the individual defendants were not issued the violation
until March 6, 1989. Trying to back date the violation to August of 1988, and prior to the
issuance of the Notice of Violation, is entirely too speculative and not supported by the
evidence. Consequently, this suggested penalty is not accepted.
250. In truth, very little evidence was introduced by either side as to all of the factors
listed above. Nevertheless, the Hearing Officer has considered the relative seriousness of the
violations, the cooperation exhibited by Pawlak and Kupchick in correcting the violations and
the appropriate amount of deterrence that can be justified with the imposition of a civil penalty.
Taking into consideration the factors that have been discussed pertaining to the appropriate
. amount of penalty that should be imposed, the Hearing Officer, for the reasons to be discussed
below, recommends that an aggregate penalty of five thousand five hundred dollars
($5,500.00) be assessed against Pawlak and an aggregate penalty of eleven thousand dollars
($11,000.00) be assessed against Kupchick. In support of this recommendation the Hearing
Officer states the following.
Q. As to Pawlak
251. The seriousness of these violations , Pawlak's participation, his culpability, and
his responsibility for the violations have all been addressed. In addition, a penalty should be
large enough to hurt, but not so large as to be devastating. The penalty should also be of an
amount that it will have an appropriate deterrent effect on others, without being ridiculously
large and. thus meaningless to those who are of a similar economic means. One way of
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summing up an appropriate penalty was stated in U. S. E.P.A.. v. Environmental Waste
Management Control, 710 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ind. 1989), where the court said:
A civil penalty must provide a meaningful deterrence without
being overly punitive; it should be large enough to hurt and it
should deter anyone in the future from showing a similar lack of
concern with compliance.
Id. at 1244.
252. At the hearing, Pawlak stated that his annual income was now thirty-five
thousand dollars ($35,000.00), which was not disputed. With respect to Pawlak's present
income, a penalty of $5,500.00 is significant but not devastating and therefore, has a real
impact. In addition, the Hearing Officer finds little or no evidence that Pawlak benefited in
any way from these violations or that the violations contributed in any significant way to his
own economic well being or that of the company. The Hearing Officer also takes into account
that the violations were promptly corrected and that Pawlak attempted to cooperate fully with
the Division of Waste, at least with respect to these violations.
253. Turning now to the basis for Pawlak's penalty for the specific violations, as to
the violation of 401 KAR 32:010 § 2 (failure to classify) and 401 KAR 32:030 § 5 (failure to
mark as hazardous and start accumulation time), the very heart and soul of the hazardous waste
program is the prompt and accurate classification and marking of a hazardous waste.
Recognizing, however, that waste characterization is complex and that Pawlak believed in
good faith he could reuse a material he mistakenly considered to be a reusable product, a
penalty of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), for each of these violations is well supported by
the evidence.
254. As to the violations of 401 KAR 35:030 § 2 (maintenance and operation of
drums), 401 KAR 35:030 §§ 3 and 4 (needed equipment and testing), 401 KAR 35:030 § 6
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(maintaining aisle space), and 401 KAR 35:180 (keeping drums in good condition) all of these
violations in one way or another represented a grave potential threat to the environment and
are only slightly less serious than the failure to classify and mark violations. Accordingly, the
evidence as reviewed above warrants a penalty of eight hundred dollars ($800.00) for each of
these violations.
Finally, as to the violation of 401 KAR 35:020 § 6 (general inspection requirements),
this violation did not represent as grave a threat to the environment as did the failure to
classify. A penalty of three dollars ($300.00) is warranted by the evidence
b. As to Kupchick
255. Many of the same factors that apply to Pawlak, apply to Kupchick as well.
Although there was some unsupported hearsay testimony that Kupchick made a significant
amount of money as president, neither documentary nor direct evidence to this effect was
introduced by the Cabinet. Nevertheless, Kupchick should be assessed a higher penalty
because ultimately he was the sole corporate officer and sole shareholder. The company was
under his direct and active command and it was his decision to bring in Pawlak as plant
manager without providing him adequate training in all aspects. of the plant, including
environmental management. Ultimate authority brings with it ultimate responsibility. Under
the facts of this case, given his higher degree of responsibility, the penalties imposed for the
violations should be double those imposed on Pawlak, for an aggregate amount of eleven
thousand dollars ($11,000.00).
256. In conclusion·, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Secretary impose an
aggregate penalty of seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($750,000.00) against ewe for
the violations that have been proven with a preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, the
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Hearing Officer recommends that Kupchick be assessed a penalty of eleven thousand dollars
($11,000.00) and that Pawlak be assessed a penalty of five thousand five hundred dollars
($5,500.00) as a civil penalty.
E. Remediation
1. Submittal of a Closure Plan
257. In its Administrative Complaint with respect to the remedial measures to be
imposed by the Secretary, the Cabinet made the following request:
That each Defendant be ordered to perform all remedial measures
sufficient to abate the violations cited (~ic) Exhibits Nos. 1
through 11 and to perform all remedial measures necessary to
remediate any and all other existing violations of Kentucky's
Water Quality and Kentucky Hazardous Waste Laws.
In its post hearing brief, the Cabinet stated that since CWC had stored a hazardous waste in
excess of ninety days, CWC was obligated to submit, pursuant to 401 KAR Chapters 34 and
38, a closure permit for CWC as a hazardous waste storage facility. The Hearing Officer
notes that the Cabinet did not specifically put any of the Defendants on notice that part of the
requested remedial measures include the submittal of a closure plan under 401 KAR Chapter
34 and 38. 34 The Cabinet also did not move to amend its Administrative Complaint to conform
. .
to the proof presented at the formal administrative hearing.
258. At the formal administrative hearing, the Cabinet did not present any proof that
the inspectors issuing the Huft\Curry NOV ever requested that cwe submit a permit under
401 KAR Chapter 34 and 38. In addition, the evidence establishes the fact that all of the
34 Since the Hearing Officer has concluded that the Cabinet failed to establish the validity of the Hazardous
Waste Discharge Violations, there is no need to address the question of whether ewc must submit a closure
permit as a disposal facility.
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